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List of Abbreviations

AALCO	Asian-African Legal Consultative Organisation
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APT	ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea)
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
B20	Business 20
BCIM	Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
CA	Content Analysis
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
CPC	Communist Party of China
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
DA	Discourse Analysis
EAS	East Asia Summit
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FM	Foreign Minister
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FYP	Five-Year Plan
G20	Group of 20
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMS	Greater Mekong Sub-Region
GNP	Gross National Product

IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IORA	Indian Ocean Rim Association
IR	International Relations (academic discipline)
IT	Information Technology
LMC	Lancang-Mekong Cooperation
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSR	21st Century Maritime Silk Road
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission, People's Republic of China
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OBOR	One Belt, One Road
PRC	People's Republic of China
QualCA	Qualitative Content Analysis
R&D	Research and Development
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RMB	Renminbi (currency of the People's Republic of China)
RQ	Research Question
SAA	Speech Act Analysis
SAT	Speech Act Theory
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SCS	South China Sea
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SREB	Silk Road Economic Belt
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UN	United Nations
US(A)	United States (of America)
WB	World Bank

1. Introduction

The research presented in this thesis is concerned with the New Silk Road vision—commonly also known as "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR, 一带一路 Yídài Yílù)[1] or "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) [2]—that has attracted worldwide attention as *the* flagship initiative of open win-win cooperation currently propagated by the People's Republic of China (PRC, thereafter referred to as China). This chapter starts with an introduction of the initiative itself. It then conducts a brief literature review, and concludes with an outline of the research project presented in this thesis.

1.1. China's "One Belt, One Road" Initiative

Over the past few years, the news has been virtually swamped with reports on China's New Silk Road initiative (see e.g. Brown, 2015; Brown & He, 2016; Eisenman & Stewart, 2017; Menon, 2017; Phillips, 2017; Sheehan, 2017; Tiezzi, 2014; Ye, 2014); an initiative that was widely regarded as an unprecedented showcase of President of China Xi Jinping's ambition to "promot[e] global leadership in China's own image" (Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang, 2017). In general terms, OBOR represents a framework for all kinds of activities in the fields of transport, communications, trade, investment and people that are aimed at the promotion of connectivity and cooperation between China and other parties (Elek, 2015). Its contents are thus virtually all-encompassing; and its boundaries difficult to grasp.

The Scope of OBOR

China's OBOR initiative basically consists of two major parts: the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB, 丝绸之路经济带 Sīchóuzhīlù Jīngjìdài), and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR, 21 世纪海上丝绸之路 21 Shìjìhǎishàng Sīchóuzhīlù; see

Figure **1**). The SREB ("the Belt") refers to a network of land-based economic corridors linking China not only with

[1]If not stated otherwise, the Chinese terminology used in this thesis is taken directly from the original Chinese-language blue-print document on OBOR issued by the government of the PRC (see State Council of the People's Republic of China [State Council], 2015b). What is more, this thesis prefers the use of the term OBOR.
[2]This thesis prefers the use of the term "OBOR". It represents the first official English-language translation of the Chinese initiative and has become a term widely recognised not only in the media but also in professional circles (Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2016).




Figure 1. Map of China's OBOR Initiative (Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2017).

Southeast, South and Central Asia but essentially also with Europe.[3] It revolves around the establishment of connective infrastructure such as railways, roads and fibre optic cables along a northern (China's Xinjiang Province – Kazakhstan – Russia – Northern Europe) and a southern (Xinjiang Province – Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan – Turkmenistan – Iran – Turkey– Southern Europe) axis (Leverett & Wu, 2017, p. 125). These routes are complemented with the MSR ("the Road"), which connects China with Europe through sea lines of communication (SLOC) traversing the South China Sea (SCS), the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. The OBOR initiative thereby evokes the notion of the ancient Silk Road in terms of "an iconic Chinese product" that unites the Eurasian and African continent (Liu & Dunford, 2016, p. 326).[4] It is yet misleading to think of OBOR as a set of distinct roads and shipping lanes that connect only those countries that are situated along the historic route; the initiative is much more inclusive as it is open to all countries and organisations that wish to join (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China [MOFA], 2015ak).

Once fully realised, OBOR is said to involve at least 65 countries that together cover 39% of overall land territory and 62% of the world population. All in all, the participating countries may thus account for a minimum of 30% of global gross domestic product (GDP; see Chin & He, 2016, p. 2).[5] More than 30 countries have already signed memorandums of understanding (MOUs) regarding the joint promotion of the initiative, and more than 40 nations are queued up (Liu & Dunford, 2016, p. 325). The countries of Southeast Asia play a particularly important role in the implementation of OBOR since the region marks a crucial point of intersection for the initiative's continental and maritime stretches. Not least because of a seemingly great fit of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum strategy[6] and China's OBOR initiative (Hou, 2017), Indonesia thereby sees itself in a prime position for realising the MSR (Yosephine, 2017). In fact, the country was even termed "the biggest beneficiary" of OBOR in Southeast Asia (Siniwi & Yuniarti, 2016).

[3]See Aoyama (2016, pp. 5–7) for a more detailed account of the six economic corridors of the SREB.
[4]China claims "historic ownership of the Silk Road" in reminiscence of the period between the 3rd century B.C. and the 15th century A.D., when China was a "dominant trade power" linked to Europe via the trade routes of the ancient Silk Road (Fallon, 2015, p. 141).
[5]Godement (2015, p. 1) even speaks of 70% of the world population, 55% of global gross national product (GNP) and 75% of all known energy reserves that are eventually covered by OBOR.
[6]The Global Maritime Fulcrum strategy denotes Indonesia's grand vision to establish itself as a maritime power in the region, e.g. through the advancement of maritime infrastructure connectivity (Saha, 2016, pp. 28–29).

The implementation of OBOR, however, requires enormous financial resources. These funds are largely provided by the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)—"a key arm of the new Silk Road" (Ye, 2015, p. 210)—and the Silk Road Fund, through which China plans to invest a total of US$900 billion in projects under the OBOR scheme (International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 2015, iv). There is good reason for such commitment: OBOR represents a great opportunity for China to deal with its "two major headaches [of] overcapacity and excessive foreign exchange reserve" (Wang, 2016, p. 461), and allows the country to simultaneously open-up at land and at sea, to the east and to the west (Aoyama, 2016, p. 9). The initiative can thus be considered not only as a means for realising "the Chinese Dream" (Aoyama, 2016, p. 20) but also as a successor to the country's Going Out and Going West strategies (Yeh & Wharton, 2016). Yet, the implementation of OBOR is largely dependent on China's handling of various economic, environmental, political and security issues at the internal *and* the external front—not to forget the risk of misperception (see e.g. Leverett & Wu, 2017, p. 130; Wang, 2016, p. 460).

The OBOR Narrative

In 2013, OBOR was officially introduced to the world by President Xi himself (see e.g. Tian, 2016) and has since become the "signature foreign policy initiative" of his presidency (Leverett & Wu, 2017, p. 111). It started out as a mere concept but became gradually more specific; with its core, however, remaining fluid (Aoyama, 2016, p. 7). Against the backdrop of China's ambitions to spearhead "the next wave of Asian regionalism" (Godbole, 2015, p. 301) and the lack of a unified, tangible strategy (Shen, 2016; Yu, 2016, p. 11), the international community is left in confusion—not to say suspicion. Is OBOR merely an economic initiative with a focus on the construction of infrastructure facilities, or is it part of China's grand strategy to expand its sphere of influence after all? Together with the AIIB, the initiative is often put "in the discursive frame of China's development at home and abroad" (Yeh, 2016, p. 276). Despite the country's efforts "to raise […] hopes and dispel […] concerns" by framing its OBOR narrative in terms of soft power politics (Stanzel, 2017) and by issuing a "clarion call of win-win cooperation" (Ruan, 2017), however, the initiative clearly also has a geopolitical narrative (Brown & He, 2016). It does not only represent the most important current advance in promoting deep economic integration (Elek, 2015) but also has the potential to challenge the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) in the region (Ba, 2016) by making China "the center of the world" (Shen, 2016). The initiative's propagated focus on economic matters could therefore not preclude concerns about security implications from being raised by the international community (Brown, 2015). It is thus of utmost importance to find out more about the motives and goals of China's ambitious OBOR initiative.

1.2. Literature Review

As noted by Leverett and Wu (2017, p. 111), Western analyses of OBOR either focus on the domestic drivers of the initiative and the obstacles it faces or stress China's increasingly assertive posture in consolidating regional and ultimately also global hegemony. The general OBOR discourse may thus be divided into two broad camps: one that perceives the initiative as a project promoting—above all—inclusive economic cooperation (e.g. Liu & Dunford, 2016; Summers, 2016; Wang, 2016; Ye, 2015), and another one that treats it primarily as a geo-political strategy initiated by China as part of a greater power game (see e.g. Aoyama, 2016; Leverett & Wu, 2017). Irrespective of this divide, emphasis was often put on only one of the two major arms of OBOR (see e.g. Brewster, 2017; Palit, 2017; Toops, 2016; Tracy, Shvarts, Simonov, & Babenko, 2017), and on regional or country-specific perspectives (see e.g. Casarini, 2016; Diener, 2015; Fallon, 2015; Gabuev, 2016; Grübler & Stehrer, 2017; Hsueh, 2016; Khurana, 2015).

The very nature and purpose of OBOR have also been much debated (see e.g. Aoyama, 2016; Leverett & Wu, 2017; Liu & Dunford, 2016; Tao, 2015). There is, however, a broad consensus that five specific aspects are put forth by Chinese authoritative sources as the main goals of the wider OBOR framework: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bond (see e.g. Swaine, 2015; Wang, 2016; Winter, 2016). Yet, these goals cover almost all fields at all levels of potential cooperation; they shed no light on the *actual* focal points of the initiative *per se*. Some scholars have therefore sought to uncover the real objectives and underlying rationales of OBOR (see e.g. Cheng, 2016; Yu, 2016). To this end, Callahan (2016) applied a constructivist logic in examining the ideas and strategies promoted in speeches by President Xi. Ye (2015), however, delved even deeper into the Chinese OBOR discourse. She conducted elite interviews and analysed Chinese texts to allow for a proper comparison of

OBOR with the supposedly competing mechanisms of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) spearheaded by the United States (US), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) affiliated with ASEAN. Sidaway and Woon (2017) also took Chinese-language writings on the initiative as a basis, however, to relate the OBOR views of China's elite to their geopolitical thinking; and Swaine (2015) examined the commentary of Chinese analysts and observers with regard to the scope, motives and consequences of the initiative.

China's OBOR initiative has thus clearly become a well-researched topic that neglects neither the international nor the Chinese point of view. As was shown in this brief literature review, however, the two perspectives have largely been considered independent of each other by focusing on either the internal or the external dimension. There is a clear lack of thorough analyses combining the two levels by examining the *Chinese English-language discourse* on the main goals of OBOR. Thereby, the initiative's direct association with statements by President Xi represents an important factor to be considered (Summers, 2016, p. 1629); it also suggests a closer examination of the OBOR discourse led by President Xi and other high-ranking Chinese politicians.

1.3. Research Project

As pointed out by Brown and He (2016): "One of the challenges of trying to make sense of the 'One Belt, One Road' strategy […] has been to work out what the idea is trying to express in the first place". Indeed, the risk of misperception is looming large (Wang, 2016, p. 460). Not least due to its fuzzy nature, further research on the initiative's actual focal points is urgently needed. In consideration of the research gap identified in the previous chapter, it suggests itself to look into explicit allusions to the main goals of OBOR made by China's political elite. To find out what image of OBOR China wants to circulate in the international community, the research presented in this thesis seeks to answer the following research questions (RQs):

RQ_1: Is there an evolutionary pattern of the OBOR discourse produced by China's high-ranking politicians?

> RQ_1.1: Which OBOR goals were promoted in speeches by President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang and Foreign Minister (FM) Wang Yi?

RQ_1.2: Does the discourse exhibit role-specific characteristics? Does it change over time?

It was further argued that China pursues a grand strategy of leveraging economic clout "to build a sinocentric 'community of shared destiny'" and eventually become a normative power (Callahan, 2016, p. 228). Accommodating the quality of discourses as "sites of power relations" (Wojczewski, 2016, p. 24) and that speech acts are always accompanied with the assignment of roles (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, p. 216), another set of research questions is raised:

RQ_2: Does China pursue a grand strategy in the allocation of roles with regard to the assignment of responsibilities under the OBOR framework?

RQ_2.1: Which illocutionary acts were performed by President Xi, Premier Li and FM Wang?

RQ_2.2: What do they reveal about the responsibilities and roles envisaged by China for itself and other participating countries?

What is more, Indonesia is "widely regarded as […] the most influential actor […] of Southeast Asia" (Rattanasevee, 2014, p. 121), assuming the natural *de facto* leadership of ASEAN (Emmers, 2014)—in particular with regard to politics and matters of security (Rattanasevee, 2014, p. 118). Indonesia's perception of OBOR is thus likely to have an influence on the overall attitude of ASEAN towards the initiative. Given the role of Indonesia and the importance of the ASEAN-region for the implementation of OBOR, this thesis adds the perception of the initiative as reported by the Indonesian news as an indicator of Indonesia's OBOR stance and a "proxy reality check" of the Chinese discourse to the analysis. The final batch of research questions thus is:

RQ_3: How is the OBOR discourse perceived in Indonesia?

RQ_3.1: How were the above-mentioned speeches and OBOR goals taken up and portrayed by the Jakarta Post, one of the major English-language daily newspapers of Indonesia?

RQ_3.2: Do the illocutionary acts and the (re)actions of Indonesia as reported by the Jakarta Post align?

To answer these questions, this thesis takes constructivism as the theoretical basis and conducts an analysis of the OBOR discourse in the style of Keller (2011). More precisely, the method of qualitative content analysis as conceived by Mayring (2000, 2010) is applied to a specialised text corpus that contains English-language transcripts of speeches by the above-mentioned three Chinese politicians and corresponding English-language online newspaper articles published by the Indonesian Jakarta Post.[7] Furthermore, the notion of illocutionary speech acts is taken up to allow for a better understanding of the roles and power relations involved. To render a comprehensive yet detailed analysis possible, the time frame considered in this thesis is September 7, 2013 (the day of President Xi's first OBOR announcement) to December 31, 2016. An examination of OBOR along the suggested lines is expected to deliver new insights into the nature, main goals and thus also possible impacts of the initiative.

The thesis itself is structured in three main parts. Part 1 (Chapter 1-7) elaborates on the conceptual, theoretical and methodological approach of the research project. It develops an analytical framework which is then applied to the empirical data in Part 2 of the thesis (Chapter 8-9). Part 3 (Chapter 10-11) contains the analytical discussion of the empirical findings in reference to the research-guiding questions raised above. Additional material can be found at the very end of this work (see Appendix A-F).

[7]Special thanks to Tomáš Petrů, PhD for confirming the choice of Indonesian newspaper made for this research.

2. Constructivism

The field of International Relations (IR) is quite diverse, as it differentiates between major schools of thought such as (neo)realism, (neo)liberalism, constructivism and critical approaches. These theoretical traditions evolved in consideration of historical and intellectual contexts, and emphasise certain—sometimes different, sometimes overlapping—aspects of the international realm (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2013). In one way or another, however, they all draw on social theories dealing with agents, structure and related processes (Wendt, 1992, p. 422). In the following, constructivism is briefly introduced as the theoretical foundation of this research.

2.1. Evolution in International Relations

To briefly sketch the emergence of constructivism on the stage of IR scholarship, the middle of the last century becomes the focus of attention. After World War II, realism—with its state-centric, rather pessimistic world view that is primarily concerned with the pursuit of national interests and survival under the conditions of impending war—was the theoretical paradigm of choice (Kubálková, Onuf, & Kowert, 2015, p. 9). The realist dominance, however, was soon to be replaced by the neorealist-neoliberal debate of the 1980's/90's, which revolved around the three main issues of anarchy, cooperation vs. distribution, and absolute vs. relative gains (Powell, 1994). Whereas neorealism states that in the absence of an overarching authority lasting cooperation and thus the pursuit of absolute gains are fatuous (Waltz, 2000), neoliberalism argues that—not least owing to institutions—fruitful cooperation and absolute gains are indeed two realistic options (Keohane & Martin, 1995; Powell, 1994, p. 338). Yet, both schools of thought "suffer from serious internal weaknesses" (Powell, 1994, p. 313). They were criticised for ignoring "the social fabric of world politics" (Checkel, 1998, p. 324), epistemological issues were not addressed (Kubálková et al., 2015, p. 12), and major events such as the end of the Cold War were neither foreseen nor properly explained (Adler, 1997, p. 342). Acting on these shortcomings, a new theoretical approach to IR emerged; one that was first called "constructivism" by Nicholas Onuf in his seminal work "World of Our Making" (1989). It questions popular views of IR scholarship by impugning the ontological and epistemological basis of realism and liberalism (Adler, 1997,

p. 323),[8] and by integrating already established theories with notions of other disciplines in a yet unprecedented manner (Checkel, 1998, pp. 324–326). Some thus construe constructivism as a counterpart to rationalist theories, while others such as Wendt (1992) and Adler (1997) regard it as a new middle ground between popular IR theories (Zehfuss, 2002, pp. 1–5). In any case, it eventually turned out a welcome alternative to "mainstream" IR scholarship (Zehfuss, 2002, p. 253).

But what actually *is* constructivism? Unfortunately, there is not only one correct answer to this question (see e.g. Adler, 1997, p. 320; Pettman, 2000/2015, p. 11). Onuf (2015, p. 58), for instance, denies constructivism the status of a theory altogether, whereas Adler (1997, p. 323) conceives of it as a social theory that serves as a basis for other, more specific IR theories; and for Checkel (1998, p. 325), it is merely a method after all. May it be a theory or a method, it is undisputed that *the* constructivist approach does not exist. Disagreements within the constructivist camp as to what aspects of international relations is to be granted primary importance led to the evolution of a variety of different strands (Adler, 1997; Hopf, 1998; Pettman, 2000/2015). Constructivism thus virtually serves as an umbrella term for several theoretical strands that are each strongly shaped by the works of leading scholars such as Alexander Wendt, Nicholas Onuf and Peter Kratochwil (Zehfuss, 2002, p. 11).

2.2. Common Features

Despite its manifold perceptions, the constructivist project rests on a set of common assumptions. It generally seeks to understand "how the material, subjective and intersubjective worlds interact in the social construction of reality," and "how individual agents socially construct these structures in the first place" (Adler, 1997, p. 330; original emphasis removed). In light of this aspiration, constructivism abandons purely material and static assumptions in favour of sociality and the possibility of change (Fierke, 2013, pp. 188–189). It suggests alternative understandings of key themes of IR by taking up fundamental claims of neorealism—especially with regard to structure, anarchy, and their effects on state behaviour, interests, power and change—and by advancing different views on each concern (Hopf, 1998, p. 181). Contrary to neorealism, however, constructivism conceives structure

[8]Including the ontological and epistemological foundations of their two "neo" spin-offs.

and actors, i.e. states or people (Onuf, 2015, 59–60, 71, 74), as mutually constitutive in the process of creating social reality (Checkel, 1998, p. 326; Zehfuss, 2002, p. 4). As a consequence, "[a]cting *in* the world means acting *on* the world" (Onuf, 2015, p. 68; emphasis added), and the international structure is both material *and* social (Zehfuss, 2002, p. 251). In a similar vein, the constructivist notion of power implies a material and a discursive dimension (Hopf, 1998, p. 181).[9] Anarchy, therefore, is subject to interpretation (Hopf, 1998, p. 181). It is not inevitable (Zehfuss, 2002, p. 4)—it "is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992, pp. 394–395; original emphasis removed).

The constructivist research agenda features some general characteristics. It often starts out with the examination of rules, which are seen as asymmetrical yet relatively stable bridging elements between people and society that provide agents with choice (Onuf, 2015, 59-60, 62–63). Norms are also of great interest because they represent collective understandings that constitute the identities and interests of actors, and thus impact on actor behaviour (Checkel, 1998, pp. 327–328), practices and the international structure alike (Zehfuss, 2002, p. 4). The notions of intersubjectivity (Zehfuss, 2002, p. 252) and collective meaning are therefore central to constructivist research. After all, people act upon the meanings that objects (incl. actors) have for them—meanings that are created through interaction (Wendt, 1992, 396–397, 403). Developing this thought further, objective facts such as money or governments are not objective in the strict sense of the word; they "are only facts by human agreement" (Searle, 1995, p. 1).

[9]Adler (1997, p. 336) makes this point clear in saying that, from a constructivist point of view, "[p]ower […] means not only the resources required to impose one's view on others, but also the authority to determine the shared meanings that constitute the identities, interests and practices of states".

3. Key Concepts

In contemporary social sciences, scholars mainly work with nominal definitions, i.e. definitions that do not claim universal and eternal validity. Instead, their suitability is contingent upon the respective research project (Brosius, Haas, & Koschel, 2012, p. 20). Building on constructivist thinking, this chapter briefly outlines the specific notions of language (including the production of meaning), text and speech as applied in this research because they represent the foundation of the discourse analytical approach proposed in this thesis.

3.1. Language and the Production of Meaning

Constructivists think of language as an integral part of the (social) world (Fierke, 2013, 194, 197), not just a means of communication. Onuf, in particular, advanced the notion of a deliberate use of language, which aims at establishing representations of the world that match people's perceptions and—even more importantly—their wishful thinking (Kubálková et al., 2015, p. 19). Language itself is thus neither neutral nor passive (Pettman, 2000/2015, p. 19); it is rather "the most powerful tool […] for social construction" (Kubálková et al., 2015, p. 19). In the constructivist sense, language can thus be used to produce several "truths" (realities) that are all true (real) in their own right.

Such deliberations raise the question of how meaning is produced. Social scientists often work with a naïve understanding of utterances such as words, by drawing on Aristotle's "aliquid stat pro aliquot"-conception (something stands for something). This notion, however, has been widely replaced by the view that there is no meaning of words, sentences, texts etc. *per se*. Instead, meaning is said to be embedded into social linguistic action (Knapp, 2008, pp. 21–22). In other words, it is socially constructed. Another important concept that needs to be mentioned in this context is that of propositions. A proposition denotes the smallest unit of meaning, i.e. usually the meaning of a simple assertive sentence (Renkema, 2004, pp. 87–88). Applying the terminology of speech act theory (SAT; see Chapter 5), it refers to "the content of the elementary illocutionary act that the speaker of that context would mean to perform if [s]he were using that single sentence literally" (Vanderveken,

2001, p. 38). Discourse analysts thus use propositions as the basis for generating (more or less) explicit interpretations (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002, p. 27).

3.2. Text and Speech

The study of texts is a great means to learn more about language. After all, a text[10] is "an instance of living language" (Yang, 2009, p. 157)—a semantic unit whose meaning is dependent on the very context (Yang, 2009, p. 158). In reference to the Latin roots of the term (lat. *texere*: to weave), a text can further be defined as interwoven units of meaning (Renkema, 2004, p. 48). It not only conveys information but also discloses the intentions of the writer, at least to some extent (Lê & Wang, 2009, p. 30). Due to the contextual relatedness of texts, however, their reception is never objective (Brosius et al., 2012, p. 135); different recipients may elicit different information from one and the same text (Knapp, 2008, p. 22). In spite—or rather just because—of their enormous information content, texts are considered important discourse fragments (Keller, 2011, p. 68). They thus serve as the main objects of discourse analyses (Lê & Lê, 2009, p. 6).

Having elaborated on text in terms of written communication, this paragraph now deals with its (alleged) verbal counterpart—talk; more precisely with a special type of it, namely speech. Strictly speaking, the term refers to a sequence of verbal coherent utterances that are made by a single person in front of an audience with a specific purpose in mind (Schmitz, 2011, p. 698). As argued by Reisigl (2008, p. 243), however, in some respects speeches are texts, too, because they are usually not improvised on the spot but rather prepared in writing. This holds especially true for the field of politics. There, speeches form part of textual chains and "dialogically connected discursive practices" (Reisigl, 2008, pp. 259–260) involving mass media, which often rely on written versions of political speeches (speech manuscripts or transcripts) for their coverage (Reisigl, 2008, p. 256). Such transcripts, therefore, do not only provide record but also allow for elite political discourse to be brought into the public domain (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002, pp. 7–8).

In general, not only talk but also text is implicitly dialogic in the sense that they "can bear the traces of many utterers" (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002, p. 22). Furthermore, both text and

[10]See Lee (2009) for a detailed yet theoretical discussion of the issues involved in defining the actual scope of a text.

talk feature a pragmatic dimension of (proposing joint) action, and a semantic dimension with regard to their role in constructing possible realities (Rocci, 2009, p. 15).

4. Discourse Analysis

Having laid the foundation, this chapter elaborates on discourse analysis (DA) as the overall approach to the research presented in this thesis. It starts out with an introduction of discourse, to then proceed with a discussion of DA and the four concepts of discourse analytical research that are most relevant for this thesis: topics, genres, pragmatics, and text corpora.

4.1. What is Discourse?

The origins of the term "discourse" lie with the Latin word *discurrere* (to circulate; Keller, 2011, p. 14) and suggest that it is about the dissemination of a certain something. Yet, discourse is a fuzzy concept (see van Dijk, 1997, pp. 1–6). It does not only mean different things in different countries but also has different notions within and across academic disciplines (see Keller, 2011, p. 13).

4.1.1. Different Notions and Common Characteristics

Discourse can be generally defined as "a set of connected meaningful sentences or utterances […] by which a sender […] communicates a message to a receiver" (Renkema, 2004, p. 39). On a small scale, it may thus refer to "something larger than a sentence" (Lê & Lê, 2009, p. 5), e.g. a paragraph or an entire text (Lê & Short, 2009, p. 18). Other notions, however, extend the meaning of discourse beyond a single text. Discourse may then refer to utterances "perceived as a single language event" (Werth, 1999, p. 1; original emphasis removed)—e.g. a series of interrelated political speeches—or more broadly to "the totality of utterances in a society viewed as an autonomous […] entity," such as the discourse of medical practice (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002, p. 18). One and the same token of text or talk may thus be related to discourse in both a narrow and a wide sense (particular vs. general meaning; see van Dijk, 1997, pp. 3–4). The specific meaning and scope of discourse, however, are dependent on the respective research interest (Keller, 2011, 20, 63). They must thus be established anew for each and every research project.

In any case, discourse engages in the social construction of reality by shaping the world whilst being shaped by it, too (Paltridge, 2012, 1, 7). Consequently, it does not simply reflect the world; it rather constitutes specific realities thereof (Keller, 2011, p. 67) by specifying

what can be said about a certain matter (Lê & Lê, 2009, pp. 5–6).[11] In discourse studies, language is therefore viewed as a tool for actors to achieve certain goals through the performance of communicative acts (Renkema, 2004, pp. 11–12).

The plurality of notions of discourse results from the existence of multiple realities, and is reflected in a large variety of discourse analytical approaches (Keller, 2011, p. 84). In spite of this diversity, however, four common characteristics of discourse and the analysis thereof can be identified (Keller, 2011, p. 9). First, they deal with real language in use.[12] Second, meaning is socially constructed. Third, different interpretations exist and form part of a wider discourse structure. And fourth, language use is governed by rules of action and interpretation. Furthermore, a general distinction is drawn between two modes of discourse: written language/discourse (text) and spoken language/discourse (talk; van Dijk, 1997, 2-3, 7), which both play a crucial role in the exercise of power (see van Dijk, 2008).[13]

4.1.2. Types of Discourse

Discourses take place in many different domains, accounting for designations such as legal discourse, academic discourse or economic discourse. The three—for want of a better word—"types" of discourse most relevant for this research are introduced below.

Public Discourse

Public discourse refers to a kind of discourse that is disseminated through mass media and characterised by an orientation towards the general public (Keller, 2011, p. 68). It is thus explicitly linked to the public sphere, i.e. "that part of life in which one interacts with others and with society at large" (Koller & Wodak, 2008, p. 1).[14] Public discourse analyses often focus on news coverages, parliamentary events and the (re)actions of key protagonists. Owing to the diversity of agents involved in public discourse, however, thematic references

[11] This feature of discourse defining its own truth see (McAuley, 2003, p. 54) significantly affects the understanding of power (Lê and Lê, 2009, p. 6).

[12] Since the understanding of discourse in this thesis is strongly language- and text-based, it is not necessary to include other symbolic forms of social practice (see Keller, 2011, p. 9) in this characterisation.

[13] The boundary between these two modes of discourse, however, is not as clear-cut as one might think. Written discourse, for instance, is not simply spoken discourse written down (Paltridge, 2012, 136, 139). In accordance with van Dijk (1997, p. 7), this thesis views speech transcripts as instances of *spoken* discourse—even though they may technically qualify as texts and, therefore, forms of written discourse.

[14] As noted by Koller and Wodak (2008, p. 1), the public sphere may overlap with that of politics or the media. Fortunately, however, either (i.e. a segregation or a conflation of these three spheres) works for the research presented in this thesis.

are deemed more important for its analysis than actual diction, for instance (Keller, 2011, p. 71).

Political Discourse

Political discourse is a particularly powerful type of discourse (van Dijk, 2008, p. 53). In the narrower sense, it refers to discourse produced only by politicians in the setting of political institutions (Fiala, 2013, p. 76). Chilton and Schäffner (2002, p. 3), however, argue that people engage in political action as soon as they talk or write about politics. Accordingly, it can be argued that any token of text or talk referring to the realm of politics (e.g. in terms of political actors, institutions or contents) forms part of political discourse. In any case, political discourse usually features "a set of particular concrete uses of language" that are "linked to […] situations in which social groups and individuals are engaged or involved in power relationships" (Fiala, 2013, pp. 83–84). Especially in the field of politics, language is thus considered a crucial means of communication and action (Pocock, 1973, p. 35); one that is characterised by a need for persuasion and the employment of certain strategies, such as heading and ambiguity (Renkema, 2004, pp. 255-257).

What is more, the examination of political discourse with regard to speech acts (see Chapter 5) is key to gaining a proper understanding of the main actors and their roles (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, p. 216). A single speech, for instance, often fulfils several functions that are realised in a sequence of speech acts (Reisigl, 2008, p. 253). Another characteristic of political text and talk is the existence of many different interpreters, such as the physically present or TV audience and the readership of later transcripts. They interpret the text or talk of the initial utterers and may in turn become utterers themselves. Political discourse, therefore, takes into special consideration the dialogic structure relating the current discourse to (possible) counter-arguments of others (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002, p. 22).

Media Discourse

According to O'Keeffe (2012, p. 441), "[m]edia discourse refers to interactions that take place through a broadcast platform, […] in which the discourse is oriented to a non-present reader, listener or viewer." It is thus "a public, manufactured, on-record, form of interaction" (O'Keeffe, 2012, p. 441) captured in form of messages that are disseminated by professional

communicators via public channels, such as the press or the Internet (Renkema, 2004, p. 266). Usually, media discourse analysts do not only look at the contents, structure and stylistic elements of such messages but also examine their conditions of production and reception, e.g. regarding possible biases arising from a journalist's personal opinion (Renkema, 2004, p. 267). They thus also seek to find out how accurately the media reflect reality (Rocci, 2009, p. 18). This becomes particularly important when looking at news coverages. After all, "[a]ll news is views"—i.e. news are never completely objective (Renkema, 2004, p. 266).

Finally, a few words on newspaper discourse. It is a special form of written public and media discourse and refers to both physical news items, such as specific newspaper articles, and their actual contents (van Dijk, 1988, vii, 1, 4). Newspaper discourse features a handful of special characteristics relating to structure, production and comprehension (see van Dijk, 1988), such as anonymity, a fragmented audience, and the embedding of speech events (Bednarek, 2006, pp. 14–15). In this context, it is noteworthy that the notions of "author" and "reader" are merely idealised constructs—not to say stereotyped images—that do not necessarily refer to real people. The readership thus often identify the institution "newspaper" as the ultimate source of information, not the actual journalists themselves (Bednarek, 2006, pp. 14–15).

4.2. What is Discourse Analysis?

Having discussed the notion of discourse at length, it is now time to turn to the scientific analysis thereof.

4.2.1. Development and "Critical" Issues

DA, or discourse studies (see van Dijk, 1997), has its origins in the fields of classical rhetoric, language philosophy, psychology and sociology (Renkema, 2004, p. 5). It was introduced as a scientific term by Harris (1952) and became increasingly inter- and multidisciplinary in the mid-1980's (Keller, 2011, p. 14; Renkema, 2004, p. 5) by specialising in discourse pertaining to individual domains such as politics or the media (Bonnafous & Temmar, 2013, p. 2). Broadly speaking, DAs look at "patterns of language across texts" by taking into consideration the mutually constitutive relationship between identities, language and context (Paltridge, 2012, p. 2). They seek to uncover "how people […] perform certain communicative acts […] and present themselves to others" (Paltridge, 2012, p. 7) in order

to learn more about the instrumental relationship between utterances, authority and power (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002, p. 18). At the end of the day, discourse studies can thus be seen as a general research perspective or "umbrella term" for various disciplinary approaches that deal with the examination of discourse (Keller, 2011, 9, 20).

Critical discourse analyses (CDAs), however, set themselves apart from other discourse analytical approaches. They focus on the examination of issues such as race, gender and identity as constructed and reflected in texts, whilst calling into question the analytical process itself (Paltridge, 2012, 168, 186). CDAs are thus "critical" in the sense that they criticise social and linguistic realities in due consideration of the wider context (Lee & Otsuji, 2009, p. 67). Critical analysts thereby work on the premise that text and talk are key in sustaining social inequality, injustice and oppression (van Leeuwen, 2009, p. 277). CDAs are thus strongly issue-oriented, with the analysts explicitly taking sides (van Dijk, 1997, p. 22). Non-critical analysts, by contrast, do not advocate such an interventionist approach. Because of the rather gradual evolution from non-critical to critical discourse studies (Lê & Lê, 2009, p. 6), however, the point of changeover cannot be clearly determined. Given the objectives of this research, however, the approach taken up in this thesis is to be ascribed to the "ordinary", less critical fraction of DAs.

4.2.2. Common Characteristics

Critical or not, discourse studies seek to find out "*who* uses language, *how*, *why*, and *when*," and are thus concerned with functional aspects of language and discourse, respectively (van Dijk, 1997, p. 2; original emphasis). To this end, discourse analysts orient themselves towards a research process that consists of the following eight steps: (1) selection of a discourse topic, (2) formulation of research questions, (3) elaborations on theoretical, methodological and conceptual foundations based on the (4) assessment of hitherto relevant academic literature, (5) data collection (i.e. the construction of a data corpus), and eventually the (6) analysis, (7) interpretation and (8) presentation of the results (Keller, 2011, pp. 84–85).[15] These steps are echoed in the methodological approach and general structure of the research presented in this thesis.

[15]The individual stages of the discourse analytical research process are mutually dependent and do not need to be passed through in linear, consecutive order (Keller, 2011, p. 84).

In addition to this process, discourse studies feature two more common characteristics that are particularly relevant to this research. Firstly, DAs deal with "talk and text in context" (van Dijk, 1997, p. 3; original emphasis removed). Owing to the mutually shaping relationship of discourse and context (van Dijk, 1997, p. 19), knowledge of the latter is crucial for an adequate interpretation of communicative acts (Paltridge, 2012, p. 39). One contextual aspect that has received much attention in discourse studies, especially with social scientists (van Dijk, 1997, p. 32), is that of institutions. With the help of rules and norms, institutions regulate—to a certain degree even objectify—people by making them take on certain roles. It is, therefore, of particular interest to discourse analysts to explore power relations that are expressed through the language use of institutional actors (Renkema, 2004, pp. 253–255). Secondly, discourse studies promote the use of scientific interpretation. Oger (2013), for instance, calls for an alliance of DA and interpretive sociology, and Keller (2011, pp. 76-78) refers to discourse studies as interpretative work altogether. He does not fail to notice, however, that DAs are not about finding the one and only "true" textual interpretation. As a matter of fact, the interpretation of linguistic data can never be complete (Mayring, 2010, p. 38). Alternative approaches and conflicting interpretations are absolutely possible (Keller, 2011, pp. 76–77)—not to say likely, or even welcome. This, however, only foregrounds the necessity of a well-elaborated, theoretically and methodologically sound discourse analytical approach.

4.2.3. Important Aspects

Just like any other academic field, discourse studies work with specific concepts. In the following, four aspects of discourse analytical research deemed most relevant to this thesis are introduced.

Topics

As suggested by Renkema (2004, p. 90), discourse analysts should not only consider the *micro*level of propositions and the *macro*level of an entire discourse but also pay attention to a certain *meso*level, namely that of topics. A topic or theme refers to the contents—i.e. the "aboutness"—of a discourse (fragment). More precisely, "[i]t is the shortest summary of a discourse, the main proposition of a paragraph or what is commented on in a sentence" (Renkema, 2004, p. 90). Even though definite rules of how to determine the topic of a

discourse fragment do not exist, most of the time an adequate consensus can be reached (Renkema, 2004, p. 92). To this end, auxiliary means such as van Dijk's (1980) macrostructures—referring to the semantic objects of a discourse that organise its local microstructures, such as sentences—may be applied.

Genres

A (speech) genre refers to a relatively stable pattern of oral or written utterances that reflect a particular situation of language use (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 60). It thus denotes "conventional, typical combinations of contextual […], communicative-functional, and structural […] features" (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002, p. 20) of language activities that are typically performed by specific persons for a specific audience, as is the case with newspaper reports, academic essays or parliamentary speeches, for instance (Paltridge, 2012, pp. 62–63). Consequently, genres do not only specify the content, style and structure of utterances (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 60) but also factor in power dynamics of the actors involved (Tardy & Swales, 2014, p. 83). The analysis of genres represents a discrete sub-field of discourse studies that is dedicated to the examination of pragmatic aspects of *spoken* discourse, in particular (Tardy & Swales, 2014, p. 82).

Pragmatics

Pragmatics literally means "the study of acts" and is a branch of linguistics—more specifically of semiotics—that deals with the relationship between signs and the people using them (Renkema, 2004, pp. 35–36). By investigating "what we do with language" and "what we want language does [sic] for us" (Lê & Short, 2009, p. 23), pragmatics focus on the instrumental use of language and regularly employ the notion of speech acts (Rocci, 2009, p. 16; van Dijk, 1997, p. 14; see Chapter 5). It thereby helps to understand the emergence and context-specific interpretations of specific discourses (Renkema, 2004, pp. 36–37). In contrast to genre analyses, however, pragmatics specialises in the analysis of *written* texts and longer talks with persuasive goals, such as political speeches (Tardy & Swales, 2014, p. 82). It further goes exceptionally well with corpus linguistic approaches (O'Keeffe, 2012, pp. 447–448; see below).

Text Corpora

Corpus linguistics is an approach of linguistics that composes text corpora on the basis of lexical or thematic selection criteria (Keller, 2011, p. 24). A text corpus thereby refers to "a collection of spoken or written authentic texts that is representative of a particular area of language use" (Paltridge, 2012, p. 144). Such data sets are often electronically searched for occurrences of specific linguistic features, such as certain word combinations (Keller, 2011, p. 24; Paltridge, 2012, p. 144). In the social sciences, discourse analysts use text corpora for the analysis of exemplary instances of certain discourses. Linguistic aspects at the level of signs are of only marginal interest because analytical priority is usually given to aspects beyond the text corpus, such as the actors involved or the effects on power (Keller, 2011, p. 69). A text corpus-based DA thus represents an empirical approach that allows for the integration of quantitative findings with qualitative interpretations thereof (Yang, 2009, p. 162).

5. Speech Act Analysis

Some constructivist scholars have sought to overhaul the understanding of social relationships based on the concepts of language and speech acts (Pettman, 2000/2015, pp. 17–18). Onuf (2015, p. 59), for instance, pointed out that "talking is undoubtedly the most important way that we go about making the world what it is". This statement rests on the assumption that "[a]ll speech […] is performative in the sense that it does things to people" in redefining their perceptions of self, others and the world (Pocock, 1973, p. 41). Since it was further argued that discourses and pragmatic aspects cannot be properly analysed without consideration of linguistic concepts such as speech acts (Lê & Short, 2009, 17, 23), this chapter introduces SAT and speech act analysis (SAA) in the genuine tradition of Austin and Searle as integral part of this research.

5.1. What are Speech Acts?

A person can be ordered to leave the room by saying "I order you to leave the room."; an egg, however, cannot be fried by simply saying so (Searle, 2001, p. 85). This example points to the essence of SAT and SAA, which both deal with speech acts—i.e. "act[s] of speaking in a form that gets someone else to act" (Onuf, 2015, p. 66). Speech acts, however, are not synonymous with utterances (see Davis, 2001); they are about communicative *acts* that are performed with the intention to produce a certain *effect*. Whereas the term could thus be used in a generic sense to refer to any kind of language use (Lê & Short, 2009, p. 23), it must be noted that not everyone can perform any kind of speech act. In fact, the successful performance of a speech act is generally contingent upon its circumstances in terms of social roles, time and place (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002, p. 10).

SAT and SAA both look into this subject in a scientific manner. Their roots, however, are not in linguistics (Searle, 1979/1981, p. 162) but in philosophy (Hindelang, 1994, p. 95; Renkema, 2004, pp. 12–13)—more precisely in the works of two renowned philosophers of language: John Austin and John Searle (Blum-Kulka, 1997, p. 42). As probably the most relevant theory in the field of pragmatics (Martínez-Flor & Usó-Juan, 2010, p. 6), SAT has nevertheless established itself as an important part of the contemporary study of language (Vanderveken & Kubo, 2001, p. 4) and discourse (Blum-Kulka, 1997, p. 47), respectively.

Finally, it must be noted that SAT partly coincides with securitisation theory as conceived by the Copenhagen School, a branch of IR scholarship that rests on social constructivism and is known for its speech act-based discourse analytical approach (Balzacq, 2016, 496, 498, 519). Even though the securitisation aspect itself is of no interest to this research, the methodology proposed in this thesis may show some parallels to the approach advanced by the Copenhagen School.

5.2. Speech Act Theory

Over time, different strands of SAT have evolved; it is not a "uniform" theory. The status of the works by Austin (1962/1967) and Searle (1969/1988) as constitutive classics, however, is undisputed (see e.g. Hindelang, 1994, p. 96; Martínez-Flor & Usó-Juan, 2010, pp. 6–7).

Austin's Speech Act Theory

John Austin was the first scholar to focus on the study of speech acts. He is thus often called "the father of speech act theory" (Martínez-Flor & Usó-Juan, 2010, pp. 6–7). Austin initially introduced his ideas about the tripartite notion of language use in a lecture series titled "How to Do Things with Words" (1962/1967), where he states that utterances can be classified into three dimensions of linguistic action: the locutionary act, the illocutionary act, and the perlocutionary act.

(1) The *locutionary act* is "[t]he act of 'saying something'" (Austin, 1962/1967, p. 94)—i.e. "the physical act of producing an utterance" (Renkema, 2004, p. 13). It can also be seen as the linguistic representation of worldly affairs (Witek, 2015, p. 15).
(2) The *illocutionary act* refers to the "performance of an act *in* saying something" (Austin, 1962/1967, p. 99, original emphasis). It thus denotes "the act committed by producing an utterance" (Renkema, 2004, p. 13), and brings the intentions of the speaker into play.
(3) The *perlocutionary act* indicates the "consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, […] the speaker, or […] other persons" (Austin, 1962/1967, p. 101). It is brought about by the respective (il)locution(s) previously made (Renkema, 2004, p. 13).

In addition to that, Austin (1962/1967) differentiates between two basic kinds of speech acts: performatives (i.e. actions, such as promising or ordering), and constatives (i.e. sayings, such as stating or describing). Whereas the former perform acts through the utterances themselves, the latter merely state something about reality (Renkema, 2004, p. 13). Austin's dichotomy of speech acts, however, was criticised for being too ambiguous (Renkema, 2004, p. 13) and resting on flawed assumptions (see Searle, 2001).

Searle's Speech Act Theory

Based on Austin's work, Searle developed a theory of speech acts according to which an utterance can be analysed in terms of its *propositional content* and its *illocutionary force*—i.e. with regard to its reference to a certain state of affairs, and its (potential) impact on social processes (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002, p. 10). According to Searle (1969/1988, p. 31), illocutionary acts thus have the general form of F(p), with *F* standing for "illocutionary force indicating device" and *p* for "propositional expression". Discourse analysts are particularly interested in exactly this relationship between propositional content (or literal meaning), illocutionary force (i.e. the meaning beyond the literal sense of the words) and speaker intentions (Paltridge, 2012, p. 40).

Elaborating on illocutionary acts, Searle (1979/1981, p. 44) further introduced the notion of *felicity conditions*, i.e. conditions that need to be fulfilled for illocutionary acts to be successfully performed. They basically amount to the proposition that "communication must be carried out by the right person, in the right place, at the right time and, normally, with a certain intention" in order to work properly (Paltridge, 2012, p. 42). Only then an illocutionary act is felicitous in the sense of inducing factual change (Witek, 2015, p. 23).

5.3. Illocutionary Acts

In consideration of the research objective of this thesis, the notion of illocutionary acts deserves closer attention.

5.3.1. Illocutionary Logic and Initial Classification

The illocutionary logic introduced by Austin and further elaborated on by Searle is a rather novel approach (Vanderveken & Kubo, 2001, p. 8). It states that, by nature, people communicate to achieve (linguistic) goals through the performance of illocutionary acts

(Vanderveken, 2001, pp. 53–54). There is, however, no need for an illocutionary act to be explicitly asserted or declared as such (Vanderveken & Kubo, 2001, p. 8). For this reason, it is all the more important that the hearer is able to infer both the propositional content and the illocutionary force of an utterance by simply hearing it (Searle, 2001, p. 90).[16] Knowledge, e.g. regarding the respective context (Searle, 1969/1988, p. 30), is thus key for correctly interpreting illocutions (Renkema, 2004, pp. 17–18).

In his study of illocutionary acts, Austin (1962/1967, pp. 150–151) differentiates between the following five types of illocutions: (1) *verdictives*, giving a verdict or judgement, (2) *exercitives*, exercising power, rights or influence, (3) *commissives*, assuming some kind of commitment or obligation (including expressions of intention), (4) *behabitives*, adopting an attitude or social behaviour, and (5) *expositives*, clarifying how an utterance fits into context (e.g. a reason or a conversation). Although this categorisation is certainly elaborate, Searle (1976, pp. 7–10, 1979/1981, pp. 8–12) criticised that it lacks consistency. He therefore concludes that it may better be regarded as a mere basis for discussion.

5.3.2. Searle's Taxonomy

Searle (1976, 1979/1981, 1969/1988) advanced Austin's approach by explicitly focusing on illocutionary aspects from the speaker's point of view. He thereby identifies 12 dimensions based on which illocutionary acts can be differentiated. The three most essential ones are the *illocutionary point*, i.e. the purpose of an illocution, the *direction of fit* between the words uttered by the speaker and the world, and the *sincerity condition* which expresses the speaker's attitude to the propositional content (Searle, 1976, pp. 2–7, 1979/1981, pp. 2–8). Based on these three dimensions, Searle (1979/1981, pp. 12–20) developed his own taxonomy of illocutionary acts,[17] constituting the following five categories: (1) representatives or assertives,[18] (2) directives, (3) commissives, (4) expressives, and

[16]Illocutionary acts can be performed by various bodily movements including—but not limited to—spoken utterances. They can, for instance, also be realised by writing a sentence or simply signalling a request (Davis, 2001, p. 138). This thesis, however, only deals with *verbal* illocutionary acts.

[17]It must be noted that Searle provides a taxonomy of illocutionary *acts*, not a classification of illocutionary *verbs*. Although often confused, they are not the same. As pointed out by Searle (1976, p. 2; emphasis added) himself: "[i]llocutions are a part of language" in general, whereas "[i]llocutionary verbs are always part of a *particular* language", such as English or German.

[18]This thesis settles on the term "assertive" for the remainder of the text.

(5) declarations (see Table 1). These types of illocutionary acts are considered particularly relevant for political discourse (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, p. 216).

Table 1. Searle's Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts

Illocutionary Acts	Examples	
1. Assertives	Assertions	Predictions
	Conclusions	Truth claims
	Complaints	
2. Directives	Constative orders (e.g. "it is time to do something", "let us do something")	Insisting
	Imperatives (e.g. requests, commands)	Suggestions
3. Commissives	Offerings	Threats
	Promises	
4. Expressives	Apologies	Congratulations
	Blaming	Praising
	Condolences	Thanks
5. Declarations	Announcements	Excommunications
	Appointments	Proclamations
	Declarations	Resignations
	Definitions	

Note: Compiled by the author (examples collected from Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, 216, 220; Searle, 1976, pp. 10-15; Vanderveken & Kubo, 2001, p. 5).

(1) Assertives[19]

The first kind of illocutionary acts—*assertives*—aims at committing the speaker to the belief that the propositional content of the utterance is true. Assertives state how things are in the world and, therefore, have the words-to-world direction of fit. What is more, they express the psychological state of "belief", and can thus be assessed in terms of being true or false (to varying degrees). According to Chilton and Schäffner (1997, p. 219), assertives account for the largest proportion of speech acts used in political discourse. They are then often stated without any further evidence. This, however, is commonly accepted due to the speaker's generally superior role.

[19]Unless otherwise stated, the reference of Searle (1979/1981, pp. 12–20) applies to the elaborations on all five types of illocutionary acts made in the remainder of this chapter.

(2) Directives

The second type of illocutions, called *directives,* attempts to get the hearer to commit to a certain course of future action. Directives thereby seek to adapt the world to the propositional content of the utterance (Vanderveken, 2001, p. 34). They thus have the world-to-words direction of fit, and the sincerity condition of "want". The coercive function of directives can be expressed rather overtly by issuing orders, for instance, but may also take effect in less explicit forms of urging (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, pp. 219–220).

(3) Commissives

The third kind of illocutionary acts seeks to commit the speaker him-/herself to a certain course of future action. These so-called *commissives* also have the world-to-words direction of fit but express the psychological state of "intention". Because of their self-committing character, politicians are usually very cautious about their performance (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, pp. 220–221).

(4) Expressives

Expressives represent the fourth category of illocutionary acts. They "express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about at state of affairs specified in the propositional content" (Searle, 1976, p. 12). The speaker does not try to make the words correspond to the world, or vice versa. Instead, the truth of the propositional content is simply presupposed. Because of this empty direction of fit, expressives represent the weakest type of illocutionary acts (Vanderveken, 2001, p. 45).

(5) Declarations

In the case of successfully performed *declarations,* the fifth type of illocutionary acts, "illocutionary force indicating devices" bring "a state of affairs into existence by declaring it to exist" (Searle, 1979/1981, p. 16). In other words, the "objects of reference are […] changed to correspond to the words in the very utterance of these words" (Vanderveken, 2001, p. 34). Declarations have no sincerity condition but a double direction of fit. They are, therefore, the strongest type of illocutionary acts (Vanderveken, 2001, p. 49). Their successful performance, however, is often contingent upon extra-linguistic institutions assigning certain roles to the speaker and the hearer alike (Searle, 1976, p. 15).

6. Content Analysis

This chapter deals with content analysis (CA) as the most popular method of communication studies, especially in the field of political communication (Brosius et al., 2012, 129, 138). It first clarifies what CA is about, before it discusses Mayring's (2000, 2010) notion of qualitative content analysis (QualCA) in more detail as it serves as the centrepiece of the methodological approach presented in this thesis.[20]

6.1. What is Content Analysis?

The views on the scope and capacity of CAs are quite diverse. They range from rather restrictive definitions such as that of Berelson (1952, p. 18), who perceives CA as a research technique to describe the manifest content of communication in a purely quantitative manner, to more "lenient" conceptions that do not pick up on the latent/manifest and quantitative/qualitative issue at all. Holsti (1969, 2, 14), for instance, describes CA as a "multipurpose research method" that uses "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages". Such diverging notions can be ascribed to the evolution of CA from a quantitative means of propaganda research to an interdisciplinary endeavour that also incorporates qualitative elements (see e.g. Holsti, 1969, pp. 20–23; Mayring, 2000). In any case, CAs do not only deal with the *contents* of communication (irrespective of the name suggesting otherwise); they are generally concerned with social reality, too (Knapp, 2008, p. 20). What is more, they generally adopt a systematic approach and subscribe to the scientific standards of objectivity and generality (Holsti, 1969, pp. 3–14). Yet, CAs are no default methods of analysis. In consideration of the research questions and data at hand, they must be adapted to each and every research project (Mayring, 2000, 2010, p. 49; see Chapter 7).

In accordance with Mayring (2010, pp. 12–13), this thesis conceives CA as a method of social sciences—more specifically as a systematic, rule- and theory-based approach to the analysis of fixed communication. As such it is comparatively independent of time and the

[20]Since DA and CA get mixed up all too often (see Oger, 2013, p. 28), it shall be clarified that this thesis differentiates between DA as the overall methodological approach to the research project, and (Qual)CA as the scientific method applied to answer the research questions.

individual researcher, and therefore allows for a rather straightforward compilation of comparative data (Brosius et al., 2012, pp. 140-142).




Figure 2. Phase Model of Research Process (adapted from Mayring, 2010, p. 21).

Having established the basic notion of CA used in this thesis, the issue of quantitative vs. qualitative needs to be taken up once more. *Quantitative* research approaches generally restrict the empirical analysis to a handful of criteria to which numerical values are assigned. They thus drastically reduce complex relations to arrive at only a few (numerical) statements. *Qualitative* approaches, on the contrary, permit a much more comprehensive description of complex phenomena (Brosius et al., 2012, p. 4). What is more, the former is primarily concerned about objectivity, whereas the latter is rather committed to the acquisition of profound understanding (Knapp, 2008, pp. 20–21). It can thus be said that the strength of one approach is the weakness of the other—or differently put: quantitative approaches add width, qualitative approaches add depth (Brosius et al., 2012, p. 4). In discourse analytical contexts, it was therefore argued in favour of quantitative-qualitative mixed-method approaches (Keller, 2011, p. 78; Paltridge, 2012, p. 212). Mayring (2010, pp. 20–22) even states that research projects *always* start with a qualitative step, namely that of defining what to look at to begin with. Only then quantitative steps may follow, before yet another round of qualitative analysis sets in. This describes a (content analytical) research process in terms of a three-phase model (see Figure 2).

6.2. Mayring's Qualitative Content Analysis

QualCAs generally pursue a double strategy of first dismantling a phenomenon through the extraction of single aspects, to later reassemble them in order to capture all facets of the matter (Rust, 1980, p. 43). In line with this notion, Mayring (2000, 2010) advances a specific

notion of QualCA[21] that conceives it in terms of an empirical, systematic and rule-based mixed-method analysis of a text corpus whose data is embedded into a certain communicative context. It rests on a multi-disciplinary basis (see Mayring, 2010, pp. 26-34), and works with a category system as the central instrument of analysis (see Chapter 6.2.1). A QualCA is therefore an interpretative yet thoroughly scientific method that must not, however, be applied in an unreflected manner (Mayring, 2010, 59, 123-124).

Table 2. Techniques of Qualitative Content Analysis

Basic Techniques	Special Techniques
1. Summarising	(1) Summarising content analysis
	(2) Inductive category formation
2. Structuring	(3) Formal structuring
(Deductive Category	(4) Content structuring
Application)	(5) Typifying structuring
	(6) Scaling structuring
3. Explication	(7) Narrow context analysis
	(8) Broad context analysis

Note: Adapted from Mayring (2010, p. 66).

The proper conduct of a QualCA requires the use of special techniques. According to Mayring (2010, pp. 64–65), three basic forms of interpretative techniques for the analysis of alien data exist: summarising, structuring, and explication. The first two techniques stand for rather text-dependent analyses. *Summarising* aims at the reduction of data in a way that only the most essential contents remain; and *structuring* seeks to carve out certain aspects based on predefined criteria. The technique of *explication*, by contrast, focuses on the collection of additional, text-external information about individual passages to allow for a deeper understanding thereof. All three approaches, however, are rather intuitive. Yet, once applied in a rule-based, step-by-step manner they turn into scientific tools for qualitative analyses (Mayring, 2010, p. 123). As such, they can further be broken down into eight distinct techniques of QualCA (see Table 2). Which special technique(s) to best apply depends on the respective research project (Mayring, 2010, pp. 64–65). For the research presented in

[21]As noted by Mayring (2010, p. 48), the adjective "qualitative" might be slightly misleading because a QualCA may as well contain quantitative steps.

this thesis, the special techniques of *inductive category formation* and *content structuring* were identified as the most appropriate forms of analysis (see Chapter 6.2.2 and 6.2.3).

6.2.1. Category System and Coding

Category systems are not only central to *quantitative* CAs but also represent the main tools of *qualitative* CAs. After all, they provide for intersubjective reliability (Mayring, 2010, p. 49). However, resting an analysis upon categories—i.e. "patterns or themes that are directly expressed in the text or […] derived from them through analysis" (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1285)—does not mean that latent content can be ignored. It rather follows that instead of an entire text, only selected features are explored (Brosius et al., 2012, p. 133). For categories to make sense, they must be developed in reciprocity of data and theory (i.e. the research questions), defined in terms of rules of construction and assignment, and checked (and adapted) again during the actual process of analysis (Mayring, 2010, p. 59). They should further be mutually exclusive, independent and suitable for jointly forming an exhaustive category system (Holsti, 1969, pp. 95–101). Nevertheless, cost-benefit considerations apply; the more sophisticated a category system is, the more costly (Holsti, 1969, p. 98) and difficult it gets to yield a high reliability of results (Ritsert, 1972, p. 70).

Closely related to the subject of categories is the process of coding. Because of its structured approach, a (Qual)CA can easily be conducted on the computer by making use of special computer programs such as MAXQDA (Mayring, 2010, pp. 112-113). The success of such computer-aided analyses, however, greatly depends on the actual coding (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1285)—i.e. "the process whereby raw data are systematically transformed and aggregated into units which permit precise description of relevant content characteristics" (Holsti, 1969, p. 94). Coding thus aims at the conceptional consolidation of selected text passages (Keller, 2011, pp. 98–99), and is primarily concerned with manifest content. Latent content usually only comes into play when interpreting the results (Holsti, 1969, pp. 12–13).

6.2.2. Special Technique 1: Summarising – Inductive Category Formation

Generally speaking, the basic technique of summarising first considers all data but then systematically reduces it to its essentials (Mayring, 2010, pp. 65–66). Summarising thereby adopts an upward (text-based) and a downward (pattern-based) approach. First, the level of summative abstraction—i.e. the level to which a text is to be transformed by means of macro-

operators—needs to be specified. Second, the coding units that are subject to this "transformation" must be defined (Mayring, 2010, pp. 67–69). To this end, it is common practice in the social sciences to resort to van Dijk's (1980, pp. 46-83) macro-rules of semantic derivation: construction, generalisation, deletion, and selection. This means that all paraphrases above the predefined level of abstraction are kept; all paraphrases below that level are generalised (macro-rule of *generalisation*). Unimportant, meaningless paraphrases or such of the same content are deleted (macro-rules of *deletion* and *selection*), and those paraphrases referring to each other are consolidated and replaced by new ones (macro-rule of *construction*). At the end of this procedure, a final check-up ensures that the category system does indeed accurately reflect the contents of the original data (Mayring, 2010, p. 69).[22]

The special technique of inductive category formation is based on the summative approach described above. It allows for the inference of categories directly from the data itself, i.e. without the need of pre-defined theoretic concepts (Mayring, 2010, p. 83), and works from the particular to the general. Therefore, it is often used for the development of hypotheses and theories (Brosius et al., 2012, p. 23). The technique of inductive category formation is further particularly suited for QualCAs because it allows the analysts to approach the data in an unbiased manner (Mayring, 2010, pp. 83–84). The process itself takes place in five steps (see Figure 3).




Figure 3. Process of Inductive Category Formation (adapted from Mayring, 2010, p. 84).

[22]See Mayring (2010, p. 70) for a more detailed account of how to perform a summarising QualCA.

At the beginning, a theory-based selection criterion and the level of abstraction must be determined to clarify which parts of the data serve as the starting point for the ensuing definition of the categories. After having thoroughly worked through the data with a view to formulating and revising the categories, the analyst faces an issue-specific category system that is linked to concrete text passages. S/he may then decide to interpret the results right away, or proceed with further analyses (Mayring, 2010, pp. 84–85).

6.2.3. Special Technique 2: Content Structuring – Deductive Category Application

Structuring[23] is probably the most central technique of CAs. With the help of a category system, it systematically extracts a certain structure from the data (Mayring, 2010, p. 92). Mayring (2010, p. 94) elaborates on four different types of structuring: (1) formal structuring, (2) content structuring, (3) typifying structuring, and (4) scaling structuring (see Table 2). They all work with deductive category application (Mayring, 2010, p. 66). Only *content structuring*, however, allows for the analysis of texts with regard to specific themes (Mayring, 2010, p. 98).




Figure 4. Process of Content Structuring (adapted from Mayring, 2010, 93, 99).

[23]See Mayring (2010, p. 104) for a detailed account of how to conduct a structuring QualCA.

The generic process of content structuring consists of nine steps (see

Figure ***4***). By and large, it requires the delineation of structuring dimensions that are to be broken down into different values. Together these dimensions and values form a category system, which is then to be deductively applied to a certain data set (Mayring, 2010, p. 92). To render a smooth coding process possible, the following points must thereby be considered and properly recorded in a code book (Mayring, 2000). First, categories must be clearly defined to clarify which text segments are to be assigned (i.e. coded) to which category. Second, text passages are to be cited as prime examples for each category. Third, encoding rules need to be established for cases where unambiguous classifications would otherwise not be possible (Mayring, 2010, p. 92).

7. Research Design

A research design is a plan that expounds the collection, analysis and interpretation of a data set in due consideration of the research purpose (Holsti, 1969, 24, 27). This chapter introduces the specific research design of this thesis. It first elucidates the adaptations made to the theoretical and methodological approach discussed in the previous chapters. These elaborations then culminate in the presentation of an analytical framework.

7.1. Theoretical and Methodological Foundation

As already established in the previous chapters, a discourse analytical approach must rest on a theoretically and methodologically sound basis. Adjustments in due consideration of the actual research project, however, are indispensable.

7.1.1. Communication Model

In this thesis, the term OBOR discourse generally refers to the notion of the initiative regarding its main goals as constructed in speeches by Chinese politicians and Indonesian online newspaper articles between September 7, 2013 and December 31, 2016. It thus takes Werth's (1999, p. 1) understanding of discourse in terms of a series of thematically coherent political speeches as a basis, and supplements it with the consideration of related newspaper articles. This conception of the OBOR discourse shall be illustrated by a simple communication model (see Figure 5). The use of a such a model was suggested in the context of both discourse studies (Renkema, 2004, pp. 40–41) and QualCAs. After all, the perception of texts as part of a larger communication chain helps to delimitate the direction—i.e. the focus and aim—of analysis (Mayring, 2010, pp. 56–57).

The communication model of the OBOR discourse takes up Reisigl's (2008, p. 257) notion of multiple audiences, and is based on the communication system of Shannon and Weaver (1964) and the interpretation thereof in Renkema (2004, pp. 40–41). It basically consists of two strands representing the *Chinese* and the (Indonesian) *newspaper* part of the OBOR discourse, respectively. In Communication Chain 1, Chinese politicians (President Xi, Premier Li, and FM Wang) code their OBOR messages into words. These words are conveyed by voice to the primary audience, i.e. the audience physically present during the

speeches. The listeners then decode the messages so that the information about OBOR eventually reaches their minds.




Figure 5. Communication Model of OBOR Discourse (adapted from Shannon & Weaver, 1964, as depicted in Renkema, 2004, p. 40).

Similarly, in Communication Chain 2, people writing for the Jakarta Post—for reasons of simplicity in this model simply referred to as journalists—code their messages about OBOR into written words conveyed by paper[24] to their readership. This readership partly qualifies as secondary audience, as it may also refer to those people reading up on the speeches by the Chinese politicians in the online press.[25] Finally, the readers decode the messages so that the information about OBOR reaches their minds.

The coding processes described above are very complex and bear, amongst others, the risk of misinterpretation. There is no guarantee that the politicians' OBOR messages are understood by the audience and processed by the Jakarta Post as intended. By reporting on the initiative, the Jakarta Post—or the journalists, to be more precise—fulfil the important function of interpretive intermediaries. They do not simply reproduce the messages of the politicians. Instead, they bring together reports on selected speech fragments in news format (see Reisigl, 2008, p. 259) with the general coverage of the initiative and Indonesia's

[24]Despite the electronic nature of online newspaper articles, the word "paper" is used as an idealised term for text put down in writing to allow for a better contrast with the communication channel of "voice".

[25]Because the "audience listening to a live transmission [of a speech] via mass media" (Reisigl, 2008, p. 257) is of no concern to this research, only two of the three types of audiences mentioned by Reisigl are used in this thesis. The secondary audience identified in this research, therefore, does not correspond to Reisigl's original definition; it actually refers to what he calls "tertiary audience".

(re)actions in this regard *as perceived* by them. Thereby, it is very likely that their personal opinions also expand into the articles. Whereas both chains of communication are thus constitutive to the OBOR discourse dealing with the initiative's main goals, the actual messages exchanged do not need to be the same. These circumstances are illustrated by the letter icons (plural) and the dashed arrow at the far right of Figure 5, which loosely links Communication Chain 1 with Communication Chain 2.

Clearly, this communication model grossly simplifies the matter. It assumes, for instance, that the Jakarta Post does indeed report on OBOR and the speeches under scrutiny; and further suggests an unrealistically clear-cut separation of the parties involved. Due to its simplicity, it also fails to factor in the notion of illocutionary acts (Renkema, 2004, p. 41). Nevertheless, the model provides a systematic account of the OBOR discourse on the initiative's goals and facilitates the determination of the analytical focus. With the research purpose in mind, it can be said that the thesis does not explore the entire communication process as depicted in Figure 5. Instead, it focuses on a text-based examination of the OBOR messages exchanged in both chains of communication. Thereby, the respective sources, communication channels and receivers are taken into consideration. The actual processes of coding and interpreting that result in the particular OBOR messages, however, are not dealt with.

Thus far, this thesis has covered the first four steps of the discourse analytical research process described by Keller (2011; see Chapter 4.2.2). The remaining three steps—namely the analysis, interpretation and presentation of the results—will be dealt with in Chapter 8-11.

7.1.2. Text Corpus

The research presented in this thesis looks at specific instances of text and talk that deal with OBOR in form of fixed communication, i.e. communication put into writing (Knapp, 2008, pp. 20–21; Mayring, 2000). They are pooled together in a specialised text corpus, [26] which consists of two parts that deal with speeches and newspaper articles, respectively.

[26] A specialised text corpus is a custom-made text corpus that examines discourse in particular situations on the basis of specific texts. It therefore does not need to be extraordinarily large to be considered valid (Paltridge, 2012, 145, 149).

Text Corpus: Part 1 – Speeches

The major part of the text corpus encompasses what Swaine (2015) refers to as "Chinese authoritative sources" represented by a set of 71 speeches by China's President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang and FM Wang Yi. More specifically, it covers all speeches touching upon OBOR that were held by the three politicians between September 7, 2013 (the official starting point of the OBOR discourse) and December 31, 2016. An additional criterion for speeches to be considered is the online availability of official English transcripts thereof.[27] Part 1 of the text corpus thus consists of the two landmark speeches that initially introduced the initiative to the world (see e.g. IISS, 2015; Kang, 2015; Tian, 2016; Ye, 2015), and another set of speeches that were found primarily upon examination of the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (MOFA).[28] This website features a 13-page long section with 500 entries on speeches by high-ranking Chinese government officials held between October 30, 2010 and April 29, 2017 (see MOFA, n.d.a). To filter out the relevant entries, a four-stage selection procedure was applied. First, all entries beyond the pre-defined time frame were dismissed. Second, only those items dealing with one of the three politicians were shortlisted. Third, only entries representing actual speeches were kept.[29] Fourth, the pool of potentially interesting speeches was refined by retaining only those texts that contain a combination of at least two of the three keywords "silk", "belt" and "road".[30] At the end of this process, 24 speeches by President Xi,

[27] The terms "speech", "text" and "transcript" are thus used synonymously in this thesis. Transcripts are considered official if published on the website of any government body of the PRC. It must further be noted that they generally represent not only written records but also translations of verbally delivered speeches that were originally held in Mandarin Chinese.

[28] The bigger part of the relevant speeches was identified with the help of the MOFA website. One of the two landmark speeches delivered by President Xi, however, was not listed there. Another source (see Xu, 2013) was thus consulted to obtain a viable transcript thereof. In addition to that, a three-page long sub-section of the MOFA website specifically dedicated to speeches held by FM Wang between November 29, 2007 and March 20, 2017 (see MOFA, n.d.b) was examined to substantiate the pool of shortlisted texts. This step of verification, however, did not lead to the inclusion of additional speeches. Yet, a supplementary 13 speeches by Premier Li were added upon review of the official website run by the State Council of the People's Republic of China, which features a sub-section that exclusively deals with speeches held by Premier Li between June 17, 2014 and March 30, 2017 (see State Council, n.d.).

[29] An entry qualifies as a speech if it exhibits the standard structure of (1) address of welcome, (2) main body, and (3) closing words. Other entries such as interviews, video messages or simple press releases are explicitly excluded from the analysis.

[30] The co-occurrence of at least two of the three keywords was chosen as the ultimate selection criterion to ensure that the texts deal with OBOR and not any kind of silk, belt or road. Upon review of the final text corpus, however, another two speeches had to be dropped because they only referred to the *ancient* Silk Road and are thus also not relevant to this research.

30 speeches by Premier Li, and 17 speeches by FM Wang were added to the OBOR-specific text corpus.

Text Corpus: Part 2 – Newspaper Articles

The second part of the text corpus deals with English-language Indonesian online newspaper articles. More specifically, it is composed of any kind of written news item (i.e. all kinds of newspaper genres such as editorials or commentaries)[31] that deals with OBOR and was published by the Jakarta Post—one of Indonesia's leading English-language daily newspapers that not only features a high quality of writing but also a comprehensive online archive (see Eklöf, 2003, p. 14; Infoasaid, 2012, 17, 119)—within the designated timeframe. To identify the relevant newspaper articles, first a simple keyword search for "silk + belt + road" was performed, using the search tool provided on the Jakarta Post's official website (see The Jakarta Post, n.d.a). Due to the low number of results (n=21), the search process was repeated; this time, however, resorting to the co-occurrence of the two less restrictive keywords of "belt" and "road". Additionally, the search function of the website of the Jakarta Post Archive (see The Jakarta Post, n.d.b) was used, employing the same search algorithm. Another 23 relevant items could thus be added to the text corpus. Out of the interim total of 44 newspaper articles, however, 11 items had to be discarded for thematic or practical reasons.[32] At the end, Part 2 of the specialised text corpus contains 33 relevant newspaper articles published by the Jakarta Post.

All in all, the specialised text corpus subject to further analysis in this thesis consists of 104 texts (Part 1: n=71; Part 2: n=33; see Figure 6). A detailed account of all speeches and newspaper articles relevant to the OBOR discourse can be found in Appendix A: Text Corpus).

[31]For reasons of simplicity, the umbrella term "news(paper) article", or simply "article", is used throughout the remainder of this thesis, irrespective of the actual kind of newspaper genre.

[32]One news article only dealt with the ancient Silk Road, one article turned out to be a reprinted part of another article already considered in the text corpus, and another nine articles were only available to paying premium subscribers. Because of their restricted accessibility, the readership of these articles would deviate from that of the other news items in the text corpus. These news articles were thus also excluded from the analysis.




Figure 6. Text Corpus – Composition (compiled by the author).

7.1.3. Levels of Analysis

Discourse studies are generally labour-intensive and time-consuming. As a consequence, analysts often deal with only a few selected features of a comparatively small number of texts (Le, 2009, pp. 114–115). The DA conducted in this thesis, too, focuses on a handful of aspects at the contextual and the textual level. It thereby seeks to find out *who* says *what*, to *whom*, *when* and *how*. Grammatical or stylistic properties, such as the use of metaphors or other figures of speech, are not considered.

(Con)textual Analysis of Speeches

Borrowing from Reisigl (2008, 249–251, 257-259) and loosely based on what van Dijk (1997, p. 19) refers to as "local structures of context", the contextual analysis of speeches conducted in this thesis is concerned with the aspects of institutional setting, speaker and audience. The institutional setting refers to the date, location (city and country), and occasion (event) of a speech. The speaker delivering a speech is to be identified by his full name and political function, and the audience refers to the people physically present during a speech (i.e. the primary audience of the OBOR discourse produced by the Chinese politicians; see Chapter 7.1.1). For reasons of feasibility, the information about the audience is primarily derived from secondary sources commenting on a speech's attendees. Whenever possible, this data is supplemented by information on those people explicitly addressed in the speech. The audience may then be classified into one or several of the following categories:

politicians/diplomats, business representatives, academics, media representatives, and others, such as heads of international organisations or people not further specified.[33]

At the textual level, this thesis looks at the structure, themes and illocutionary acts of each speech. The structural aspect is captured in terms of a speech's overall number of paragraphs[34] and the identification of those paragraphs explicitly dealing with the initiative. These *OBOR paragraphs* are to feature at least two of the three keywords "silk", "belt" or "road". In addition to that, a semantic analysis is conducted to filter out the themes of each speech. It thereby considers the main topic(s) and specific OBOR themes—i.e. the themes dealing with the initiative's main goals—that are taken up in each speech. To this end, the analysis focuses on the actual *OBOR sentences*, i.e. those sentences containing at least two of the three key words mentioned above. Only gradually, the neighbouring sentences are included up to the boundaries of the respective OBOR paragraph (provided the thematic coherence permits their consideration at all). The semantic analysis thus implicitly applies Renkema's (2004, p. 90) differentiation between topics at the sentence, paragraph and later also discourse level. Finally, each sentence considered for the thematic analysis is also examined with regard to Searle's (1976, 1979/1981) five categories of illocutionary acts (i.e. assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations). Taking the examples that were identified in the relevant literature as a guide (see Table 1), however, only rather pronounced instances of illocutionary acts are registered. It must further be noted that this thesis does not conduct a full-fledged SAA but merely borrows the notion of speech acts to allow for a deeper understanding of the OBOR discourse.[35]

(Con)textual Analysis of Newspaper Articles

Similarly, the contextual analysis of the newspaper articles looks at the aspects of institutional setting, author- and readership. In this context, the institutional setting refers to

[33]These categories were developed upon preliminary examination of the primary data. Such a classification is reasonable because it can be assumed that—owing to the highly institutionalised contexts of the political speeches—it is *institutional roles* sending and receiving messages, not private individuals. It must further be noted that the "Others" category only applies if the presence of other people not covered by any of the other categories is explicitly mentioned in either a speech itself or by the respective secondary source(s).

[34]The count of paragraphs is based on the official speech transcripts. For more details, see Appendix A: Text Corpus.

[35]It therefor also suffices to not further differentiate the illocutionary acts in terms of primary/secondary or explicit/implicit speech acts, for instance (see Searle, 1979/1981, pp. 31-35; Stadler, 2011, p. 36).

an article's date of publication, the name of the publishing newspaper (i.e. the Jakarta Post), and the respective newspaper section it was published in. The following eight sections of the Jakarta post can thereby be differentiated: Academia – Interview, Academia – Opinion, Business, City, National, Politics, Southeast Asia and World (see The Jakarta Post, n.d.a). An article's author[36] is to be identified by his/her name and occupation, if indicated in the text. Because it is impossible to determine the exact readership of every single newspaper article, the general readership of the Jakarta Post is to be cited instead.

Since it was argued that the analysis of themes is particularly important for the examination of news discourses (van Dijk, 1988, p. 30), the textual analysis of the newspaper articles refrains from a pragmatic investigation of illocutionary acts. Instead, it focuses on an article's main theme(s) and its coverage of OBOR-related topics—i.e. the initiative's main goals and any of the speeches constituting Part 1 of the text corpus. For this purpose, the contents of the OBOR paragraphs[37] and those two paragraphs directly preceding (*pre-OBOR paragraph*) and succeeding (*post-OBOR paragraph*) them are examined. Through such an expansion of the analytical scope, the instalment character of newspaper articles according to which information on a specific topic is not delivered all at once but rather bit by bit (van Dijk, 1988, p. 43) is accommodated.




Figure 7. News Schema Categories (based on van Dijk, 1988, pp. 52–57).

In addition to that, structural aspects are taken into account by relating the pre-/post-/OBOR paragraphs to the appropriate news schema categories. Thereby, valuable clues to the importance of OBOR in the Indonesian news coverage are to be yielded. Adapting van Dijk's

[36]Since it cannot be assumed that all persons writing for a newspaper are professional journalists, the generic term of "author" is used in this thesis instead.
[37]For the analysis of newspaper articles, the notion of OBOR paragraph is slightly extended by adding the acronym of "OBOR" to the list of eligible keywords.

(1988, pp. 52–57) scheme, the following categories are used in this thesis: headline, main and side event[38]—which together make up the story of a news report—and commentary, featuring explicit statements of an author's personal opinion (see Figure 7).

7.1.4. Content Analytical Approach

The DA presented in this thesis applies Mayring's (2010) notion of a QualCA, using the computer program MAXQDA Plus 12[39] to employ the special techniques of summarising (inductive category formation) and content structuring (deductive category application). Both techniques work with category systems and require the intuitive application of van Dijk's (1980) macro-rules of deletion, selection, generalisation, and construction.

Special Technique of Summarising – Inductive Category Formation

First, a summarising content analysis of the Chinese document "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road" (thereafter referred to as Action Plan) is conducted to obtain a category system that reflects the main goals of OBOR and is later applied to the actual text corpus.[40] The Action Plan is considered the main official blue-print document of OBOR (see e.g. Summers, 2016, p. 1630; Wang, 2016, pp. 456–457), and was jointly released by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), MOFA and the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) on March 28, 2015 (National Development and Reform Commission [NDRC], 2015). The units under scrutiny are those paragraphs of the Action Plan that elaborate on the five core areas of OBOR—also called "five connections" or "five connectivities" (五通 wǔtōng; Summers, 2016, p. 1636)—which are to be promoted by the OBOR countries as the initiative's main goals. These are (1) policy coordination (政策沟通 zhèngcè gōutōng), (2) facilities connectivity (设施联通 shèshī liántōng), (3) unimpeded trade (贸易畅通 màoyì chàngtōng), (4) financial integration (资金融通 zījīn róngtōng), and (5) people-to-people bond (民心相通 mínxīn xiāngtōng; see NDRC, 2015: section

[38]The news schema category "main event" is equivalent to an article's main theme. In the reverse conclusion, the category "side event" refers to any information provided in the news article that does not directly refer to the main event, such as additional background information e.g. on previous or future events.
[39]See http://www.maxqda.com/.
[40]The Action Plan is only drawn on to construct a meaningful category system. It is not subject to a detailed analysis and thus not included in the specialised text corpus.

"IV. Cooperation Principles"). They were identified as the main goals of OBOR by other authors, too (see e.g. Swaine, 2015; Wang, 2016).




Figure 8. Category System: Main Categories – OBOR Goals (screenshot from MAXQDA Plus 12, taken by the author).

In the end, the inductively developed category system representing the main goals of OBOR consists of two levels. The first level is made up of five main categories representing the five cooperation principles—and thus main goals—of the initiative (see Figure 8). At the second level, these five aspects are split up into 46 sub-categories that reflect the various aspects, i.e. sub-topics, of each goal as elaborated on in the Action Plan (see Appendix B: Code Book – Action Plan. The categories are so-called "subject matter categories" (see Holsti, 1969, p. 104), and focus on nouns as the carriers of themes (Knapp, 2008, p. 27).

Special Technique of Content Structuring – Deductive Category Application

Upon completion of the summarising analysis of the Action Plan, the special technique of content structuring (see Chapter 6.2.3) is applied to the text corpus in consolidated form. First, those text passages to be coded to the various categories (i.e. the coding units) and the largest stretch of content to be considered for that purpose (i.e. the context units) are defined (Holsti, 1969, 116, 118). Second, the category system developed on the basis of the Action Plan is adopted and further elaborated on by introducing proper definitions, examples and encoding rules to avoid ambiguity (see Appendix B: Code Book – Action Plan). Furthermore, an additional set of five main categories reflecting Searle's five types of illocutionary acts is constructed in the same vein (see Appendix C: Code Book – Speeches).

Up to this point, the research presented in this thesis has taken a similar approach to Holzmann (2016). Compared to her work, however, this thesis expounds a more elaborate methodology for the analysis of the speeches. The consideration of newspaper articles published by the Jakarta Post represents yet another addition to Holzmann's approach; one that accounts for the newspaper's role in advancing (a particular perception of) the discourse

on OBOR. The analysis of relevant newspaper articles is expected to not only yield important clues on the general attitude of Indonesia towards the initiative but—in reference to the aforementioned speeches—may also allow for a kind of "proxy reality check" on the effectiveness of the OBOR messages sent out by the Chinese politicians. Therefore, the same category system reflecting the main goals of OBOR is used for the content structuring of the newspaper articles; it is, however, slightly extended to allow for the additional consideration of speech references and the application of the news schema categories (see Appendix D: Code Book – Newspaper Articles).

7.2. Analytical Framework

In sum, the analytical approach proposed in this thesis and elaborated on in the previous sections is depicted in Figure 9. It shows the analytical framework which is applied to the empirical data of the specialised OBOR text corpus in the following two chapters. It should be noted, however, that the political functions of the speakers are only mentioned once at the beginning of each sub-section of Chapter 8. Similarly, the Jakarta Post and its readership are only introduced at the very start of Chapter 9. Owing to the central role of China's OBOR vision in this research, the empirical section dealing with the speeches by the three Chinese politicians is further particularly elaborate.




Figure 9. Analytical Framework (compiled by the author).

The results of the analysis are discussed in Chapter 10 and 11, employing the following three types of comparison mentioned by Holsti (1969, pp. 28–32): (1) *inter-message analysis*, i.e.

the comparison of messages from a single source in different situations, (2) *contingency analysis* regarding the relationship of certain aspects within a single document, and (3) *inter-source analysis*, i.e. the comparison of messages from different sources.

8. Text Corpus – Part 1: Speeches

In this chapter, the analytical framework is applied to the speeches compiled in Part 1 of the specialised text corpus on the OBOR discourse. The speeches are examined by speaker in the following order: (1) President Xi Jinping, (2) Premier Li Keqiang, and (3) FM Wang Yi.

8.1. President Xi Jinping

At the 18th National Congress convened in November 2012, Xi Jinping was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, "making him China's top leader for what is expected to be the next decade" (Lawrence, 2014, p. 58). In March 2013, he also became State President of the PRC (Lawrence, 2014, p. 59) and as such attends to primarily ceremonial duties (Lawrence & Martin, 2014, p. 34). Xi Jinping thus simultaneously serves as head of the CPC, head of the military and head of the state—with the latter function being most relevant to this research.

Xi_1: Nazarbayev University

On September 7, 2013, President Xi delivered a speech at Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats and academics. The speech was explicitly addressed to Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev, and the president, faculty members and students of Nazarbavey University (see China.org.cn, 2013; MOFA, 2013b).

The speech text is 33 paragraphs long. It has four central themes: China-Kazakhstan relations (especially in the context of the ancient Silk Road), the relationship between China and Central Asian countries as friendly neighbours, President Xi's proposal to jointly build the SREB, and the importance of young people and knowledge for thriving bilateral relations. In paragraph 18, President Xi states that "an innovative approach" to "jointly build an 'economic belt along the Silk Road'" should be taken in order "[t]o forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development space in the Eurasian region" to the benefit of all peoples along route (MOFA, 2013b). To this end, he suggests starting out "with work in individual areas and link them up over time to [eventually] cover the whole region" (MOFA, 2013b). In paragraph 21, President Xi further elaborates on one of these initial focus areas, namely the promotion of unimpeded trade. In this context, he points out that "[t]he

proposed ‘economic belt along the Silk Road’ is inhabited by close to 3 billion people and represents the biggest market in the world” with sheer unparalleled potential for trade and investment cooperation (MOFA, 2013b). Therefore, trade and investment facilitation, the removal of trade barriers and the reduction of trade and investment costs should be discussed. All in all, President Xi thus referred to the OBOR goal of unimpeded trade in this speech and made use of directives.

Xi_2: Indonesian Parliament

On October 2, 2013, President Xi gave a speech at the Indonesian Parliament—more precisely to the People’s Representative Council—in Jakarta, Indonesia. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats. The speech, however, was simply addressed to “friends” (Xu, 2013).

The speech has 19 paragraphs and deals with China-Indonesia friendly relations, the strategic partnership between China and ASEAN, and China’s economic development as the main themes. In paragraph 10, President Xi elaborates on the need for China and ASEAN to advance win-win cooperation. Referring to Southeast Asia as a key hub of the ancient maritime Silk Road, he states that “China will strengthen maritime cooperation with ASEAN countries to make good use of the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund […] and vigorously develop maritime partnership in a joint effort to build the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century” (Xu, 2013). In this speech, President Xi thus touched upon the OBOR goals of unimpeded trade and financial integration, and made use of a commissive.

Xi_3: College of Europe

On April 1, 2014, President Xi gave a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, academics and other guests not further specified. The speech was explicitly addressed to King Philippe and Queen Mathilde of Belgium, President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, Belgium’s Prime Minister Elio Di Rupo, Spain’s President Inigo Mendez de Vigo, Rector of the College of Europe Jörg Monar, and more generally to diplomatic envoys, faculty members and students (see College of Europe, 2014; MOFA, 2014t).

The speech is 25 paragraphs long. Its main topics are the role and development of the College of Europe, China-EU relations including four “bridges” that need to be built to intensify

cooperation, and President Xi's descriptions of some of China's key features that are important to know to be able to properly understand the country. In paragraph 19, President Xi elaborates on the "need to build a bridge of growth and prosperity" to link the markets of China and the EU (MOFA, 2014t). In this context, he states that the two parties "should […] study how to dovetail China-EU cooperation with the initiative of developing the Silk Road economic belt so as to integrate the markets of Asia and Europe" and provide new impetus to economic activities on the two continents (MOFA, 2014t). In this speech, President Xi did not refer to any OBOR but made use of a directive.

Xi_4: 4th CICA Summit

On May 21, 2014, President Xi presented his remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Shanghai, China. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats and others, such as representatives of international organisations (see MOFA, 2014o, 2014u).

The speech has 31 paragraphs. Its main themes are the role of Asia in today's world, China's peaceful development, its vision of and commitment to CICA, and the new concept of "common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security in Asia" (MOFA, 2014o). In paragraph 29, President Xi talks about China's commitment to maintaining friendly relations with its neighbours. He thereby mentions that "China will work with other countries to speed up the development of an economic belt along the Silk Road and a 21st Century maritime silk road", and that it is hoped that the AIIB will be launched soon (MOFA, 2014o). In this speech, President Xi thus referred to the OBOR goal of financial integration, making use of a commissive and an expressive.

Xi_5: 60th Anniversary of the Five Principles

On June 28, 2014, President Xi gave an address at a conference commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in Beijing, China. The audience consisted of diplomats/politicians. The speech was explicitly addressed to President of Myanmar, U Thein Sein, Vice President of India, Mohammad Hamid Ansari, and diplomatic envoys (see MOFA, 2014b; People's Daily Online, 2014b).

The text is 42 paragraphs long. The main topics of the address are the history, commemoration, promotion and coverage of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,

and China's commitment to building the current international system in consideration of these Five Principles. In paragraph 39, President Xi reaffirms China's commitment to the strategy of opening-up featuring win-win cooperation. He thereby refers to the SREB, MSR and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor as examples of major cooperation initiatives proposed by China, and stresses that "China will seize the opportunity presented by these initiatives to launch a new round of all-round opening-up" (MOFA, 2014b). In this speech, President Xi referred to the OBOR goal of facilities connectivity in this speech, and used a commissive.

Xi_6: State Great Khural of Mongolia

On August 22, 2014, President Xi delivered a speech at the State Great Khural of Mongolia in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats and others not further specified. The speech was explicitly addressed to the President of Mongolia, Tsakhia Elbegdorj, and his wife, the Chairman of the State Great Khural, Zandaakhuu Enkhbold, Prime Minister Norovyn Altankhuyag, and more generally to ministers and members of the State Great Khural (see MOFA, 2014p, 2014aa).

The speech is 32 paragraphs long and deals with three main themes, namely the deepening of China-Mongolia bilateral ties, China's peaceful development and neighbourhood policy, and Asia as a dynamic hotspot region upholding the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Elaborating on the need of China and Mongolia to be good, mutually supportive neighbours, President Xi states in paragraph 10 that "China is […] ready to increase cooperation with Mongolia in matters covered by the Silk Road Economic Belt project" and that it is "open to Mongolia's initiative for passage to grassland" (MOFA, 2014p). He also says that mutually beneficial cooperation may be deepened through new platforms such as the AIIB. In this speech, President Xi thus referred to the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity and financial integration, making use of a commissive.

Xi_7: 14th Meeting of the SCO Council – Heads of State

On September 12, 2014, President Xi held a speech at the 14th Meeting of the Council of the Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) member states in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats and others, such as

representatives of international organisations. The only person explicitly addressed in the speech was President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon (see MOFA, 2014x, 2014z).

The text consists of 20 paragraphs. The speech's main theme is the further development of the SCO. Elaborating on the importance to intensify external cooperation, President Xi brings up his proposal of building the SREB—which according to him has been particularly well received by the SCO member states—in paragraph 17. He mentions that "the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt is entering a new stage featuring practical cooperation", with China welcoming "the active participation from SCO member states, observer states and dialogue partners" to jointly formulate plans, work on projects, "establish a new model of regional and south-south cooperation" and, for instance, promote regional connectivity (MOFA, 2014x). In this speech, President Xi referred to the OBOR goals of policy coordination and facilities connectivity. He thereby made use of a directive.

Xi_8: 9th G20 Summit

On November 15, 2014, President Xi presented his remarks at the Ninth Group of 20 (G20) Summit in Brisbane, Australia. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with Australia's Prime Minister Tony Abbott being the only person explicitly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2014q, 2014y).

The speech is 12 paragraphs long and deals with President Xi's suggestions of how to promote the G20 Comprehensive Growth Strategy and China's economic development as its main themes. In paragraph 6, President Xi proposes to leverage "the pulling effect of infrastructure on the economy" (MOFA, 2014q). In this context, he states that China supports various international platforms in their efforts to advance global infrastructure investment, and that the country will do its part by establishing the SREB, the MSR, the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund. In this speech, President Xi referred to the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity and financial integration and performed a commissive.

Xi_9: Parliament of Australia

On November 17, 2014, President Xi gave an address at the Parliament of Australia in Canberra, Australia. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, academics and others not further specified. The speech was explicitly addressed to the Prime Minister of Australia, Tony Abbott; the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Bronwyn Bishop; the President

of the Senate, Stephen Parry; the Leader of the Labour Party, Bill Shorten; and more generally to senators and members of the House (see MOFA, 2014f, 2014ab).

The speech text has 39 paragraphs. The main topics of the speech are the development and further improvement of China-Australia friendly relations, and the key issues of China's economic development. Elaborating on China's commitment to promoting cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region and its neighbouring countries, in particular, President Xi states in paragraph 22 that China will cooperate with others "to make good use of such platforms as APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation], EAS [East Asia Summit] and ARF [ASEAN Regional Forum]", advance the RCEP negotiations "and accelerate the building of the Silk Road economic belt and the 21st-century maritime Silk Road" with a view to "creat[ing] a virtuous cycle of development and security" in the region (MOFA, 2014f). Talking about the importance to advance strategic dialogue between China and Australia, President Xi further says in paragraph 35 that—with Oceania as the "natural extension of the ancient maritime Silk Road"—"China welcomes Australia's participation in the 21st-century maritime silk Road" (MOFA, 2014f). He thereby also suggests deeper cooperation in the field of security with regard to humanitarian disaster relief, counter-terrorism and maritime safety. Therefore, President Xi touched upon to the goal of people-to-people bond in this speech. He also used a commissive and directives.

Xi_10: Boao Forum for Asia 2015

On March 28, 2015, President Xi delivered a keynote speech at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2015 in Boao, China. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats from 14 different countries, and others. The speech was generally addressed to heads of state, government and international as well as regional organisations; and to ministers and members of the Board of Directors of the Boao Forum for Asia (see Euronews, 2015; MOFA, 2015i).

The text is 33 paragraphs long. The main themes of the speech are the developments in Asia and the world over the past 70 years, President Xi's views on how to build a community of common destiny in Asia, and China's economic development. Elaborating on China's commitment to maintaining friendly relations with its neighbours, President Xi brings up the building of the SREB and the MSR he proposed in 2013 in paragraph 29. He states that

"[t]he 'Belt and Road' initiative [meets] the development needs of China, countries along the routes and the region at large", serving their common interests and "answer[ing] the call of our time for regional and global cooperation" (MOFA, 2015i). In paragraph 30, President Xi further emphasises the open and inclusive nature of OBOR and the AIIB. He states that—to promote these initiatives—China will adopt an approach of "wide consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits" and build on existing cooperation mechanisms with a view to facilitating the alignment of national development strategies (MOFA, 2015i). In this context, President Xi also mentions that more than 60 countries and international organisations have already expressed their interest in joining OBOR, and that China welcomes all countries to take part in the initiative. Finally, in paragraph 31, he stresses that OBOR "is not meant as rhetoric" but "represents real work" bringing "real benefits" to the region (MOFA, 2015i). He thereby refers to the release of the Action Plan, the establishment of the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund and the progress of several infrastructure connectivity projects as early achievements and signs of promising prospects for the initiative. In this speech, President Xi thus referred to the OBOR goals of policy coordination, facilities connectivity and financial integration. He thereby made use of a directive and commissives.

Xi_11: Parliament of Pakistan

On April 21, 2015, President Xi gave a speech at the Parliament of Pakistan in Islamabad, Pakistan. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with Pakistan's Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Senate Chairman Raza Rabbani, Speaker of the National Assembly Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, and more generally ministers and members of the parliament being addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2015c, 2015w).

The text consists of 32 paragraphs. The speech's main topics are the development and deepening of China-Pakistan bilateral relations in the context of establishing a community of shared destiny in Asia, China's development and it relations with South Asia. Elaborating on China's development approach, President Xi refers in paragraph 25 to the building of the SREB and the MSR as important initiatives launched by China to fully open-up the country, however, also to the benefit of others. He states that China "will strengthen cooperation with countries along the land and maritime Silk Roads and realize the connectivity of roads, trade, finance, policies and our peoples" in order to achieve sustainable development in the regions

concerned (MOFA, 2015c). In paragraph 26, President Xi further says that the two routes of OBOR meet in South Asia, which "is therefore a focal area and important cooperation partner for advancing the Belt and Road Initiative" (MOFA, 2015c). In this context, he also mentions the satisfying progress of the China-Pakistan and the BCIM economic corridors, which are both closely associated with the initiative and are expected to greatly advance cooperation and development in South Asia. In this speech, President Xi thus touched upon all five main goals of OBOR and made use of a commissive.

Xi_12: Asian African Summit

On April 22, 2015, President Xi presented his remarks at the Asian African Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats and others, such as heads of international organisations. The only person explicitly addressed in the speech was the President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo (see MOFA, 2015d, 2015as).

The text is 21 paragraphs long. The main themes covered by the speech are the promotion of a new type of international relations taking up the Bandung Spirit, and China's economic development and commitment to closer Asia-Africa relations. Elaborating on China's support of more cooperation with other developing countries in Asia and Africa, in particular, President Xi states in paragraph 17 that China will cooperate "with all parties in the building on the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, managing well the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and making proper use of the Silk Road Fund" (MOFA, 2015d). In this speech, President Xi thus referred to the OBOR goal of financial integration and performed a commissive.

Xi_13: 15th Meeting of the SCO Council – Heads of State

On July 10, 2015, President Xi made a statement at the 15th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO member states in Ufa, Russia. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats (see MOFA, 2015ah, 2015at).

The speech is 28 paragraphs long and deals with the promotion of SCO development in accordance with the SCO Development Strategy Towards 2015 as its main theme. In paragraph 16, President Xi elaborates on the proposal to establish a SCO development bank in order to advance intra-organisational cooperation. He thereby states that "China is ready to use financing platforms such as the Silk Road Fund and the China-Eurasia Economic

Cooperation Fund" to support investment cooperation of SCO member states (MOFA, 2015ah). In paragraph 19, President Xi further mentions that thanks to the "support of all parties, the initiative of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt proposed by China is well underway" (MOFA, 2015ah). He also expresses China's hope that the SREB and the development plans of other SCO member states go well together, and states that China "will work with relevant countries to form synergy between this initiative [SREB] and the Eurasian Economic Union" with a view to promoting more balanced development on the Eurasian continent (MOFA, 2015ah). Finally, in paragraph 20, President Xi stresses that SCO member states "should carry forward the silk road spirit and enhance public support" to allow for deeper understanding and lasting friendship between the different peoples involved (MOFA, 2015ah). All in all, President Xi thus referred to the OBOR goals of policy coordination, financial integration and people-to-people bond in this speech. He also performed a directive, commissives and an expressive.

Xi_14: Welcome Dinner

On September 22, 2015, President Xi delivered a speech at a welcome dinner hosted by local governments and friendly organisations in the United States in Seattle, USA. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, business representatives and other dignitaries. The people explicitly addressed in the speech were Henry Kissinger; Governor Jay Inslee of the State of Washington; Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker; the Mayor of Seattle, Ed Murray; the Chairwoman of the National Committee on US-China Relations, Carla Hills; and the Chairman of the US-China Business Council, Mark Fields (see CCTV.com, 2015; MOFA, 2015af).

The text consists of 31 paragraphs. It has two main themes, namely the development and advancement of China-US major country relations, and President Xi's thoughts on China's development and overall policy orientation. Elaborating on China's commitment to peaceful development, President Xi talks about the mutually beneficial synergies between China's development and that of the international community in paragraph 21. He thereby takes the opportunity to assert that China's OBOR initiative, the establishment of the Silk Road Fund and the proposal of the AIIB "are all aimed at helping the common development of all countries rather than seeking some kind of spheres of political influence" (MOFA, 2015af).

President Xi also stresses that OBOR is open and inclusive, and welcomes the US and other countries as well as international organisations to participate in the initiative. In this speech, President Xi thus touched upon the OBOR goal of financial integration, making use of a directive.

Xi_15: 3rd China-US Governors' Forum

On September 22, 2015, President Xi gave an address at the Third China-US Governors' Forum in Seattle, USA. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with the people explicitly addressed in the speech being the Governor of California, Jerry Brown; the Governor of Washington, Jay Inslee; the Governor of Iowa, Terry Branstad; the Governor of Michigan, Rick Snyder; the Governor of Oregon, Kate Brown; and more generally leaders of provinces and states (see MOFA, 2015b, 2015aq).

The text consists of 14 paragraphs, and has the advancement of China-US relations in special consideration of sub-national cooperation as its main theme. Elaborating on the need for both China and the US to leverage each other's favourable policies, President Xi talks about China's efforts to promote social and economic development in accordance with the country's 13th five-year plan (FYP) in paragraph 8. In this context, he mentions that China "will advance the Belt and Road Initiative at a faster pace" to allow Chinese provinces such as Xinjiang—"a core area of the Silk Road economic belt"—and Yunnan, which he calls a "gateway to the southwest under the 'Belt and Road' Initiative", to expand their external relations (MOFA, 2015b). He then also says that the active participation of the US and other countries in the initiative is welcome. In this speech, President Xi did not refer to any of the main goals of OBOR. He did, however, make use of a commissive.

Xi_16: UN Sustainable Development Summit

On September 26, 2015, President Xi presented his remarks at the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Summit in New York, USA. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with the speech being generally addressed to the co-chairs (see MOFA, 2015al).

The text has 24 paragraphs, and the speech's main topics are the coverage and implementation of the Post-2015 Development Agenda adopted by the summit as well as China's commitment to the cause. In the latter context, President Xi states in paragraph 23

that "China is […] ready to work with other relevant parties to move forward the implementation of the 'Belt and Road' initiative" and "achieve an early operation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS [Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa] New Development Bank" in order to promote economic growth and a higher standard of living for developing countries (MOFA, 2015al). In this speech, President Xi thus touched upon the OBOR goals of financial integration and people-to-people bond, making use of a commissive.

Xi_17: National Assembly of Vietnam

On November 6, 2015, President Xi gave an address at the National Assembly of Vietnam in Hanoi, Vietnam. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats and others not further specified. The speech was explicitly addressed to the Chairman of the National Assembly, Nguyen Sinh Hung, and more generally to deputies and comrades (see MOFA, 2015ao, 2015au).

The text is 22 paragraphs long and deals with the forging of stronger China-Vietnam relations—especially between their communist parties—as the main theme. Elaborating on the importance to engage in win-win cooperation, President Xi brings up the two countries' already close economic ties and converging interests in paragraph 17. He states that China considers the alignment of their development strategies an important step adding momentum to their comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. In this context, President Xi mentions that China "is ready to strengthen cooperation with Vietnam in connectivity and other infrastructure projects, production capacity, investment and trade under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Two Corridors and One Economic Circle plan" (MOFA, 2015ao). Therefore, President Xi referred to the OBOR goals of policy coordination, facilities connectivity and unimpeded trade in this speech, performing a commissive.

Xi_18: Singapore Lecture

On November 7, 2015, President Xi delivered a speech as a guest speaker of the 36th Singapore Lecture at the National University of Singapore, Singapore. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats and academics. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong; Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean; the President of the National University of Singapore, Tan Chorh Chuan; Professor Wang Gungwu; and more generally faculty

members and students were addressed in the speech (see ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, 2015; MOFA, 2015h).

The text has 38 paragraphs, with its main themes being China-Singapore bilateral relations, China's neighbourhood diplomacy—especially regarding the deepening of cooperation with Southeast Asian countries—and China's own development. Elaborating on the latter point, President Xi brings up his proposal to build the SREB and MSR in paragraph 15. He states that "[t]he Belt and Road Initiative, as it is now called, is about openness, development and cooperation" (MOFA, 2015h). President Xi then lists a number of examples demonstrating the initiative's steady progress, such as the release of the Action Plan, the signing of the Articles of Agreement of the AIIB, and the launch of the Silk Road Fund. He also makes clear that China's neighbours are the main partners and primary beneficiaries of OBOR—which is why "China welcomes its neighbours to get involved in the Belt and Road Initiative" (MOFA, 2015h). In this speech, President Xi thus referred to the OBOR goals of policy coordination and financial integration, and made use of a directive.

Xi_19: 10th G20 Summit

On November 15, 2015, President Xi presented his remarks at Session I of the Tenth G20 Summit in Antalya, Turkey. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan being the only person explicitly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2015j, 2015ar).

The text is 24 paragraphs long and has two main themes, namely the role of G20 and closer cooperation amongst the member states as well as China's own economic development. Elaborating on China's development trajectory for the coming five years, President Xi talks in paragraph 21 about the country's intent to work towards a closer integration of its economy with the global economy. He thereby mentions that China will implement OBOR, open-up its market to foreign investments "and build a community of shared interests" (MOFA, 2015j). In this speech, President Xi therefore did not refer to any OBOR goal but made use of a commissive.

Xi_20: APEC CEO Summit

On November 18, 2015, President Xi delivered a keynote speech at the APEC Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Summit in Manila, the Philippines. The audience consisted of

business representatives, with the speech being explicitly addressed to the Chairman of the Summit, Tony Tan Caktiong, and more generally to business leaders from the Asia-pacific region (see MOFA, 2015aj; Xinhuanet, 2015a).

The text consists of 24 paragraphs. The main themes of the speech are the advancement of the Asia-Pacific economy and China's economic development. In paragraph 20, President Xi presents China as "a member of the Asia-Pacific family" (MOFA, 2015aj). In this context, he mentions his proposal "of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road", and states that the initiative had been well-received, "gaining momentum and achieving some initial results" (MOFA, 2015aj). In paragraph 21, President Xi further talks about China's commitment to open regionalism. He says that many cooperation agreements were signed with a view "to harmoniz[ing] policies and development strategies and facilitate [sic] freer and more orderly flow of economic factors, […] and deeper integration of the markets" (MOFA, 2015aj). The implementation of OBOR will thus allow for "even broader, deeper and more sophisticated cooperation at the regional level" (MOFA, 2015aj). Finally, in paragraph 22, President Xi elaborates on the progress already made regarding economic corridors and major bi- and multilateral projects. He thereby mentions China's establishment of the Silk Road Fund and the forthcoming launch of the AIIB. At the end, President Xi also states that China "will gradually put in place new cooperation platforms in such priority areas as economy and trade, energy, investment, people-to-people and cultural exchanges" (MOFA, 2015aj). In this speech, President Xi thus not only touched upon all five main goals of OBOR but also performed a commissive.

Xi_21: 23rd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting

On November 19, 2015, President Xi presented his remarks at Session I of the 23rd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Manila, Philippines. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with the only person explicitly addressed in the speech being "Mr. Chair" (MOFA, 2015g)—which most likely referred to the chair of the meeting, i.e. the President of the Philippines, Benigno Aquino III (see MOFA, 2015g, 2015ap).

The text is 14 paragraphs long. The speech's main themes are the role and further development of the Asia-Pacific region and China's commitment to the APEC process. In paragraph 10, President Xi talks about the importance of APEC member countries to agree

on and take concrete actions. He says that "[t]he connectivity blueprint adopted at the Beijing meeting" must be advanced to overcome "the bottlenecks in Asia-Pacific's development", and further talks about the progress already achieved in launching the AIIB—which he calls "an important platform for regional connectivity"—and the implementation of both the SREB and the MSR, "with economic corridors identified as the priority area of cooperation" (MOFA, 2015g). President Xi further mentions that "the projects supported by the Silk Road Fund have started operation" (MOFA, 2015g). In this speech, President Xi thus touched upon the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity and financial integration, making use of a directive.

Xi_22: Opening Ceremony of the AIIB

On January 16, 2016, President Xi gave an address at the Opening Ceremony of the AIIB in Beijing, China. The audience consisted of about 450 people from 57 different countries falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and others. The speech was addressed to heads of delegations and ministers (see MOFA, 2016d; The Japan Times, 2016).

The speech is 18 paragraphs long, and its main topics are the development, nature and expected impacts of the AIIB on economic growth, as well as China's role in advancing (inter)national development. Talking about the focus points of China's current development agenda, President Xi asserts in paragraph 16 China's continuous commitment to further opening-up. He further states that "China stands ready to work with other parties to make sure that the AIIB will start to operate […] as soon as possible" and that it "continues to welcome AIIB and other international financial institutions to take part in the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" (MOFA, 2016d). President Xi thus referred to the OBOR goal of financial integration in this speech, making use of a commissive and a directive.

Xi_23: Nuclear Security Summit

On April 1, 2016, President Xi held a speech at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C., USA. The audience consisted of people from 52 different countries falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and others, such as heads of international organisations. The only person explicitly addressed in the speech was US President Barack Obama (see MOFA, 2016x, 2016ab).

The text consists of 26 paragraphs and deals with two major themes: the establishment of a global nuclear security architecture and China's own progress in and contributions to nuclear security. In paragraph 21, President Xi talks about China's intention to form a network for capacity building in the field of nuclear security based on already existing mechanisms. He thereby mentions that China "welcome[s] the participations of […] countries along the Belt and Road and other developing countries in relevant projects" and that it will also closely cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA; MOFA, 2016x). In this speech, President Xi therefore did not refer to any of the main goals of OBOR but made use a directive and a commissive.

Xi_24: B20 Summit

On September 3, 2016, President Xi delivered a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the Business 20 (B20) Summit in Hangzhou, China. The audience consisted of more than 1,100 people falling in the categories of politicians/diplomats, business representatives and others such as heads of international organisations (see MOFA, 2016l, 2016aa).

The speech text is 48 paragraphs long and deals with three major themes: China's economic development, President Xi's suggestions of how to jointly address the current issues of the global economy, and various aspects that G20 members should cooperate on more intensely with the international community. Elaborating on the continuation of China's opening-up strategy to the benefit of all, President Xi mentions in paragraph 22 China's intention to be more active in the provision of public goods. He thereby brings up his proposal "of building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road to share China's development opportunities with countries along the Belt and Road" (MOFA, 2016l). He also points out that "[m]ajor progress has been made in launching" the MSR "and building the economic corridors" of the SREB; and that the AIIB "has already started its positive role in regional infrastructure development" (MOFA, 2016l). In this speech, President Xi thus referred to the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity and financial integration without, however, performing any illocutionary acts.

8.2. Premier Li Keqiang

In March 2013, Li Keqiang—the CPC's second-ranked official (Lawrence, 2014, p. 69)—became Premier of the State Council of the PRC (State Council, 2014a), which represents

the virtual "locus of power in the State system" and is primarily concerned with the daily management of China's economy (Lawrence & Martin, 2014, p. 36). Premier Li, who holds a PhD in economics from Peking University (The Economist, 2015), is thus regarded as "China's most senior economic official" (Lawrence & Martin, 2014, p. 36).

Li_1: Boao Forum for Asia 2014 – Opening Ceremony

On April 10, 2014, Premier Li gave a speech at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2014 in Boao, China. The audience consisted of people from 52 different countries falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats, business representatives, academics and media representatives (see MOFA, 2014e, 2014j).

The speech text is 22 paragraphs long and deals with Asia's and China's economic development as the main topics. Elaborating on the need to promote integrated development, Premier Li talks in paragraph 9 about the importance of infrastructure connectivity. He says that "countries in the region should join hands and speed up infrastructure construction" and that China is ready to jointly work out plans with countries involved to build economic corridors (such as the BCIM Economic Corridor) and to upgrade the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA; MOFA, 2014e). Premier Li thereby stresses that "China will continue to promote the important projects of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road this year" (MOFA, 2014e). He also states that "China is ready to intensify consultations with relevant parties" on the forthcoming launch of the AIIB, which is hoped to happen in the near future (MOFA, 2014e). In this speech, Premier Li thus touched upon the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade and financial integration. He also performed a directive, commissives and an expressive.

Li_2: 10th ASEM Summit

On October 16, 2014, Premier Li presented his remarks at the first plenary session of the Tenth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit in Milan, Italy. The audience consisted of people from more than 50 countries falling into the category of politicians/diplomats. The only person explicitly addressed in the speech was "Mr. President" (State Council, 2014b), which most likely referred to the Chair of the summit, i.e. the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy (see European Council & Council of the European Union, 2014; MOFA, 2014i; State Council, 2014b).

The speech has 12 paragraphs, with its main themes being ASEM and the deepening of Asia-Europe cooperation, and China's development and approach to foreign relations. In paragraph 6, Premier Li stresses that connectivity as well as trade and investment liberalisation need to be jointly promoted in Asia and Europe. He thereby mentions that "China has initiated the Silk Road economic belt and the 21st century maritime Silk Road" and that it "is ready to work with countries in the region to build a network of infrastructure connectivity on Eurasia" with a view to deepening regional cooperation and common development (State Council, 2014b). Premier Li also states that "China will host a dialogue on Asia-Europe connectivity in 2015, and […] launch a number of cooperation projects in this regard in due time" (State Council, 2014b). In this speech, Premier Li thus referred to the OBOR goal of facilities connectivity and made use of commissives.

Li_3: 4th Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan

On October 31, 2014, Premier Li gave a speech at the opening ceremony of the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan in Beijing, China. The audience consisted of people from 46 countries falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and others, such as representatives of international organisations. The speech was explicitly addressed to Afghanistan's President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and the foreign ministers of participating countries (see MOFA, 2014g, 2014v).

The speech is 19 paragraphs long and deals with the event itself, the settlement of the Afghan issue and the China-Afghanistan relations as its main themes. In paragraph 16, Premier Li reaffirms China's support of Afghanistan's participation in regional cooperation efforts. In this context, he states that "China wishes to see Afghanistan […] actively participate in China's Silk Road economic belt initiative" and that "China's competent departments will send working groups to have thorough consultations with Afghanistan on specific cooperation programs" (MOFA, 2014v). In this speech, Premier Li addressed the OBOR goal of people-to-people bond. He also made use of a directive and a commissive.

Li_4: 17th APT Summit

On November 13, 2014, Premier Li presented his remarks at the 17th ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats,

with Myanmar's President Thein Sein being the only person explicitly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2014d).

The speech consists of 14 paragraphs and has the enhancement of APT cooperation as its main theme. In paragraph 8, Premier Li elaborates on China's call for deeper cooperation as far as connectivity is concerned. Talking about the issue of infrastructure financing, he refers to the progress already made in launching the AIIB, which—together with the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)—"will make [sic] positive contribution to infrastructure financing in Asia, ASEAN countries in particular" (MOFA, 2014d). Premier Li further mentions China's recent announcement to establish "a US$40 billion Silk Road Fund with a priority on connectivity" (MOFA, 2014d). In this speech, Premier Li thus only referred to the OBOR goal of financial integration; he did not perform any illocutionary acts.

Li_5: 17th ASEAN-China Summit

On November 13, 2014, Premier Li presented his remarks at the 17th ASEAN-China Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with Myanmar's President Thein Sein being the only person explicitly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2014c, 2014r).

The text is 13 paragraphs long. Its main theme is the strengthening of the China-ASEAN strategic partnership. In paragraph 2, Premier Li talks about the deepening relations of China and ASEAN by mentioning great achievements that had already been made. He thereby states that together they have "come up with such major initiatives as to build […] the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" (MOFA, 2014r). In paragraph 9, Premier Li elaborates on the need to quickly develop a basic connectivity network. He thereby states that both parties—China and ASEAN—may continue to work towards an early launch of the AIIB and that "China has announced the establishment of the Silk Road Fund" to allow for the financial support of regional infrastructure development "on a priority basis" (MOFA, 2014r). In paragraph 10, Premier Li goes on to elaborate on the need for China and ASEAN to deepen maritime cooperation. In this context, he brings up China's proposal to build a MSR to facilitate such cooperation. In this speech, Premier Li thus touched upon the OBOR goals of unimpeded trade and financial integration without, however, performing any illocutionary acts.

Li_6: 9th EAS

On November 13, 2014, Premier Li presented his remarks at the Ninth EAS in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with the only person explicitly addressed in the speech being Myanmar's President Thein Sein (see State Council, 2014c).

The speech has 18 paragraphs.[41] Its main theme is the importance of cooperation for peace and stability in East Asia. In paragraph 12, Premier Li elaborates on the need to step up cooperation on connectivity in East Asia. He states that China's initiatives "to build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road are aimed at strengthening connectivity among countries along the ancient land and maritime Silk Roads" (State Council, 2014c). He also mentions that the AIIB should be open, inclusive and complementary to other existing institutions such as the ADB and the WB in their provision of financial support to regional infrastructure development. Premier Li further brings up China's announcement to establish the Silk Road Fund and mentions, amongst others, its intention to "support infrastructure construction on a priority basis" and to "provide US$10 billion of preferential loans to ASEAN countries" (State Council, 2014c). In this speech, Premier Li thus referred to the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity and financial integration. He also made use of commissives.

Li_7: 13th Meeting of the SCO Council – Heads of Government

On December 15, 2014, Premier Li presented his remarks at the 13th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of the SCO in Astana, Kazakhstan. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with Kazakhstan's Prime Minister Karim Massimov being the only person explicitly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2014k; State Council, 2014d).

The text is 10 paragraphs long.[42] The speech's main theme is the need for closer cooperation amongst SCO member states. Elaborating on the need for SCO member states to deepen regional cooperation, Premier Li talks about China's economic advantages and commitment to the cause in paragraph 5. In this context, he mentions that "China's initiative to build a

[41]In the original text, at two instances single sentences represented two separate paragraphs. Since they served as mere sub-headings, however, they were merged with the subsequent paragraphs. This affected the paragraph count, accordingly.

[42]At three instances in the original text, single sentences represented three separate paragraphs. Since they served the purpose of subheadings, however, they were merged with the subsequent paragraphs which affected the paragraph count, accordingly.

Silk Road Economic Belt has much in common with the development strategies of relevant SCO members" (State Council, 2014d). In paragraph 7, Premier Li further elaborates on the need of financial support for projects dealing with construction and development. He thereby mentions the necessity "to bring into better play the role of such funds as the Silk Road Foundation" (State Council, 2014d). In paragraph 8, Premier Li then goes on to stress that cooperation on people's livelihood as well as cultural and people-to-people exchanges needs to be stepped up. In this context, he brings up China's "working on a plan of green Silk Road envoys" and states that China "will be happy to offer training in environmental protection to countries along the Silk Road" (State Council, 2014d). In this speech, Premier Li dealt with the OBOR goals of policy coordination, financial integration, unimpeded trade and people-to-people bond. He thereby made use of a commissive.

Li_8: 4th China and CEEC Economic and Trade Forum

On December 16, 2014, Premier Li gave an address at the Fourth China and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) Economic and Trade Forum in Belgrade, Serbia. The audience consisted of more than 1,500 people falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and business representatives. The only person explicitly addressed in the speech was Serbia's Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic (see MOFA, 2014h; State Council, 2014f).

The speech has 13 paragraphs and deals with China-CEEC cooperation as its main theme. In paragraph 12, Premier Li comments on China's economic development as it will continue to be driven by reforms and opening-up activities. He thereby mentions China's "strategic initiative of building the 'Silk Road Economic Belt' and the '21st Century Maritime Silk Road'", and says that China "stands ready to welcome the active involvement of countries concerned" (State Council, 2014f). In this speech, Premier Li did not refer to any of the main goals of OBOR but performed a commissive.

Li_9: 3rd Meeting of China and CEEC – Heads of Government

On December 16, 2014, Premier Li presented his remarks at the Third Meeting of Heads of Government of China and CEEC in Belgrade, Serbia. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with Serbia's Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic being the only person directly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2014m; State Council, 2014e).

The text consists of 12 paragraphs. Its main topics are China-CEEC relations and their potential for deeper cooperation. In paragraph 7, Premier Li talks about the outlook of jointly building new connectivity corridors. In this context, he mentions that "CEECs are welcome to take an active part in China's initiatives of building the 'Silk Road Economic Belt' and the '21st Century Maritime Silk Road'" (State Council, 2014e). In this speech, Premier Li neither referred to an OBOR goal nor performed an illocutionary act.

Li_10: 5th GMS Summit

On December 20, 2014, Premier Li presented his remarks at the opening session of the Fifth Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) Summit in Bangkok, Thailand. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats and others, such as the head of the ADB. The only person explicitly addressed in the speech was the Prime Minister of Thailand, General Prayut Chan-o-cha (see MOFA, 2014l; State Council, 2014g).

The speech is 11 paragraphs long. Its main theme is the relationship between China and the GMS, including their common achievements and proposals for deeper cooperation. In paragraph 5, Premier Li talks about the need to intensify cooperation in the field of infrastructure to promote regional economic integration. He thereby mentions that China's "Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiatives […] will bring new opportunities […] to deepen cooperation at the subregional level" (State Council, 2014g). He then elaborates on the MOU on railway cooperation between China and Thailand that was just signed, and expresses his confidence in the high quality and efficiency of the railway—a line that "will be built entirely with Chinese technology and equipment" (State Council, 2014g). Premier Li also stresses the need for the "[p]arties concerned […] to take the establishment of the Greater Mekong Railway Association as the opportunity to develop comprehensive connectivity facilities, including highways railways and shipping links at the subregional level" and to facilitate customs clearance and cross-border transport "to improve software connectivity" (State Council, 2014g). Finally, he states that "China will allocate 100 million RMB [Renminbi] for pre-stage II dredging of waterways of the Lancang-Mekong River" and that it "stands ready to share hydrological information […] to strengthen cooperation in disaster prevention" (State Council, 2014g). In this speech, Premier Li thus

touched upon all five main goals of OBOR. He also made use of directives, commissives, and an expressive.

Li_11: World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2015

On January 21, 2015, Premier Li gave a special address at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2015 in Davos, Switzerland. The audience consisted of more than 2,000 people falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats, business representatives, academics and others, such as heads of international organisations. The speech was explicitly addressed to the Chairman of the World Economic Forum, Professor Klaus Schwab, and the President of Switzerland, Simonetta Sommaruga (see MOFA, 2015u, 2015am).

The text has 26 paragraphs. The speech's main themes are suggestions of how to tackle current global issues and China's economic development. In paragraph 24, Premier Li elaborates on China's intent to step up international investment cooperation by gradually exporting its "sophisticated manufacturing capacities" to other countries (MOFA, 2015am). He thereby mentions China's proposal "to build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" and expresses China's hope to jointly advance these initiatives with other countries to the benefit of those concerned (MOFA, 2015am). In this speech, Premier Li did not refer to any of the main goals of OBOR but made use of an expressive.

Li_12: 54th Annual Session of AALCO

On April 13, 2015, Premier Li presented his remarks at the opening meeting of the 54th Annual Session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organisation (AALCO) in Beijing, China. The audience consisted of more than 200 people falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and others, such as representatives of international organisations. The speech was explicitly addressed to the President and Secretary-General of AALCO (see MOFA, 2015s, 2015ag).

The text has 17 paragraphs, and the speech's main topics are Asia-Africa relations and the role of AALCO. In paragraph 9, Premier Li talks about the need of Asian-African cooperation to work towards a global economy that is more institutionalised and open. He thereby mentions that China is ready "to align our [China's] 'Land and Maritime Silk Road' initiatives with the development plans and needs of countries along the routes" to create "new opportunities for greater cooperation in Asia and Africa" (MOFA, 2015ag). In this

speech, Premier Li touched upon the OBOR goal of policy coordination and performed a commissive.

Li_13: China-EU Business Summit

On June 29, 2015, Premier Li gave a keynote speech at the China-EU Business Summit in Brussels, Belgium. The audience consisted of about 400 people falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and business representatives. Jean-Claude Junker, the President of the European Commission, was explicitly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2015e, 2015v).

The text is 19 paragraphs long and deals with China-EU relations and the need for international cooperation on production capacity as its main themes. In paragraph 12, Premier Li elaborates on China's ability, capability and willingness to integrate its development agenda with the Investment Plan for Europe initiated by the EU to advance joint infrastructure development. He states that China does not only support Chinese enterprises to get engaged in infrastructure projects but "also welcome[s] European enterprises to take an active part in the 'Belt and Road Initiative'" (MOFA, 2015e). In paragraph 14, Premier Li further talks about the potential of China and the EU to join forces in the field of industrial investment and financial cooperation. He states that China "may fully tap the pan-European investment cooperation platform, […] AIIB and other financial arrangements, and expand cooperation with Europe through the Silk Road Fund" (MOFA, 2015e). In this speech, Premier Li dealt with the OBOR goals of unimpeded trade and financial integration. He also made use of directives.

Li_14: 9th Annual Meeting of the New Champions

On September 10, 2015, Premier Li delivered a special address at the Ninth Annual Meeting of the New Champions—also known as Ninth Summer Davos Forum—in Dalian, China. The audience consisted of more than 1,700 people falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats, business representatives, academics and media representatives. The Chairman of the World Economic Forum, Professor Klaus Schwab, was the only person explicitly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2015o; State Council, 2015c).

The text consists of 20 paragraphs. The main topics of the speech are the importance of three-party cooperation on global production capacity, and the special features and general development of China's economy. In paragraph 16, Premier Li stresses that not only national

reform but also international cooperation are needed to allow for the stability in financial markets and thus the support of the real economy. In this context, he mentions China's initiatives "to build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, and to promote global cooperation on production capacity" with a view to further opening-up the country whilst providing for "a more balanced and inclusive global industrial chain" (State Council, 2015c). In this speech, Premier Li thus touched upon the OBOR goal of unimpeded trade without, however, performing any illocutionary acts.

Li_15: Luncheon of the Business Community of Korea

On November 1, 2015, Premier Li delivered a keynote speech at a welcoming luncheon hosted by the business community of the Republic of Korea (thereafter referred to as South Korea or simply Korea) in Seoul, South Korea. The audience consisted of more than 400 people falling into the category of business representatives. Premier Li explicitly addressed the speech to the Chairman of the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Park Yongmaan (see MOFA, 2015l, 2015t).

The text is 16 paragraphs long. The speech's two main themes are China-Korea relations—including some ideas for deeper economic cooperation—and China's own economic development. In paragraph 8, Premier Li talks about the need of China and Korea to jointly explore new markets such as the ASEAN countries. He thereby states that "China supports synergizing the 'Belt and Road' Initiative and the 'Eurasia Initiative'" and that it "is ready to boost international cooperation on production capacity through such platforms as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank" (MOFA, 2015l). In this speech, Premier Li touched upon the OBOR goals of policy coordination unimpeded trade and financial integration, performing a commissive.

Li_16: 18th China-ASEAN Summit

On November 21, 2015, Premier Li presented his remarks at the 18th China-ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Najib Razak, being the only person explicitly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2015m, 2015aa).

The speech is 21 paragraphs long and has the deepening of cooperation between China and the ASEAN countries as its main topic. In paragraph 2, Premier Li talks about the good

partnership between China and ASEAN. He mentions that together they "have accelerated the building of the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road" and have generally forged a stronger bond of China-ASEAN relations to the benefit of the entire region. In paragraph 16, Premier Li further stresses the "need to synergize China's Belt and Road Initiative with the development strategies of other countries in the region" (MOFA, 2015aa). He says that whilst promoting the initiative, "China wishes to fully harness the China-ASEAN Connectivity Cooperation Committee, and take an active part in the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity"; focusing on the fields of information and land-based connectivity with a view to facilitating international transport, e.g. through the establishment of a Pan-Asia railway network (MOFA, 2015aa). Thereby, the AIIB and funds such as the Silk Road Fund and the China-ASEAN Investment Fund may be put to good use. Finally, Premier Li states that "China will set aside 10 billion US dollars for phase II of the China-ASEAN special infrastructure loan to finance relevant projects" (MOFA, 2015aa). In this speech, Premier Li referred to the OBOR goals of policy coordination, facilities connectivity and financial integration. He also made use of a directive and commissives.

Li_17: 18th APT Summit

On November 21, 2015, Premier Li delivered a speech at the 18th APT Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats. Najib Razak, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, was the only person explicitly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2015q; State Council, 2015d).

The text is 14 paragraphs long and has the enhancement of APT cooperation as its main theme. In paragraph 9, Premier Li elaborates on the need to advance connectivity—which he calls "a major part of China's Belt and Road initiative"—to deepen regional cooperation (State Council, 2015d). In this context, he expresses China's willingness to discuss the "introduction of a master plan on connectivity in East Asia" based on ASEAN's connectivity plan (State Council, 2015d). Premier Li also brings up the forthcoming launch of the AIIB as well as the substantial investment operations of the Silk Road Fund, and says that they will complement and learn from other multilateral development institutions such as the ADB and the WB. Finally, Premier Li talks about China's efforts to promote maritime connectivity, cooperation and related scientific and educational measures in East Asia, welcoming "all

parties to take part" (State Council, 2015d). In this speech, Premier Li thus dealt with the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bond. He thereby performed directives and a commissive.

Li_18: 10th EAS

On November 22, 2015, Premier Li presented his remarks at the Tenth EAS in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats. The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Najib Razak, was the only person explicitly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2015p, 2015z).

The text has 24 paragraphs. Its main themes are the further development of the EAS and China's stance on the SCS issue. Talking about the need to speed up regional economic cooperation and to strengthen the role of East Asia in the world economy, Premier Li elaborates in paragraph 7 on China's commitment to the cause. He states that "China is working with East Asian countries to advance the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road as well as international cooperation on production capacity", and that the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund will financially support these initiatives (MOFA, 2015z). Premier Li thus referred to the OBOR goals of unimpeded trade and financial integration in this speech. He did not, however, perform any illocutionary acts.

Li_19: 5th China and CEEC Economic Trade Forum

On November 24, 2015, Premier Li gave an address at the Fifth China and CEEC Economic Trade Forum in Suzhou, China. The audience consisted of more than 2,100 people, falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and business representatives. The speech itself was explicitly addressed to business leaders (see MOFA, 2015n, 2015an).

The speech is 15 paragraphs long. Its main themes are China-CEEC cooperation and China's economic outlook. Talking about the economic ties between China and CEEC, Premier Li says in paragraph 3 that currently "China is partnering with other countries to advance the Belt and Road initiative" and that there is great potential to synergise their development strategies (MOFA, 2015n). In paragraph 5, he elaborates on the need "for early completion of connectivity projects" to further advance China-CEEC cooperation, which has the "strengthen[ing of] regional transport infrastructure in synergy with the Belt and Road initiative" as one of its top priorities (MOFA, 2015n). In this context, Premier Li also states

that "[o]ne of the priorities of the 16+1 cooperation is to strengthen regional transport infrastructure in synergy with the Belt and Road initiative" (MOFA, 2015n). Premier Li further says that China will spare no effort to advance the Budapest-Belgrade railway link and the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line, and that such instances of logistics cooperation are open to companies from all countries. He also mentions China's expertise in port zone development and Internet technology, which it would both bring to the China-CEEC cooperation. Finally, in paragraph 8, Premier Li calls for an expansion of financial cooperation. He thereby mentions that financial institutions such as the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund may also support China-CEEC cooperation projects. All in all, Premier Li thus touched upon the OBOR goals of policy coordination, facilities connectivity and financial integration in this speech. He also made use of a directive and commissives.

Li_20: 4th Summit of China and CEEC

On November 24, 2015, Premier Li presented his remarks at the Fourth Summit of China and CEEC in Suzhou, China. The audience consisted of people from more than 16 countries falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and others, such as representatives of the EU (see MOFA, 2015r, 2015ac).

The text consists of 14 paragraphs and has China-CEEC cooperation as its main theme. Elaborating on the need to implement a "roadmap for advancing cooperation", Premier Li states in paragraph 7 that "China and the EU […] will work to synergize" various cooperation initiatives such as "the Belt and Road initiative with the development plan for Europe" (MOFA, 2015ac). In paragraph 8, he stresses once again the "need to promote synergy between the Belt and Road initiative and the development strategies of CEECs" at the policy level whilst striving for a fast implementation of demonstrative projects (MOFA, 2015ac). He further says that Central and Eastern European countries—"[l]ocated at the east gateway to Europe and along the routes of the Belt and Road initiative"—are in a great position to enhance connectivity, and that "China is ready to discuss and sign" respective cooperation agreements along the routes regarding projects such as the Belgrade-Budapest railway and the China-Europe land-sea express line (MOFA, 2015ac). What is more, Premier Li states that China "also encourage[s] businesses to be involved in cooperation in transport and logistics" and "welcome[s] Serbia and Latvia to lead the respective efforts" (MOFA,

2015ac). He thereby also mentions China's hope to advance customs cooperation, jointly develop China-Europe rail links and deepen cooperation in the field of civil aviation. In his speech, Premier Li thus dealt with the OBOR goals of policy coordination and facilities connectivity. He also performed directives, commissives and an expressive illocutionary act.

Li_21: 14th Meeting of the SCO Council – Heads of Government

On December 15, 2015, Premier Li presented his remarks at the extended session of the 14th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of the SCO in Zhengzhou, China. The audience comprised politicians/diplomats and others, such as heads of international organisations (see MOFA, 2015ab, 2015ai).

The text is 11 paragraphs long and deals with the strengthening of China-SCO cooperation as its main theme. In paragraph 4, Premier Li calls the formulation of "new cooperation measures in alignment with the Silk Road Economic Belt and other initiatives" an important subject of the current SCO Council meeting (MOFA, 2015ab). He further states that "China is ready to synergize its Silk Road Economic Belt initiative with the national development strategies of […] SCO member states" and with other regional cooperation mechanisms, such as the Eurasian Economic Union, to promote common regional development (MOFA, 2015ab). To this end, Premier Li proposes to strengthen cooperation on six SCO platforms whilst focusing on traditional areas of cooperation such as people-to-people exchanges. In paragraph 10, Premier Li suggests the establishment of a platform for cooperation on social issues. Bringing up the launch of the SCO environmental protection information platform, he also mentions that "China will be happy to work with other parties to formulate and implement the plan of green Silk Road envoys" (MOFA, 2015ab). Premier Li then goes on to reaffirm that "China is ready to better synchronize its development strategy with those of the countries along the Silk Road" (MOFA, 2015ab). In this speech, Premier Li referred to the OBOR goals of policy coordination, unimpeded trade and people-to-people bond. He also used a directive and commissives.

Li_22: 1st LMC Leaders' Meeting

On March 23, 2016, Premier Li gave an address at the First Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Leaders' Meeting in Sanya, China. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats (see MOFA, 2016c, 2016t).

The speech has 18 paragraphs. Its main theme are the prospects of deeper cooperation amongst the LMC countries. In paragraph 15, Premier Li stresses the need to accelerate cooperation in the fields of connectivity and production capacity. He mentions that "China has signed or is discussing with Mekong countries cooperation documents on jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" (MOFA, 2016c). In this context, he also brings up China's intent to synergise its own development strategy with that of other countries in the region. Premier Li further states that major projects such as the China-Laos railway or the China-Myanmar land-water transportation facility need to be advanced, and that the establishment of "border area economic zones, industrial parks, investment zones and transportation networks" should be explored (MOFA, 2016c). He also says that China will use platforms such as the AIIB and the Silk Road fund to support such cooperative efforts of regional infrastructure development. In this speech, Premier Li thus touched upon the OBOR goals of policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade and financial cooperation. He also performed directives and commissives.

Li_23: Boao Forum for Asia 2016 – Opening Ceremony

On March 24, 2016, Premier Li delivered a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2016 in Boao, China. The audience consisted of more than 2,100 people from 62 different countries, falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats, business representatives, academics and media representatives (see MOFA, 2016b, 2016s).

The text consists of 29 paragraphs. It has two main topics, namely cooperation in and development of Asia, and China's own economic development. In paragraph 9, Premier Li talks about the need of Asian countries to jointly advance integrated development. He expresses China's hope "to align its initiative of building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road with the development strategies of other countries in the region and regional organizations", and further states that the priorities of the AIIB and

the Silk Road Fund should be connectivity and production capacity cooperation for the benefit of Asia's developing countries (MOFA, 2016b). In this speech, Premier Li dealt with the OBOR goals of policy coordination and financial cooperation, making use of an expressive.

Li_24: 11th ASEM Summit

On July 15, 2016, Premier Li presented his remarks at the Eleventh ASEM Summit in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats and others, such as representatives of international organisations. The only person explicitly addressed in the speech was the President of Mongolia, Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj (see MOFA, 2014s, 2016p).

The text is 19 paragraphs long and deals with the development of and further cooperation amongst ASEM member states as its main theme. Elaborating on the need to advance common and coordinated economic development in the region, Premier Li says in paragraph 13 that "[t]he Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road […], initiated by China on the basis of the principle of wide consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits, have received favorable response" and that they promote not only local employment but also economic development (MOFA, 2014s). In paragraph 14, Premier Li further stresses that adaptations providing for changing conditions must be made. He thereby says that "China is ready to make full use of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund as investment and financing platforms" to explore new cooperation models (MOFA, 2014s). In this speech, Premier Li referred to the OBOR goals of policy coordination and financial integration. He also made use of a commissive.

Li_25: 19th China-ASEAN Summit

On September 7, 2016, Premier Li presented his remarks at the 19th China-ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with the only person explicitly addressed in the speech being the Prime Minister of Laos and Premier Li's co-chair at the summit, Thongloun Sisoulith (see MOFA, 2016o; State Council, 2016c).

The text is 22 paragraphs long. The speech's two main themes are China-ASEAN relations and the SCS issue. In paragraph 4, Premier Li elaborates on the fruitful cooperation between China and ASEAN. He thereby mentions that over the past couple of years "the two sides have worked actively to align the initiatives of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the

21st Century Maritime Silk Road with individual national development strategies of the region" (State Council, 2016c). In this context, he also states that "the negotiations on upgrading the China-ASEAN FTA have [sic] completed, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has been set up and the Lancang-Mekong cooperation mechanism has been instituted" (State Council, 2016c). In paragraph 19, Premier Li further talks about the need to advance China-ASEAN business cooperation, stating that "China is willing to work with ASEAN countries in building the 'Belt and Road'" (State Council, 2016c). Premier Li also says that they could synergise their development plans, deepen cooperation in the field of transport, and enhance connectivity through major projects such as the China-Laos, China-Thailand and Jakarta-Bandung railways. Finally, in paragraph 20, Premier Li suggests intensifying people-to-people exchanges and cooperation. Premier Li says that—to allow for 300,000 China-ASEAN student exchanges by 2025—"China will set up 'China-ASEAN maritime silk road scholarships'" and provide a thousand such scholarships to ASEAN students in 2017 (State Council, 2016c). In this speech, Premier Li thus dealt with all five main goals of OBOR. He also made use of commissives.

Li_26: 19th APT Summit

On September 7, 2016, Premier Li presented his remarks at the 19th APT Summit in Vientiane, Laos. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with Prime Minister of Laos, Thongloun Sisoulith, being the only person explicitly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2016n; State Council, 2016b).

The speech is 16 paragraphs long and has APT cooperation as its main theme. In paragraph 10, Premier Li talks about the need of APT countries to promote connectivity. He states that China "stands ready to strengthen synergy between the Belt and Road Initiative and the master plan [on ASEAN Connectivity 2025]", and that "China will work together with other parities [sic] to make full use of such financing platforms as the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund" to supporting connectivity projects in Asia, particularly in ASEAN countries (State Council, 2016b). Finally, Premier Li mentions that "China will continue to advance the building of the East Asia maritime cooperation platform" and that it will host "the Seminar on APT Connectivity Partnership" (State Council, 2016b). In this speech, Premier

Li thus touched upon the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade and financial integration, making use of commissives.

Li_27: 11th EAS

On September 8, 2016, Premier Li presented his remarks at the Eleventh EAS in Vientiane, Laos. The audience comprised politicians/diplomats. Only the Prime Minister of Laos, Thongloun Sisoulith, was explicitly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2016m; State Council, 2016a).

The text has 15 paragraphs. Its main themes are the EAS—its role and areas for deeper cooperation—and China's stance on the SCS issue. In paragraph 6, Premier Li elaborates on the need for the EAS to strengthen economic development cooperation, especially in the field of regional connectivity. He states that "China hopes to work with all parties to promote development of the Belt and Road Initiative", and that financing platforms such as the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund could be used to advance regional connectivity (State Council, 2016a). In this speech, Premier Li thus referred to the OBOR goal of financial integration, making use of an expressive.

Li_28: 71st Session of the UN General Assembly

On September 21, 2016, Premier Li made a statement at the General Debate of the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly in New York, USA. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with the only person explicitly addressed in the speech being President of the General Assembly Peter Thomson (see MOFA, 2016z; United Nations, n.d.).

The text is 21 paragraphs long. The speech's main topics are the advancement of sustainable development, and China's own economic development and commitment to the cause. In paragraph 17, Premier Li talks about China's intention to stick with its win-win strategy of opening-up. He thereby mentions that China will "work with parties concerned to advance the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" (MOFA, 2016z). In this speech, Premier Li did not refer to any of the main goals OBOR but performed a commissive.

Li_29: 6th China-CEEC Business Forum

On November 5, 2016, Premier Li gave a keynote speech at the Sixth China-CEEC Business Forum in Riga, Latvia. The audience consisted of almost 1,000 people falling into the category of politicians/diplomats and business representatives. Only the Prime Minister of Latvia, Maris Kucinskis, was explicitly addressed in the speech (see MOFA, 2016k, 2016q).

The text consists of 23 paragraphs and has two main themes, namely China-CEEC relations (including areas of future cooperation), and China's own strong economic performance. In paragraph 6, Premier Li talks about openness and inclusiveness as important cornerstones of successful China-CEEC and China-EU cooperation. He thereby mentions that considerable progress was made in "enhancing complementarity and synergy between the Belt and Road initiative and the development plans of Europe" (MOFA, 2016k) In this speech, Premier Li touched upon the OBOR goal of policy coordination without, however, performing any illocutionary acts.

Li_30: 5th Summit of China and CEEC

On November 5, 2016, Premier Li delivered a speech at the Fifth Summit of China and CEEC in Riga, Latvia. The audience consisted of people from more than 16 countries, falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and others, such as representatives of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The speech was explicitly addressed to the Prime Minster of Latvia, Maris Kucinskis, and observer parties such as Austria and the EU (see MOFA, 2016r; State Council, 2016d).

The speech is 12 paragraphs long and deals with China-CEEC relations and the direction of future cooperation as its main topic. Elaborating on such areas of future collaboration, Premier Li stresses in paragraph 8 the need to improve cooperation in the field of infrastructure and connectivity. He calls infrastructure development "both a significant part of the Belt and Road Initiative and a priority in '16+1' cooperation", and mentions that China encourages Chinese companies to engage in related activities (State Council, 2016d). In this context, Premier Li expresses China's readiness to advance the construction of transport corridors, such as the Budapest-Belgrade railway link and the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line, and also mentions China's intention to work towards the improvement of border crossing rules and the international supply chain. In paragraph 9, Premier Li further

elaborates on his proposal to enhance financial cooperation. He thereby briefly mentions that "China […] supports the Silk Road Fund and other financial institutions in providing financing for '16+1' cooperation projects" (State Council, 2016d). In this speech, Premier Li thus referred to the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade and financial integration, making use of a directive and commissives.

8.3. Foreign Minister Wang Yi

In March 2013, Wang Yi became Minister of Foreign Affairs and thus the head of MOFA (BBC, 2013; Lawrence, 2014, p. 82). As FM, he is primarily concerned with China's foreign affairs (Lawrence, 2014, p. 77) and therefore one of the "senior foreign policy players in China" (Lawrence, 2014, p. 81).

Wang_1: New Year Reception for 2014

On December 11, 2013, FM Wang gave a toast at MOFA's New Year Reception for 2014 in Beijing, China. The audience consisted of more than 400 people falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and others. State Councilor Yang Jiechi, his wife Le Aimei, and diplomatic envoys and representatives of international organisations and their spouses were explicitly addressed in the speech (see Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Ireland, 2013; MOFA, 2013c).

The toast is 12 paragraphs long and deals with a review of China's diplomatic achievements in 2013 and an outlook on its efforts in 2014 as the main themes. In paragraph 6, FM Wang elaborates on the successful implementation of China's neighbourhood diplomacy in the passing year. He thereby mentions that China "put forward a series of important cooperation initiatives such as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, and the Asian infrastructure investment bank" (MOFA, 2013c). In this speech, FM Wang thus touched upon the OBOR goal of financial integration. He did not, however, perform any illocutionary acts.

Wang_2: Symposium "New Starting Point"

On December 16, 2013, FM Wang gave an address at the Symposium "New Starting Point, New Thinking and New Practice 2013: China and the World" in Beijing, China. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, with former FM of China Li Zhaoxing and

diplomatic envoys being explicitly addressed in the speech (see China Pictorial, 2017; MOFA, 2013a).

The speech has 22 paragraphs. Its main themes are the review of China's diplomatic achievements in 2013 and an outlook on its diplomatic efforts in 2014. In paragraph 6, FM Wang talks about the many diplomatic initiatives that were promoted by China in 2013. According to him, these "series of major cooperation initiatives"—which "represent the direction of regional cooperation"—are in the interest of all countries concerned and "include the economic belt along the Silk Road, the maritime Silk Road for the 21st century, […] an Asian infrastructure and investment bank" as well as two economic corridors—the BCIM Economic Corridor and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (MOFA, 2013a). In paragraph 19, FM Wang further elaborates on China's efforts in the field of economic diplomacy in the upcoming year of 2014. He thereby mentions that China "will vigorously promote the development of the economic belt along the Silk Road and the maritime Silk Road for the 21st century" with a view to achieving early results (MOFA, 2013a). In this speech, FM Wang thus referred to the OBOR goals of policy coordination, facilities connectivity and financial integration, making use of a commissive.

Wang_3: 10th Lanting Forum

On October 29, 2014, FM Wang held a speech at the Tenth Lanting Forum in Beijing, China. Although the only people explicitly addressed in the speech were members of the diplomatic corps, it can be assumed that those people usually present at the Lanting Forum—namely politicians/diplomats, business representatives, academics, media representatives and others that represent the general public—also attended this event (see MOFA, 2014a; People's Daily Online, 2014a).

The speech consists of 21 paragraphs. It has three main themes: the role of APEC, China's commitment to the Asia-Pacific region, and the upcoming APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting to be hosted by China. In paragraph 10, FM Wang elaborates on China's commitment to building an open and inclusive Asia-Pacific region. He thereby mentions that "President Xi Jinping has put forth a series of major cooperation initiatives […] including the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, as well as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank" (MOFA, 2014a). He further states that Asia-Pacific

countries will be the main cooperation partners and beneficiaries of these initiatives, which are meant to be open, inclusive and complementary to already existing cooperation mechanisms. In this speech, FM Wang thus addressed the OBOR goal of financial cooperation but did not perform any illocutionary acts.

Wang_4: New Year Reception for 2015

On December 11, 2014, FM Wang made a toast at MOFA's New Year Reception for 2015 in Beijing, China. The audience consisted of about 340 people falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and others, such as representatives of international organisations. The speech was explicitly addressed to State Councilor Yang Jiechi and his wife Le Aimei; and to diplomatic envoys and representatives of international organisations as well as their spouses (see MOFA, 2014n, 2014w).

The speech is 19 paragraphs long and deals with the review of China's economic development and diplomatic achievements in 2014, and the outlook of China's diplomatic efforts in 2015 as the main themes. In paragraph 8, FM Wang states that—upholding "the ancient Silk Road spirit of mutual learning and harmonious co-existence"—China has "promoted the initiative of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" with a view to achieving common development of China and other countries in Asia and Europe (MOFA, 2014w). He thereby mentions that already more than 50 countries located at the routes have joined the initiative, that the AIIB will soon be launched and that the Silk Road Fund has already started its operations in support of OBOR. Moving on to the year of 2015, FM Wang asserts in paragraph 16 that China "will continue to advance the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road through consultation, joint development and sharing" (MOFA, 2014w). He further states that China "will kick-start the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, make good use of the Silk Road Fund", promote infrastructure connectivity and drive forward FTA negotiations whilst "work[ing] to ensure that various bilateral and regional cooperation agreements in the Asia-Pacific are inclusive and mutually reinforcing" (MOFA, 2014w). In this speech, FM Wang thus referred to all five main goals of OBOR and also performed commissives.

Wang_5: Year of China-Pakistan Friendly Exchanges

On February 12, 2015, FM Wang presented his remarks at the inauguration of the Year of China-Pakistan Friendly Exchanges in Islamabad, Pakistan. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats. The speech was explicitly addressed to the speaker of the Pakistan National Assembly, Sardar Sadiq, and to the adviser of the Prime Minister on national security and foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz (see MOFA, 2015y; SABAH News - South Asian Broadcasting Agency, 2015).

The text has 10 paragraphs and deals with the China-Pakistan "all-weather friendship" as its main theme (MOFA, 2015y). In paragraph 8, FM Wang talks about the importance that China attaches to Pakistan on its diplomatic agenda. He thereby mentions that the building of the SREB and the MSR, which were both proposed by President Xi, is currently "in full swing"; and also says that "[i]f we [China and Pakistan] liken the initiative to a symphony that involves and benefits many countries, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will be a brilliant melody of its first movement" (MOFA, 2015y). In this speech, FM Wang thus touched upon the OBOR goal of facilities connectivity without, however, performing any illocutionary acts.

Wang_6: China Development Forum 2015

On March 23, 2015, FM Wang delivered a speech at a luncheon of the China Development Forum 2015 in Beijing, China. It is assumed that the audience usually present at the China Development Forum—namely politicians/diplomats, business representatives, academics and others, such as heads of international organisations—also attended this event (see MOFA, 2015ak; State Council, 2015a).

The speech text is 30 paragraphs long and has three main topics: the history and development of dominant IR systems, China's proposal of a new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation, and China's path of peaceful development. Elaborating on the importance to pursue common economic development on the basis of shared interests, FM Wang refers in paragraph 22 to the SREB and the MSR as two Chinese initiatives upholding exactly such a vision. He states that the "'Belt and Road' initiative" is "[i]nspired by the ancient Silk Road" and that it has already been well-received by about 60 countries (MOFA, 2015ak). Additionally, FM Wang states that it "is designed to embrace the

tremendous need for cooperation among countries concerned" and that it gives priority to the development of transport infrastructure facilities in Eurasia (MOFA, 2015ak). He then also mentions that China "believe[s] the proposal to establish a US$100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is most opportune" (MOFA, 2015ak). In paragraph 23, FM Wang further asserts that "China will work with other countries and parties concerned to make the AIIB a success and ensure that the Silk Road Fund is put to good use" (MOFA, 2015ak). He says that China "will make the most of the Dialogue on Connectivity partnership and other platforms" to build economic corridors for the benefit of regions along the routes by promoting common development and regional integration (MOFA, 2015ak). "The 'Belt and Road' initiative will [thus] be a public good China provides to the world", with China "welcom[ing] all countries, international organizations, multinationals, financial institutions and NGOs to join in and be part of the specific cooperation programs" (MOFA, 2015ak).[43] All in all, FM Wang thus referred to the OBOR goals of policy coordination, facilities connectivity and financial integration in this speech. He also made use of a directive, commissives and an expressive.

Wang_7: Boao Forum for Asia 2015

On March 28, 2015, FM Wang delivered a speech at the session "ASEAN Community: A Major Milestone for Asian Integration" of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2015 in Boao, China. The audience of the Conference consisted of more than 2,700 people from 49 countries, falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats, business representatives, academics, media representatives and others, such the Chairman of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, Prince Norodom Sirivudh. The only person explicitly addressed in the speech, however, was the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (see MOFA, 2015ae; Xinhuanet, 2015b).

The text is 24 paragraphs long. The speech's main themes are the role and achievements of ASEAN and its relations with China. In paragraph 18, FM Wang talks about the recent efforts that were made to intensify China-ASEAN relations. In this context, he mentions President Xi's visit to Indonesia in October 2013 and his proposal for China and ASEAN countries to "forge a closer community of common destiny and jointly build the 21st Century

[43]The acronym NGO stands for non-governmental organisation.

Maritime Silk Road" (MOFA, 2015ae). In paragraph 21, FM Wang reaffirms that China "stand[s] ready to work with ASEAN countries to build the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road", and says that together they should "promote connectivity in infrastructure and other sectors" and "jointly work for the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank" in order to drive forward interconnected common economic development and prosperity in the region (MOFA, 2015ae). In paragraph 22, he further mentions that 2015 is the designated Year of China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation. In this context, he says that China and ASEAN countries "need to actively expand maritime cooperation so that it will […] provide important support for our [China-ASEAN] joint endeavour to build the Maritime Silk Road" (MOFA, 2015ae). In this speech, FM Wang thus dealt with the OBOR goals of policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade and financial integration. He also performed directives and a commissive.

Wang_8: 11th Lanting Forum

On April 28, 2015, FM Wang gave a keynote speech at the 11th Lanting Forum in Beijing, China. The audience consisted of people from 80 different countries, falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and others, such as representatives of international institutions. FM Wang explicitly addressed the Governor of Hebei Province, Zhang Qingwei, and members of the diplomatic corps in the speech (see MOFA, 2015k, 2015x).

The text consists of 16 paragraphs and deals with the importance to intensify international industrial cooperation and China's commitment to the cause with a view to further integrate itself in the world economy as the main themes. In paragraph 16, FM Wang talks about the economic strengths of Hebei Province. He thereby mentions that the advancements made in the implementation of OBOR and the China-Africa joint Three Networks and Industrialisation programme present Hebei with great opportunities to further globalise. In this speech, FM Wang thus touched upon the OBOR goal of facilities connectivity. He did not, however, perform any illocutionary acts.

Wang_9: 4th World Peace Forum

On June 27, 2015, FM Wang delivered a speech at the luncheon of the Forth World Peace Forum in Beijing, China. The forum was attended by people from almost 60 different countries falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats, academics, media

representatives and others, such as representatives of international organisations and think tanks (see Forum on China-Africa Cooperation [FOCAC], 2015; MOFA, 2015f).

The text is 28 paragraphs long and the speech has three main themes, namely China's views on and commitment to world peace, its role as an Asia-Pacific country, and its path of peaceful development. In paragraph 24, FM Wang talks about China's continuous effort to promote economic development in the Asia-Pacific region. He thereby refers to "the land and maritime Silk Road initiatives" as great opportunities to deepen "mutually beneficial cooperation among Asia-Pacific countries in business, investment, industrial, infrastructure and other fields"; and names international production capacity cooperation and the utilisation of financial institutions such as the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund important elements of the initiatives' implementation (MOFA, 2015f). In paragraph 25, FM Wang further elaborates on the two Silk Road initiatives. He says that "[t]he aim of these initiatives is to promote common development and shared prosperity along the routes, with a view to building a community of common destiny" (MOFA, 2015f). He also mentions that they "follow a win-win approach featuring wide consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits", and that Asia-Pacific countries are seen as the initiatives' natural partners and most direct beneficiaries (MOFA, 2015f). Finally, FM Wang stresses that Eurasian countries "should work together to make the renewal of the ancient Silk Roads a pathway towards lasting peace and cooperation" (MOFA, 2015f). In this speech, FM Wang referred to the OBOR goals of policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade and financial integration, making use of a directive.

Wang_10: 14th Lanting Forum

On September 16, 2015, FM Wang gave a keynote speech at the 14th Lanting Forum in Beijing, China. The audience consisted of about 350 people falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats, business representatives, academics, media representatives and others, such as representatives of international organisations. The speech was explicitly addressed to members of the diplomatic corps (MOFA, 2015a, 2016h).

The text consists of 51 paragraphs and has two main themes: China-US relations and the priorities and agenda of President Xi's upcoming visit to the US. Briefing the audience on the highlights of President Xi's visit, FM Wang elaborates on China's neighbourhood

diplomacy in paragraph 19. He thereby stresses that "[b]y putting forward initiatives such as building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, China does not intend to seek dominance […] but to offer more development opportunities to other countries" (MOFA, 2016h). The same holds true for the proposed AIIB, which is meant to supplement the existing financial system. In this speech, FM Wang thus touched upon the OBOR goal of financial integration. He did not, however, perform any illocutionary acts.

Wang_11: Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process

On December 9, 2015, FM Wang delivered a speech at the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process in Islamabad, Pakistan. The audience consisted of people from more than 31 countries falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and others, such as representatives of international organisations. The speech was explicitly addressed to the adviser of Pakistan's Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, and to Afghanistan's FM Salahuddin Rabbani—i.e. the two chairs of the conference (Kahn, 2015; MOFA, 2015ad).

The text consists of 15 paragraphs and deals with the promotion of closer cooperation under the framework of the Asia-Istanbul Process and China's general support for Afghanistan as the speech's main themes. In paragraph 8, FM Wang calls upon the international community to "deepen regional connectivity and economic integration" by providing "support and facilitation to Afghanistan on transportation infrastructure, investment, trade, market and tariff" (MOFA, 2015ad). He thereby states that "China welcomes active participation by Afghanistan and other Heart of Asia countries in the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative and supports early integration of Afghanistan in regional development" (MOFA, 2015ad). In paragraph 12, FM Wang further says that China actively supports cooperation and coordination efforts related to Afghanistan. He states that for the upcoming year, "China plans to hold workshops to discuss further regional cooperation on connectivity and business, host training programs on disaster relief […] and organize field trips […] to explore cooperation opportunities under the 'Belt and Road' initiative" (MOFA, 2015ad). In this speech, FM Wang thus dealt with the OBOR goals of policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade and people-to-people bond. He also performed directives and commissives.

Wang_12: New Year Reception for 2016

On January 6, 2016, FM Wang presented his remarks at MOFA's New Year Reception for 2016 in Beijing, China. The audience consisted of almost 350 people falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and others. The speech was explicitly addressed to State Councilor Yang Jiechi and his wife Le Aimei; and more generally to diplomatic envoys and representatives of international organisations and their spouses (see MOFA, 2016j, 2016v).

The speech text is 21 paragraphs long. Its main topics are China's diplomatic achievements in 2015, and the outlook on China's diplomatic efforts in 2016. Elaborating on the past year, FM Wang talks about the release of the Action Plan and the signing of cooperation agreements with more than 20 countries located at the silk routes. He also mentions the inauguration of the AIIB, and the launch of the Silk Road Fund and several major cooperation projects. What is more, he states that "[t]he Belt and Road Initiative achieved important early harvests, providing strong impetus to the development and revitalization of countries along the routes" (MOFA, 2016v). In paragraph 10, FM Wang further says that China managed to foster major-country relations. In this context, he mentions the joint decision of China and Russia to align the SREB and the Eurasian Economic Union. Talking about the year of 2016, FM Wang stresses in paragraph 15 that China will spare no effort to promote domestic development. He says that—"[w]ith promoting the Belt and Road initiative as the overarching goal"—China "will focus on the three key areas, namely, connectivity, production capacity cooperation and people-to-people exchanges" whilst upholding "the three main principles of consultation, joint development and shared benefits" (MOFA, 2016v). FM Wang assures that to this end, China will work towards a mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries whilst striving for a smooth launch of the 13th FYP. In this speech, FM Wang referred to all five main goals of OBOR. He also made use of a commissive.

Wang_13: CSIS

On February 25, 2016, FM Wang delivered a speech at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C., USA. Although lacking a formal address, it can be inferred that the audience consisted of academics and others referred to as "experts" (MOFA, 2016a; see also Xinhuanet, 2016).

The text has 44 paragraphs and covers three main topics: the development and key advantages of China's economy, its diplomacy and China's relations with the US. In paragraph 24, FM Wang elaborates on one of the main tasks of China's diplomacy, namely the promotion of China's own development. He states that currently "the most important job is to work with various countries to take forward the Belt and Road Initiative" (MOFA, 2016a). He further says that the initiative, which "is about drawing on each other's strengths and pursuing win-win economic cooperation", had already been well-received by more than 70 countries (MOFA, 2016a). In paragraph 25, FM Wang elaborates on connectivity as the first out of three pillars of OBOR. He mentions that China cooperates with other countries to establish "corridors of greater connectivity" (MOFA, 2016a). In addition to that, he states that China seeks to build such a corridor on the Eurasian continent and works towards the establishment of a pan-Asian and pan-African railway network, too. In paragraph 27, FM Wang talks about the third pillar of OBOR, namely that of people-to-people and cultural exchange. He thereby expresses China's hope that the initiative will facilitate the process of mutually beneficial learning. In this speech, FM Wang thus dealt with the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity and people-to-people bond, performing a commissive and an expressive.

Wang_14: Promotion Event – Ningxia

On March 2, 2016, FM Wang gave a speech at the inaugural event of a MOFA event series promoting Chinese Provinces—which this time focused on Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (thereafter referred to as Ningxia)—in Beijing, China. The audience consisted of politicians/diplomats, business representatives and others referred to as "people of all sides from Ningxia" (MOFA, 2016e; see also China.org.cn, 2016; MOFA, 2016i).

The speech text is 9 paragraphs long and has the new series of MOFA events and Ningxia itself as the main topics. In paragraph 5, FM Wang talks about one of the reasons why MOFA hosts such events, namely to promote the country's opening-up. He thereby mentions that "with the all-round advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative called for by President Xi Jinping, the central and western part of the country are becoming new frontiers of opening up" (MOFA, 2016e). In paragraph 7, FM Wang elaborates on Ningxia's special features. He says that "[w]ith the unfolding of the Belt and Road Initiative, today's Ningxia is a new name

card of China's opening up", and further mentions the China-Arab States Economic and Trade Forum and the China-Arab States Expo as examples of platforms that are important for the initiative (MOFA, 2016e). In this speech, FM Wang referred to the OBOR goal of unimpeded trade without, however, performing an illocutionary act.

Wang_15: 5th Foreign Ministers' Meeting of CICA

On April 28, 2016, FM Wang delivered a keynote address at the Fifth Foreign Ministers' Meeting of CICA in Beijing, China. The audience consisted of more than 40 people falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats and others, such as heads of international organisations (see MOFA, 2016g, 2016y).

The text consists of 19 paragraphs. The main topics of the speech are CICA's past achievements—with a special focus put on the progress made over the last two years under China's first CICA chairmanship—and the forum's agenda to strengthen cooperation over the course of the next two years of China's extended chairmanship. In paragraph 17, FM Wang talks about one of the key areas of cooperation suggested by China, namely that of capacity building and innovation. He states that China thinks about hosting a series of events by mid-2017 to jointly "explore a new Asian security architecture" that would focus, amongst others, on security support for OBOR (MOFA, 2016g). In this speech, FM Wang thus touched upon the OBOR goal of people-to-people bond but did not perform any illocutionary acts.

Wang_16: Promotion Event – Guangxi

On May 27, 2016, FM Wang presented his remarks at a MOFA event promoting Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (thereafter referred to as Guangxi) in Beijing, China. The audience consisted of more than 500 people from over 110 countries, falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats, business representatives, academics, media representatives and others, such as representatives of international organisations. The speech was explicitly addressed to diplomatic envoys and "friends from the media" (MOFA, 2016f; see also MOFA, 2016u).

The text is 9 paragraphs long and has three main themes: the event series hosted by MOFA itself, Guangxi and OBOR. Elaborating on the latter theme, FM Wang states in paragraph 7 that today Guangxi is automatically associated with the MSR initiative, which was initially

proposed by President Xi. He further stresses that Guangxi had already been an integral part of the ancient maritime Silk Road and that nowadays, too, it serves as "one of the important departure points and indispensable part of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road", connecting Guangxi via land routes with the Indo-China Peninsula, Central Asia and eventually even Europe (MOFA, 2016f). In paragraph 8, FM Wang mentions President Xi's call on Guangxi to become "an international passage to ASEAN, a strategic pivot for the opening-up and development of […] China and a crucial window connecting the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" (MOFA, 2016f). He further expresses China's confidence that Guangxi "will take off on the two strong wings of" OBOR—just as President Xi had envisioned (MOFA, 2016f). In this speech, FM Wang referred to the OBOR goal of facilities connectivity. He did not, however, perform any illocutionary acts.

Wang_17: Symposium on International Development and China's Diplomacy

On December 3, 2016, FM Wang gave a speech at the opening ceremony of the Symposium on International Development and China's Diplomacy. Based on the information available on previous year's symposium, it can be assumed that this event also took place in Beijing, China; with an audience of about 200 people, falling into the categories of politicians/diplomats, academics and media representatives. The speech itself was simply addressed to experts and friends (see China Institute of International Studies [CIIS], 2015; MOFA, 2016w).

The text is 42 paragraphs[44] long and deals with China's diplomatic achievements in 2016 and an outlook on the country's diplomatic agenda for the upcoming year of 2017 as its main themes. Talking about the progress that was made in China's major-country relations, FM Wang elaborates in paragraph 16 on deepening cooperation—e.g. in the fields of energy and aviation—between China and Russia. He thereby states that "greater synergy is being forged between the Belt and Road initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union", which had greatly advanced the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership (MOFA, 2016w). In paragraph 23, FM Wang further delves into the topic of OBOR. He states that "new breakthroughs in carrying out the Belt and Road initiative through enhancing

[44]At eight instances in the original text, single sentences represented eight separate paragraphs even though they actually served the purpose of subheadings. They were thus merged with the subsequent paragraphs, affecting the paragraph count, accordingly.

complementarity" were made, mentioning President Xi's review of the initiative's progress and his expression of China's readiness to cooperate with other countries located at the routes in the fields of green development, public health, think tank collaboration and peace, in particular (MOFA, 2016w). He then talks about how well the initiative had been received by more than 100 countries and international organisations, and elaborates on major milestones of increased cooperation such as the plan of China, Mongolia and Russia to establish a multilateral economic corridor, the gradual synergising of OBOR with the Eurasian Economic Union, and the inclusion of the initiative's main principles of "wide consultation, joint contribution and shared benefit" in the APEC leaders' declaration (MOFA, 2016w). In paragraph 24, FM Wang elaborates on China's intensified efforts to advance cooperation with OBOR countries in the fields of connectivity and capacity cooperation. He thereby mentions the construction of railways such as the Jakarta-Bandung High-speed Railway and the Belgrade-Budapest Railway linking Asian, European and African countries; the realisation of maritime infrastructure projects at Gwadar and Piraeus Port, for instance; and various other important steps taken towards the establishment of international economic corridors. What is more, FM Wang not only brings up the resumed work on "[t]he construction of the Colombo Port City", which he sees as "a promising linchpin in the making of the Maritime Silk Road", but also the launch of a fund for industrial capacity cooperation jointly established by China and Kazakhstan (MOFA, 2016w). In paragraph 25, he further says that institutional innovation for OBOR was actively promoted. He thereby mentions the launch of the AIIB and the successful support of "the first batch of investment projects under the Silk Road Fund" (MOFA, 2016w). FM Wang then briefly talks about the establishment of a high-level committee by China and Saudi Arabia—more precisely its achievements regarding energy and industrial park cooperation—and the progress that was made in the China-Gulf Cooperation Council and in the negotiations of a China-Israel FTA. Finally, in paragraph 36, FM Wang states that China "will make thorough preparations for the 'Belt and Road' Forum for International Cooperation", which he refers to as the key event to be hosted by China in 2017; and that the country will thereby "draw a blueprint for the development of [sic] 'Belt and Road' initiative, enhance the complementarity of […] development strategies and push for more cooperation projects" (MOFA, 2016w). In this speech, FM Wang thus referred to all five OBOR goals. He also made use of commissives.

9. Text Corpus – Part 2: Newspaper Articles

The Jakarta Post is the oldest and largest English-language daily newspaper of Indonesia (The Internet Archive, 2011). It is mainly read by educated Indonesians and foreigners (Infoasaid, 2012; The Internet Archive, 2011), and—as a quality newspaper meeting international standards—seeks to "bring together some of the best Indonesian journalists and editors" to provide for "a truly Indonesian perspective" (UCLA Asia Pacific Center, 2005). To this end, the Jakarta Post website does not only feature the stories of its print edition but also offers additional, in-depth multimedia content to local and international audiences alike that are interested in Indonesia, its government and people (The Internet Archive, 2011; UCLA Asia Pacific Center, 2005).

News_1: High Hopes for OBOR

On March 11, 2015, the Jakarta Post published an article titled "High Hopes for the 'Belt and Road' Initiative" written by Li Qiaoyi in the Business section of its website (see Li, 2015).

As already indicated by the article's title, the prospects of OBOR—with its two arms, the SREB and the MSR—represent the main topic of this text. It discusses the initiative's initial announcement by President Xi Jinping, its contents and issues. The article thereby stresses OBOR's inclusive nature and potential to promote the development of green economies, for instance, through the launch of a US$4.79 billion Ecological Silk Road Investment Fund. It further elaborates on the alleviation of China's overcapacity problem through increased exports to developing markets under the OBOR framework, and links the initiative to China's national development, regional integration and further opening-up. All in all, this article thus dealt with OBOR as the main event. It referred to the main goals of policy cooperation, unimpeded trade and financial integration and also featured a relevant speech reference.

News_2: Modi's New Ocean Politics

On March 31, 2015, the Jakarta Post published an article about India's new hydro-politics—i.e. the recent efforts of India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi to advance cooperation across the Indian Ocean Rim in the fields of security and blue economy—in the National section of

its website. The author, Ashok B. Sharma, is a senior columnist specialised in strategic and political issues who writes for various Indian and international newspapers (see Sharma, 2015).

The article emphasises the importance of maintaining the centrality of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in the light of China's "String of Pearls" operations, as exemplified by China's OBOR, MSR and BCIM Corridor proposals. It, therefore, dealt with OBOR as a side event, touching upon the main goal of facilities connectivity without, however, referring to any of the OBOR-related speeches of the text corpus.

News_3: SREB – A Journey Without End

On April 10, 2015, the Jakarta Post published an article titled "Silk Road Economic Belt – A Journey Without End" written by Tho Xin Yi in the National section of its website (see Tho, 2015).

The newspaper article mainly deals with the new and more detailed but still rather vague information about OBOR and its two main parts—the SREB and the MSR—that became known in the wake of the release of China's Action Plan. It describes the proposed routes and stresses the inclusive nature and potential contribution of OBOR to the solving of territorial disputes. The initiative is further discussed in the context of complementing India's Spice Route and Mausam projects, and the New Silk Road Initiative proposed by the US in 2011. Dealing with OBOR as the main event, this article addressed the OBOR goal of policy coordination but did not feature any relevant speech references.

News_4: China, ASEAN – NGO Network

On May 27, 2015, the Jakarta Post featured an article written by Dwi Atmanta about the second China-ASEAN people-to-people dialogue to be held in Bali at the end of May, and about its expected major outcome—the agreement to form a NGO network. It was published in the World section of the newspaper's website (see Atmanta, 2015).

Elaborating on the role and focus points of the event, the article mentions that China's development strategy and OBOR framework will be addressed, too. It thus dealt with OBOR as a side event without making any references to the initiative's main goals or related speeches.

News_5: Three Brilliant Initiatives

On July 4, 2015, the Jakarta Post published an article in the National section of its website that deals with three interconnected initiatives proposed by President Xi with a view to reshaping the international order. The author, Anwar Nasution, is emeritus professor of economics and formerly served as senior deputy governor of Indonesia's central bank and head of the State Audit Agency (see Nasution, 2015).

The article discusses the revival of the ancient land and maritime Silk Roads as the first of the these "[t]hree brilliant Chinese initiatives" (Nasution, 2015) and thereby brings up the initial proposal of the SREB in 2013. In the context of establishing the AIIB, i.e. the second initiative, the article mentions China's intention to invest US$40 billion into the building of modern transportation systems and maritime infrastructure in the Indian Ocean Rim. It thereby also briefly touches upon the attractiveness of new markets on all three continents that are linked through the silk routes. The third initiative—the internationalisation of the RMB—is also said to be facilitated through increased trade and investment under the OBOR scheme. This article thus dealt with OBOR as the main event. It addressed the main goals of facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade and financial integration and also featured a relevant speech reference.

News_6: MSR to Bridge China-ASEAN

On August 5, 2015, the Jakarta Post published an article written by Xu Bu, Ambassador of China to ASEAN, in the National section of its website. The article is titled "Maritime Silk Road Can Bridge China-ASEAN Cooperation" (see Xu, 2015).

As indicated by the title, the article mainly deals with the role of the MSR and ASEAN countries in the context of China's neighbourhood diplomacy. It refers to President Xi's speech at the Indonesian House of Representatives in 2013 as China's initial proposal to build the MSR together with ASEAN. The maritime arm of OBOR is thereby portrayed as an important platform that provides for closer China-ASEAN cooperation and focuses on maritime and people-to-people cooperation in such fields as science and technology, environmental protection, and tourism. The article further mentions that the MSR enables the alignment of development policies, promotes political trust, and advances the economic ties between China and ASEAN. Priority is thereby given to trade and investment facilitation.

China is further said to support Chinese companies in their ASEAN operations and to promote the establishment of industrial parks and similar initiatives in the region. In addition to that, the article states that the MSR provides for the establishment of an integrated connectivity network—with the AIIB, currency swaps, special instruments such as the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund and the general "development of financial infrastructure and trans-border cooperation of financial services" (Xu, 2015) playing a crucial role therein. All in all, this article thus dealt with OBOR as the main event. It addressed all five main goals of the initiative and also featured a relevant speech reference.[45]

News_7: Yunnan at the Core of the Silk Road

On August 23, 2015, the Jakarta Post featured an article titled "Yunnan at the Core of Modern-day Silk Road" that deals with the important role and favourable location of the Chinese province of Yunnan on the ancient and "modern" Silk Road. It was written by Evi Mariani, and published in the National section of the newspaper's website (see Mariani, 2015).

In this article, Yunnan is presented as a crucial cornerstone of almost all of China's recent trade schemes—including the SREB, the MSR and various economic belts that are subsumed under the OBOR umbrella. It thus dealt with OBOR as a side event, and touched upon the OBOR goal of facilities connectivity without, however, mentioning any of the speeches covered by the text corpus.

News_8: Beijing Airport's 4th Runway

On September 15, 2015, the Jakarta Post published an article in the Business section of its website that reports on the construction of a new gateway at Beijing Capital International Airport. It was written by Zhao Lei (see Zhao, 2015).

The article quotes Shi Boli, the general manager of the airport, stating that the new gateway will spur China's air connectivity with other OBOR countries. It also briefly elaborates on the initial proposal and scope of President Xi's initiative. The article thus dealt with OBOR

[45]Even though this article dates President Xi's speech at the Indonesian Parliament to October 3, 2013 (and not October 2), it evidently refers to the respective speech covered by the text corpus.

as a side event. It addressed the main goal of facilities connectivity and featured a relevant speech reference.

News_9: Industrial Park in West Java

On October 29, 2015, the Jakarta Post published an article that deals with the plans of China Minsheng Investment Corporation to build an industrial park in West Java in the Business section of its website. No specific author was named for this article (see The Jakarta Post, 2015).

The text states that the proposed industrial park is part of China's OBOR strategy aimed at the promotion of "connectivity and commerce between Asia and Europe" (The Jakarta Post, 2015). It, therefore, dealt with OBOR as a side event, referring to the main goal of unimpeded trade. References to any of the relevant speeches were not made.

News_10: New Rail Route Proposed

On November 21, 2015, the Jakarta Post published an article written by Zheng Yanpeng in the World section of its website, dealing with China's proposal for a high-speed railway connecting Urumqi with Iran (see Zheng, 2015).

The article states that the project was proposed at an OBOR forum hosted by the China Civil Engineering Society on November 19, and that the "Silk Road high-speed railway" (Zheng, 2015) is expected to help surmounting issues of cross-border connectivity. It thus dealt with OBOR as a side event, touching upon the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity and people-to-people bond but none of the relevant speeches.

News_11: MOU with United Overseas Bank

On December 6, 2015, the Jakarta Post published an article written by Arif Gunawan S. in the Business section of its website. It reports on a MOU between Indonesia's Investment Coordinating Board and the Singapore Division of United Overseas Bank that seeks, amongst others, to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) into Indonesia (see Gunawan S., 2015).

The article refers to Iwan Satawidinata, the Deputy President Director of United Overseas Bank's Indonesia office, by stating that Indonesia had attracted substantial overseas investment—from Chinese investors after the launch of China's OBOR initiative, in

particular. It thus dealt with OBOR as a side event, referring to the goal of unimpeded trade but none of the speeches covered by the text corpus.

News_12: Issues of Global Economy 2016

On January 11, 2016, the Jakarta Post published an article in the National section of its website that elaborates on the effects of faltering capital markets, geopolitical turbulences and new threats (e.g. cybercrime) on the global economy. It was written by Djamester Simarmata, a lecturer at the School of Economics at the University of Indonesia (see Simarmata, 2016).

The article views the establishment of the AIIB as a means for China to expand its sphere of influence in the neighbourhood. It further refers to OBOR as China's plan to install land-based and maritime links to Africa and Europe, with a potentially negative impact on the economy. The article thus dealt with OBOR as a side event, touching upon the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity and financial integration. It did not, however, refer to any relevant speeches.

News_13: China-led Development Bank

On January 17, 2016, the Jakarta Post published an article by Helene Franchineau in the Business section of its website. The article deals with China's recently established AIIB as "part of Beijing's efforts to weave together regional trade partners and solidify its global status" (Franchineau, 2016).

The article elaborates on US concerns regarding the banks' lending standards and presents the AIIB not only as China's response to Western-dominated international financial institutions but also as a key component of OBOR—President Xi's "broad plan […] to deepen trade relations with neighbouring countries" (Franchineau, 2016). This article thus dealt with OBOR itself as a side event but referred to the main goals of unimpeded trade and financial integration. It did not, however, mention any relevant speeches.

News_14: China and Hong Kong – Engines of World Economy

On January 18, 2016, the Jakarta Post featured an article that discusses the roles of China and Hong Kong as engines for global economic growth. It was written by Luo Weiteng and published in the Business section of the newspaper's website (see Luo, 2016).

The article states that OBOR and the newly launched AIIB are expected by some to act as major economic stimuli. It also mentions that both initiatives—"marking a milestone in the reform of the global economic governance system" (Luo, 2016)—were named as highlights of regional cooperation in the opening address by Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying at the Asian Financial Forum on January 18, 2016. The article thus dealt with OBOR as a side event. It referred to the goal of financial integration but did not feature any relevant speech references.

News_15: SCS Arbitration Case

On January 28, 2016, the Jakarta Post published an article elaborating on China's attitude to the SCS arbitration case that was brought by the Philippines against the PRC, and how ASEAN countries could go about it. It was written by Elizabeth P. Buensuceso, Ambassador of the Philippines to ASEAN, and published in the National section of the newspaper's website (see Buensuceso, 2016).

The text discusses a recently published article written by China's ASEAN-ambassador[46] and thereby refers to the MSR and OBOR as alluring proposals that strive to conceal China's aggressive behaviour in the SCS and beyond. The article therefore dealt with OBOR as a side event, without making any references to the initiative's main goals or relevant speeches.

News_16: Emerging Markets & Corporate Sustainability

On March 7, 2016, the Jakarta Post featured an article in its Business section that forms part of a larger series about emerging market firms. It was written by Francisco Szekely, adjunct professor of leadership and sustainability at IMD Business School, and Victoria Kemanian, Director of Latitude (a Swiss consulting firm), and elaborates on five factors that explain why such companies adopt greater approaches to corporate sustainability (see Szekely & Kemanian, 2016).

In discussing the importance to view stakeholders as key business partners, the authors name the Chinese Elion Resources Group as an example of an emerging market firm that forged partnerships with relevant international organisations and thus managed to expand its anti-

[46]However, not the one covered by this text corpus.

desertification efforts into several countries along the SREB. This article, therefore, dealt with OBOR as a side event without touching upon any goals or relevant speeches.

News_17: China-ASEAN Cooperation

On March 23, 2016, the Jakarta Post featured an article about the inaugural LMC meeting between China and five ASEAN countries—namely Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam—held that same day in China with a view to deepening regional cooperation. It was published in the World section of the newspaper's website without, however, naming a specific author (see The Jakarta Post, 2016a).

In the article, the five ASEAN countries are referred to as a key market for China under the OBOR framework, which seeks to promote trade and investment through major projects such as a "textile-making hub in Cambodia […] and new railways in Thailand" (The Jakarta Post, 2016a). This article thus dealt with OBOR as a side event, addressing the goal of facilities connectivity and unimpeded trade. Is did not, however, mention any relevant speeches.

News_18: China-Brunei Relations

On April 22, 2016, the Jakarta Post featured an article about the economic relations between Brunei and China on the occasion of FM Wang's visit to Brunei the day before. It was written by Quratul-Ain Bandial and published in the Southeast Asia – Brunei section of the newspaper's website (see Bandial, 2016).

The article quotes FM Wang in stating that Chinese companies are encouraged to invest in Brunei's infrastructure as part of OBOR—which seeks to link China through a modern infrastructure network with the Indian Ocean and Europe—and that China may also grant financial support through the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund. It further mentions that the two countries intend "to sign an 'intergovernmental cooperation document' linking China's Belt and Road initiative with Brunei's long-term development program called Vision 2030" (Bandial, 2016). The article thus dealt with OBOR as a side event. It addressed the goals of policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade and financial integration but did not refer to relevant speeches.

News_19: Belt and Road Summit – ASEAN Connectivity

On April 22, 2016, the Jakarta Post published an article titled "Belt and Road Summit to Focus on ASEAN Infrastructure Opportunities" in the Academia – Opinion section of its website. It was written by a senior editor, namely Vincent Lingga (see Lingga, 2016).

The article states that OBOR "fits well with the 2010 Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity" and refers to the president of the AIIB, Jin Liqun, in saying that the AIIB would cooperate with other international banks to finance infrastructure projects (Lingga, 2016). It further elaborates on China's financial commitments under the OBOR framework but also mentions that China's activities have raised concerns, e.g. in the case of a US$3 billion infrastructure loan granted to three Indonesian banks that entailed the involvement of Chinese construction companies; or the controversial Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway project. The authors thereby point out that it is difficult for China to build trust amongst the OBOR countries. This article thus dealt with OBOR as the main event. It touched upon the goals of policy coordination, facilities connectivity and financial integration without, however, featuring any speech references.

News_20: Indonesia & Hong Kong – Investment Promotion

On May 19, 2016, the Jakarta Post published another article written by senior editor Vincent Lingga in the Business section of its website. It reports on the signing of a MOU on the joint promotion of investments and the exchange of best practices by Indonesia's Investment Coordinating Board and its Hong Kong counterpart the day before (see Lingga, 2017).

The article mentions that the MOU was signed on the sidelines of an event that was concerned with the prospects of infrastructure development under China's OBOR initiative. In this context, Hong Kong and Indonesia are presented as important gateways to China and ASEAN, respectively. The article further states that both signatory parties, Franky Sibarani and Charles Ng, agreed on the complementary of OBOR and Indonesia's infrastructure and connectivity development agenda. It thus dealt with OBOR as a side event, referring to the goals of policy coordination and facilities connectivity. Speeches covered by the text corpus were not mentioned.

News_21: Indonesia's SCS China Policy

On June 17, 2016, the Jakarta Post published an article written by Pierre Marthinus, executive director of the Marthinus Academy, in the Academia – Opinion section of its website. The article deals with China-Indonesia relations and six foreign policy considerations that determine the continuation of Indonesia's "see no China" SCS policy (see Marthinus, 2016).

The article states that China and Indonesia acknowledge their economic weights and refers to President Xi's first-ever announcement of the MSR in Indonesia's legislature back in 2013. It further mentions that Indonesia's Maritime Fulcrum initiative fits better with China's MSR than with the US-led TPP but also says that "embryonic forms of potential Sino-centric institutional order is [sic] emerging" (Marthinus, 2016), as exemplified by the AIIB, OBOR and its Silk Road Fund. The article thus dealt with OBOR as a side event. It touched upon the main goals of policy coordination and financial integration, and also referred to one of the speeches covered by the text corpus.

News_22: Maritime Implications of China's Investment

On June 27, 2016, the Jakarta Post featured an article written by two interns at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta—namely Julius Utama, student at the Department of Applied Psychology at New York University; and Michelle Kim, a double major in IR and Chinese at Emory University. The article was published in the Academia – Opinion section of the newspaper's website, and assesses Indonesia's supposedly neutral stance on the SCS issue in the light of China's increasing influence on its economy (see Utama & Kim, 2016).

The article states that Indonesia is Southeast Asia's main beneficiary of China's OBOR infrastructure investments. It mentions that China had just been awarded the contract to build Indonesia's first high-speed railway linking Jakarta with Bandung—which marks "a landmark agreement representing the win-win nature of China's ambitious 'One Belt, One Road' initiative" (Utama & Kim, 2016). However, the article also cautions that OBOR must not be assessed solely in economic terms; political implications need to be taken into consideration, too. All in all, the text thus dealt with OBOR as a side event, referring to the goal of facilities connectivity but none of the relevant speeches.

News_23: China-Philippines Ties

On July 2, 2016, the Jakarta Globe published an article written by Deng Yanzi in the Southeast Asia section of its website. It deals with the Philippines and the potential improvement of its relations with China (see Deng, 2016).

The article states that owing to the Philippine's geographic location, former Philippine President Fidel Ramos sees "a bigger role for the Philippines" in China's OBOR and MSR initiatives, which generally aim at the promotion of "closer trade, infrastructure and people-to-people cooperation" (Deng, 2016). The text thus dealt with OBOR as side event, touching upon the main goals of facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade and people-to-people bond. Relevant speeches, however, were not addressed.

News_24: China's Weakening Soft Power

On August 18, 2016, the Jakarta Post featured an article in the Academia – Opinion section of its website that deals with China's foreign diplomacy approach and the weakening of its soft power through its behaviour in SCS. It was written by Ati Nurbaiti, a journalist of the Jakarta Post (see Nurbaiti, 2016).

The article elaborates on China's endeavours to win over countries along the MSR route "with money and charms", and mentions that China's actions in the SCS may lead to "resentful patriotism" and "the potential obstruction" of OBOR (Nurbaiti, 2016). It further states that an international media cooperation forum on OBOR hosted by the People's Daily in Beijing a couple of weeks ago—which was attended by the author—concluded with agreements on the sharing of information about the initiative's coverage and potential benefits. However, the articles states that "uncensored coverage", e.g. on the controversial Jakarta-Bandung railway project, "should also help anticipate problems" (Nurbaiti, 2016). All in all, the thus article dealt with OBOR as a side event. It addressed the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity and people-to-people bond but did not refer to any of the relevant speeches.

News_25: Stalling G20

On September 6, 2016, the Jakarta Post published an article in the Academia – Opinion section of its website. It was written by Kishore Mahbubani, a Singaporean diplomat and lecturer of public policy at the National University of Singapore, and deals with the stalling

G20 process as well as the outlook of the recent G20 meeting held in Hangzhou (see Mahbubani, 2016).

The article states that not only concrete, high-profile projects but also symbolic steps—such as a G20 endorsement of both the TPP *and* OBOR—are needed to restore faith in globalisation and the G20 process. It therefore dealt with OBOR as a side event, without referring to any of its main goals or relevant speeches.

News_26: Bank of China – RMB Usage

On September 22, 2016, the Jakarta Post featured an article about the Bank of China's call for an increased usage of RMB by Indonesian business people. It was written by Ayomi Amindoni and published in the Southeast Asia section of the newspaper's website (see Amindoni, 2016).

The article refers to Zhang Min, the bank's Jakarta branch country manager, by stating that the demand for RMB is very likely to rise due to the currency's inclusion in the special drawing rights basket of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and China's OBOR strategy. It thus dealt with OBOR as a side event and did not touch upon any of its main goals or relevant speeches.

News_27: China Paves Road to Growth

On October 17, 2016, the Jakarta Post published an article written by Noel P. Quinn, CEO of Global Commercial Banking at HSBC Group, in the Academia – Opinion section of its website, dealing with China's recent overseas infrastructure development activities (see Quinn, 2016).

Elaborating on the business opportunities arising from such activities, the article mentions President Xi's 2013 proposal of OBOR and its expected positive impacts on cross-border trade, cooperation (e.g. in the fields of policy and finance) and infrastructure (e.g. with regard to roads, power networks, telecommunications and ports)—which is referred to as the initiative's initial focus. The article thus dealt with OBOR as a side event, touching upon the goals of policy coordination, facilities connectivity and financial integration. It also referred to one of the speeches covered by the text corpus.

News_28: ASEAN – China's Being Misunderstood

On October 22, 2016, the Jakarta Post featured an article dealing with China-Indonesia relations in the context of the SCS dispute and the frequent misunderstandings of China's initiatives and intentions by ASEAN countries. It was written by Tama Salim and published in the World section of the newspaper's website (see Salim, 2016).

The article mentions the AIIB, OBOR and the RCEP as examples of large-scale projects offered by China to ASEAN. It also states, however, that ASEAN had not yet bought into the initiative. The article therefore dealt with OBOR as a side event. It referred to the goal of financial integration but did not mentioned any of the relevant speeches.

News_29: Malaysia-China Relations

On October 31, 2016, the Jakarta Post published an article in the Southeast Asia section of its website, dealing with the views of Malaysia's Prime Minister Najib Razak on the flourishing Malaysia-China relations. A specific author, however, was not named for this article (see The Jakarta Post, 2016c).

The text states that Prime Minister Najib Razak thinks of the AIIB as a great stepping stone for developing countries. It also mentions his positive attitude towards OBOR, seeing a great fit between the initiative and Malaysia's own national development agenda. The article thus dealt with OBOR as a side event, addressing the goals of policy coordination and financial integration. Speeches, however, were not referred to.

News_30: Malaysia's Prime Minister Seeks Better Image with China

On November 1, 2016, the Jakarta Post featured an article about Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak's current visit to Beijing. It was written by Louise Watt and published in the Southeast Asia – Malaysia section of the newspaper's website (see Watt, 2016b).

The article states that Prime Minister Najib Razak hopes to deepen Malaysia-China bilateral cooperation. It mentions that China is also interested in closer ties with a view to promoting President Xi's OBOR initiative—which includes the construction of a high-speed railway from Singapore to China that passes through Malaysia. The article thus dealt with OBOR as a side event. It touched upon the goal of facilities connectivity without, however, referring to any relevant speeches.

News_31: China & Malaysia – Closer Cooperation

On November 2, 2016, the Jakarta Post published another article by Louise Watt in its Southeast Asia – Malaysia section that deals with the closer cooperation between China and Malaysia in the SCS and other fields, as underpinned by various agreements that had been reached during Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak's current visit to China (see Watt, 2016a).

The OBOR passage of this article is exactly the same as the one in Louise Watt's previous article (see News_31 above). This article thus also dealt with OBOR as a side event, referring to the goal of facilities connectivity but none of the relevant speeches.

News_32: Malacca Harbor Plan

On November 14, 2016, the Jakarta Post published an article written by Shannon Teoh in the Southeast Asia section of the newspaper's website, reporting on the Malacca harbor project and China's interests in it (see Teoh, 2016).

The article states that "[t]he Melaka Gateway joint venture is part of a wider port alliance between Kuala Lumpur and Beijing" that seeks "to increase bilateral trade and boost shipping and logistics along China's much-vaunted Maritime Silk Road" (Teoh, 2016). It thus dealt with OBOR as a side event, touching upon the goal of facilities connectivity. Speeches, however, were not mentioned in the text.

News_33: Xi's New Year's Eve Address

On December 31, 2016, the Jakarta Post featured an article in its World section about the contents of the televised New Year's Eve address of President Xi that was aired that same day. A specific author, however, was not stated (see The Jakarta Post, 2016b).

The article mentions that the G20 summit in Hangzhou, the OBOR "pan-Eurasian infrastructure project" and the AIIB were cited by President Xi as examples of China's successful achievements of the passing year (The Jakarta Post, 2016b). The text thus dealt with OBOR as a side event. It addressed the goals of facilities connectivity and financial integration but did not refer to any of the speeches covered by the specialised text corpus.

10. Discussion

This chapter examines the results of the empirical analysis conducted hitherto. To allow for an in-depth discussion, it deals with both parts of the specialised text corpus separately. Priority is thereby given to elaborations on the most striking findings. The two components are then integrated and related to the research questions (see Chapter 1.3) in the subsequent, final chapter of this thesis (see Chapter 11).

10.1. Chinese Discourse: Text Corpus – Part 1

Part 1 of the text corpus consists of 71 speeches by three high-ranking Chinese politicians: President Xi (n=24), Premier Li (n=30) and FM Wang (n=17). On average, the speeches were 22 paragraphs long and referred to OBOR in 2 paragraphs.[47] The longest speeches were given by President Xi, the shortest ones by Premier Li. Only 7% of all paragraphs explicitly dealt with the initiative. Most speeches (62%) featured not more than one such OBOR paragraph. What is more, the initiative was mainly raised in the latter halves of the speeches (applies to 72% of all speeches). All in all, these "hard facts" already indicate that OBOR was dealt with in the analysed speeches as a mere sub-topic and not the most central theme.

A look at the timeline further shows that the highest number of speeches per year of each politician was given in 2015 (in total accounting for 42% of all speeches; see Figure 10). For President Xi and Premier Li, 2014 was the second busiest year; for FM Wang, it was the year of 2016. It is further noteworthy that Premier Li did not give a single speech in 2013 but contributed a consistently high number of speeches in the latter three years under scrutiny; and that President Xi only contributed 3 speeches in 2016—considerably less than in 2015 (n=12). Overall, this suggests that Premier Li only got involved in the OBOR discourse once a certain level of awareness was reached, and that President Xi's declining engagement towards the end of the period was somewhat compensated for by a comparatively active FM Wang. It can further be concluded that the OBOR discourse produced by the three politicians peaked in 2015. These findings are also in line with Shambaugh (2015), who noted that "[r]arely, if ever, has China had a more active year in diplomacy" than 2015;

[47]All figures and percentages mentioned in the running text of Chapter 10 are rounded off to whole numbers; those stated in tables and graphs are rounded off to two decimal places.

which, to some extent, can be explained by China's increased dispatching of diplomatic envoys after the release of the Action Plan in March 2015 with a view to educating (prospective) OBOR countries about the initiative (Callahan, 2016, p. 237).




Figure 10. Speeches by Speaker, Year (compiled by the author).

The analysis of the speeches with regard to the aspect of audience did not yield any significant results. For the sake of completeness, however, it should be noted that the audience mainly consisted of politicians/diplomats (present at 96% of all speeches), followed by "others" (present at 48% of all speeches) and business representatives (present at 25% of all speeches). The presence of media representatives, by contrast, was barely acknowledged (only stated for 13% of all speeches). It can further be said that President Xi and Premier Li primarily addressed their speeches to other heads of state and heads of government. FM Wang, by contrast, mainly referred to members of the government ranking lower than the state president and—more generally—to diplomatic envoys and their spouses in his initial words of address.

Speech Locations

The speeches under scrutiny were held in 23 countries located on four different continents. These are Asia (Northeast Asia: China, Korea, Mongolia; Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam; Central

Asia: Kazakhstan and Tajikistan; South Asia: Pakistan; West Asia: Turkey; and Russia),[48] Oceania (Australia), Europe (Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Latvia and Serbia), and North America (US). By far the most speeches were delivered in Asia (n=56, representing 79% of all countries); the least in Oceania (n=2, all by President Xi; see Figure 11). In light of the initiative's envisioned scope, it is striking that not a single speech covered by the text corpus was delivered in Africa, even though the African continent was explicitly mentioned in the Action Plan—just like Europe and Asia (see NDRC, 2015). This could indicate that up until the end of 2016, higher priority was attributed to the promotion of OBOR on the Eurasian landmass, with bilateral China-Africa dealings deferred until later. In fact, the only two speeches of the text corpus that dealt with Africa were given at multilateral forums (Asian African Summit and AALCO). Such a comparatively low engagement with Africa, however, is surprising since Wu, Alden, and Sidiropoulos (2017) asserted that the "[s]upport from African countries is key" to the initiative's implementation and that "China has responded, at least rhetorically, in favour of their inclusion".




Figure 11. Speeches by Speaker, Continent (compiled by the author).

In any case, President Xi was the only politician to deliver speeches on all four continents. He also accounted for most speeches held in North America (n=4 out of 6). It can thus be said that he truly lived up to his role as a well-travelled "foreign policy president" (Summers, 2015). Overall, however, each politician gave at least one speech in North America and

[48]This classification is based on the M49 Standard of the United Nations Statistics Division (see United Nations Statistics Division, n.d.). Owing to the primary role of Russia in the examined speeches as an SCO member state, however, this thesis considers Russia a part of Asia.

delivered most of his speeches in Asia. In fact, FM Wang exhibited the strongest focus on Asia, where he delivered all but one of his speeches (the American "outlier"); and Premier Li accounted for all but one of the speeches given in Europe. The regional focus of diplomatic efforts suggested by these findings is therefore not only in line with the geographical scope of OBOR but also with China's neighbourhood diplomacy, which needs to accommodate the US-factor, too (Wu, 2016).

Adding time to the equation, it can be said that Asia was the most popular continent for each of the politicians to deliver speeches in every single year. In fact, all speeches that were delivered in 2013 were held in Asia, Oceania was solely visited in 2014, and North America only made it on the itinerary in 2015 and 2016. A closer examination of those 56 speeches that were delivered in Asia shows that most of them were given in Northeast Asia (n=32, representing 57% of all speeches held in Asia), followed by Southeast Asia (n=16, representing 29%) and various other sub-regions (n=8, representing 14%). By far the most speeches were given in China (n=29), which can be seen as a sign of China's efforts to establish itself as a central platform for the promotion of OBOR; followed by Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar and Pakistan (n=3 each). The data further suggests an inner-Asian division of labour between the three politicians—with most of the speeches in Northeast Asia delivered by FM Wang (n=14), in Southeast Asia by Premier Li (n=10), and in other sub-regions of Asia by President Xi (n=5). Overall, it thus seems to have primarily fallen to Premier Li to talk about OBOR in those (sub-)regions that mark the crucial meeting points of the two arms of OBOR: namely Europe at the one end, and Southeast Asia at the other.

OBOR Aspects and Terminology

When talking about OBOR, the three politicians either referred to the entire initiative, one of its two major components—the SREB and the MSR—or a combination thereof (see Table ***3***). As it turned out, the highest number of references was made to the initiative as one entity (n=73, representing 41% of all references), with the SREB and the MSR referred to almost equally often (n=54 and n=50, respectively). Each of the two arms, however, was taken up in more speeches than the entire initiative. In fact, 8 speeches exclusively referred to the SREB, 3 speeches only to the MSR, and 24 speeches solely mentioned both the SREB *and* the MSR without featuring any of the terms explicitly referring to OBOR as a whole (see

Table 4). Another 20 speeches, however, exclusively dealt with the entire initiative; they did not break OBOR down into its two main components. It can further be said 6 out of those 10 speeches that featured references to all three aspects were delivered by President Xi. These findings suggest that it was important for all three politicians—for President Xi, however, in particular—to not only talk about OBOR in a general manner but to also go into detail by specifically mentioning the two major arms of the initiative in their speeches.

Table 3. OBOR Aspects – Speeches (No. of References, No. of Speeches)

Aspect		President Xi		Premier Li		FM Wang		Total	
Silk Road Economic Belt	No. of References	21	*38.89%*	20	*37.04%*	13	*24.07%*	**54**	***30.51%***
	No. of Speeches	18		17		10		**45**	
21st Century Maritime Silk Road	No. of References	15	*30.00%*	17	*34.00%*	18	*36.00%*	**50**	***28.25%***
	No. of Speeches	13		16		10		**39**	
Entire Initiative	No. of References	28	*38.36%*	17	*23.29%*	28	*38.36%*	**73**	***41.24%***
	No. of Speeches	12		13		10		**35**	
References per Speaker (Total):		**64**	***36.16%***	**54**	***30.51%***	**59**	***33.33%***	**177**	***100.00%***
Average (ø)*:		**2.67**		**1.80**		**3.47**			

*Total no. of references per speaker related to total no. of speeches per speaker (President Xi: n=24; Premier Li: n=30; FM Wang: n=17).

Note: Compiled by the author.

In fact, Premier Li even made the highest number of his references to the SREB (n=20), which indicates a slight preference for elaborations on the Eurasian stretch of OBOR on his part. The data further shows that FM Wang was the most balanced of the three politicians in the sense that he mentioned each of the three aspects in an equal number of speeches (n=10). Although President Xi made the highest total number of references to the initiative in absolute terms, relating the total number of references per speaker to the total number of speeches per speaker puts FM Wang (ø=4 OBOR references per speech) slightly ahead of President Xi (ø=3 OBOR references per speech).[49] In either case, Premier Li made the fewest references to OBOR—which is astonishing since he delivered more speeches than any of the other two politicians. It can thus be inferred that Premier Li devoted the least time and space in his speeches to elaborations on the initiative—which, however, does not say anything about the actual quality of this OBOR-related statements. The overall variations in OBOR aspects that were addressed in the speeches further show that there is not only *one* standard

[49]In this chapter, all mean values are rounded up to whole numbers.

OBOR message that gets reiterated by the three politicians in an unreflected manner; the contents rather seemed to be tailored to the respective speech situations. This impression is further substantiated by the fact that the MSR was addressed in a higher share of speeches that were delivered in countries with sea access and thus in countries that are (potentially) located at the maritime route of OBOR (63% of the speeches given in the relevant countries) than in landlocked countries (27% of the respective speeches).

Table 4. OBOR Terminology – Speeches (No. of References)

Aspect	Terminology	President Xi		Premier Li		FM Wang		Total		
Silk Road Economic Belt	Economic Belt along the Silk Road	3	*60.00%*	0	*0.00%*	2	*40.00%*	**5**	***9.26%***	*100.00%*
	Silk Road Economic Belt	18	*33.33%*	18	*66.67%*	11	*23.40%*	**47**	***87.04%***	
	Silk Road	0	*0.00%*	2	*100.00%*	0	*0.00%*	**2**	***3.70%***	
21st Century Maritime Silk Road	21st Century Maritime Silk Road	14	*31.82%*	17	*38.64%*	13	*29.55%*	**44**	***88.00%***	*100.00%*
	Maritime Silk Road of/for the 21st Century	1	*33.33%*	0	*0.00%*	2	*66.67%*	**3**	***6.00%***	
	(Modern) Maritime Silk Road	0	*0.00%*	0	*0.00%*	3	*100.00%*	**3**	***6.00%***	
Entire Initiative	Belt and Road (Initiative)	24	*37.50%*	16	*25.00%*	24	*37.50%*	**64**	***87.67%***	*100.00%*
	The Belt and the Road	1	*33.33%*	0	*0.00%*	2	*66.67%*	**3**	***4.11%***	
	(Land and Maritime) Silk Road Initiatives	0	*0.00%*	1	*33.33%*	2	*66.67%*	**3**	***4.11%***	
	Land and Maritime Silk Roads	3	*100.00%*	0	*0.00%*	0	*0.00%*	**3**	***4.11%***	

Note: Compiled by the author.

The distinction of the OBOR references regarding the above-mention three aspects derives from the differentiated terminology that was employed by the three politicians when talking about the initiative (see Table 4).[50] Referring to the land-based arm of OBOR, for instance, President Xi and FM Wang at first used the phrase "Economic Belt along the Silk Road". This term, however, was replaced by "Silk Road Economic Belt" upon the latter's first usage by FM Wang in his speech at the New Year Reception in December 2013. From that point onward, all three politicians almost exclusively used this term to refer to the continental stretch of OBOR (accounting for 87% of all references made to the SREB). The terms "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" and "Belt and Road Initiative" both joined the ranks of common terminology used by President Xi, Premier Li and FM Wang (accounting for 88%

[50]Since this analysis deals with *speech* transcripts, differences in notation (e.g. regarding the capitalisation or use of quotation marks) are negligible.

of all references to the MSR and the entire initiative, respectively). Again, both terms were first used by FM Wang—at the New Year Receptions in 2013 and 2014, respectively. This, however, does not necessarily mean that it was FM Wang who introduced these terms to the world in the first place; nor does it mean that MOFA's New Year Reception represents the prime occasion for the delivery of such significant speeches. In fact, it is much more likely that the actual speeches that marked the initial usages of these three terms are simply not covered by the text corpus used in this research. Nevertheless, it is viable to infer from the data that the phrases used by President Xi in the two speeches representing the first-ever OBOR announcements—namely the "economic belt along the Silk Road" and the "Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century"—did not establish themselves as standard terminology. This is not all too surprising after all, since President Xi's initial OBOR proposals were refined by a group of experts within the first 18 months of the initiative's first announcement (Leverett & Wu, 2017, p. 126). It is, however, striking that an official government statement on the standard English translation of the Chinese OBOR nomenclature was only released in September 2015 (Tao, 2015)—and thus long after President Xi, Premier Li and FM Wang had already adopted such common terminology. The findings of this research thus suggest that either an already common practice of the Chinese OBOR discourse was officialised in retrospect; or the English-language speech transcripts of the three politicians made available online were subject to some post-processing to create a coherent OBOR narrative.

Main Goals of OBOR

Upon examination of the speeches regarding their allusions to the main goals of OBOR, it turned out that 8 speeches did not touch upon any of the initiative's five main goals at all. These speeches were delivered by President Xi and Premier Li in equal parts; and all in countries at either the European end of the routes or in the US—i.e. countries that are not of immediate importance to the gradual roll-out of the initiative as projected by the Chinese government (see NDRC, 2015). Consequently, 63 speeches (President Xi: n=20; Premier Li: n=26; FM Wang: n=17; together representing 89% of all speeches) dealt with *at least* one main goal. Most of these speeches referred to the goal of financial integration (n=44, representing 70%; see Table 5). This is followed by the goals of facilities connectivity (n=34, representing 54%), policy coordination (n=28, representing 44%), unimpeded trade (n=26, representing 41%) and people-to-people bond (n=17, representing 27%). This ranking is

confirmed by the total number of references made to each goal (see Table 6). It can further be said that President Xi touched upon 2 OBOR goals per speech in the highest number of his speeches (n=8), and FM Wang upon 1 (n=8). Premier Li, however, did not exhibit a similarly clear pattern; he addressed up to 3 OBOR goals in an equally high number of speeches (n=7 each). Since the data further shows that the highest share of speeches touching upon either of the five main goals of OBOR was virtually always accounted for by Premier Li (with the exception of the goals of facilities connectivity and people-to-people bond, where he contributed the same number of relevant speeches as FM Wang), it can be inferred that Premier Li talked about more OBOR goals at more occasions than any of the other two politicians. Contrary to Swaine (2015, p. 6), however, who concludes that the goal of facilities connectivity is probably the most important OBOR goal of all, the findings of this research suggest that China attaches the highest priority to the goal of financial integration. They further disclose that the actual focus areas of OBOR as envisioned by the Chinese political elite are not necessarily in line with the official rhetoric. For instance, FM Wang referred in his speech at the New Year Reception for 2016 to the goals of facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade and people-to-people bond as the key areas of OBOR (see MOFA, 2016v). In any case, the findings offer a plausible explanation for the goal of people-to-people bond having "passed largely unnoticed outside China" (Winter, 2016); it simply did not get mentioned often enough in the speeches by those three Chinese politicians that are perhaps most closely watched by the international community.

Table 5. OBOR Goals – Speeches (No. of Speeches)

OBOR Goal	President Xi		Premier Li		FM Wang		Total		Rank
Policy Coordination	7	*25.00%*	13	*46.43%*	8	*28.57%*	**28**	***100.00%***	③
Facilities Connectivity	10	*29.41%*	12	*35.29%*	12	*35.29%*	**34**	***100.00%***	②
Unimpeded Trade	5	*19.23%*	14	*53.85%*	7	*26.92%*	**26**	***100.00%***	④
Financial Integration	15	*34.09%*	19	*43.18%*	10	*22.73%*	**44**	***100.00%***	①
People-to-people Bond	5	*29.41%*	6	*35.29%*	6	*35.29%*	**17**	***100.00%***	⑤

Note: Compiled by the author.

A few more words on the general characteristics of the goal-related speeches. On the one hand, 22 speeches addressed only one of the five mail goals of OBOR. Such exclusivity pertained mainly to the goals of financial integration (n=9) and facilities connectivity (n=5). On the other hand, 7 speeches referred to all five goals together; they did, however, not

exhibit any other conspicuous common features. What is more, 16 speeches dealt with two main goals, 12 speeches with three, and 6 speeches with four. Those 34 speeches that touched upon at least two OBOR goals most often dealt with the combination of financial integration-facilities connectivity (n=24, representing 71%). These figures thus confirm the leading role of the two goals of financial integration and facilities connectivity in the OBOR discourse produced by the Chinese politicians. Whereas the goal-specific analysis regarding the situational aspects of audience and location did not yield any significant results, 20 different occasions could be identified at which OBOR was addressed multiple times. As it turned out, all speeches that were delivered at the Boao Forum for Asia (n=4), EAS (n=3) or New Year Reception (n=3) as well as those given at events involving ASEAN (n=6) and APEC (n=2) referred to the goal of financial integration. What is more, all speeches given at SCO-related events (n=4, delivered by President Xi and Premier Li in equal parts) dealt with the goal of policy coordination, which can be seen as an early harbinger of China's later efforts to link OBOR more closely with the SCO (Patranobis, 2017). Overall, however, it can be said that China has indeed followed up on its words to "take full advantage of the existing bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms to push forward the building of the Belt and Road" (NDRC, 2015).




Figure 12. OBOR Goals by Year – Speeches (compiled by the author).

Adding the aspect of time further shows that the number of speeches referring to any of the five OBOR goals peaked in 2015 (see Figure 12). The figures for the goals of financial integration, facilities connectivity and unimpeded trade basically co-evolved, which can be

explained by their close thematic fit. The number of speeches referring to the goal of policy coordination developed along similar lines. Its upswing, however, set in a year later (in 2014)—yet all the more pronounced, quadrupling the figure for 2014 to reach 16 speeches in 2015. Such a sharp increase could be a sign of increased efforts on the part of China to accelerate the implementation of OBOR by more actively promoting cooperation at the policy level. After all, policy coordination was identified as "an important guarantee for implementing the Initiative" in the Action Plan itself (NDRC, 2015). It is further noteworthy that the goal of people-to-people bond was only addressed in the latter three years, with the number of respective speeches remaining relatively stable over time. Neither the examination of those 6 instances where several speeches were held on the same day nor the comparative analysis of the speeches delivered prior to vs. after the release of the Action Plan, however, yielded meaningful results regarding the respective OBOR goals raised.




Figure 13. OBOR Goals by Speaker (compiled by the author).

Returning to the speaker-specific analysis, it can be said that President Xi and Premier Li addressed the goal of financial integration in the highest number of their speeches (n=15 and n=19, respectively; see Figure 13); FM Wang, however, the goal of facilities connectivity (n=12). Whereas President Xi and FM Wang clearly raised the two goals of financial integration and facilities connectivity in more speeches than the other three goals, Premier Li did not show a similarly strong preference. In fact, he talked about the goals of unimpeded trade (n=14), policy coordination (n=13) and facilities connectivity (n=12) in almost the

same number of speeches. All three politicians, however, referred to the goal of people-to-people bond in the lowest number of their speeches (Premier Li and FM Wang: n=6; President Xi: n=5, i.e. the same as the number of speeches touching upon the goal of unimpeded trade). Overall, these findings show that the goals of financial integration and facilities connectivity are two topics of high relevance to the advancement of OBOR in the eyes of all three politicians. The OBOR messages conveyed by Premier Li, however, further suggest that the goals of unimpeded trade, policy coordination and facilities connectivity are considered almost equally important.

Taking the number of actual references (i.e. the number of individual coding units) into consideration (see Table 6) further substantiates the significance of the two goals of financial integration and facilities connectivity: they were not only raised in the highest number of speeches but also elaborated on quite extensively. Although only addressed in 5 of his speeches, however, President Xi talked about the goal of unimpeded trade in comparatively much detail (n=14, representing 20% of all his goal-specific references). Premier Li, by contrast, did not elaborate much on this goal (n=15, representing 12% of his goal-specific references)—even though he raised it in the second-highest number of his speeches (n=14).

Table 6. OBOR Goals – Speeches (No. of References)

OBOR Goal	President Xi		Premier Li		FM Wang		Total	Rank
Policy Coordination	13	*18.57%*	20	*16.26%*	16	*18.82%*	**49**	③
Facilities Connectivity	12	*17.14%*	43	*34.96%*	27	*31.76%*	**82**	②
Unimpeded Trade	14	*20.00%*	15	*12.20%*	14	*16.47%*	**43**	④
Financial Integration	25	*35.71%*	39	*31.71%*	19	*22.35%*	**83**	①
People-to-people Bond	6	*8.57%*	6	*4.88%*	9	*10.59%*	**21**	⑤
Total:	**70**	***100.00%***	**123**	***100.00%***	**85**	***100.00%***	**278**	
Average* (ø):	**3.50**		**4.70**		**5.00**			

*Total no. of references per speaker related to total no. of speeches dealing with at least one OBOR goal (President Xi: n=20; Premier Li: n=26; FM Wang : n=17).

Note: Compiled by the author.

It is further noteworthy that FM Wang referred to the goal of people-to-people bond more often than the other two politicians. In general, however, the comparison of the average number of goal-specific references per speaker substantiates the preliminary conclusion that FM Wang provided a well-rounded and comparatively detailed account of OBOR in his speeches. These figures also help to round off the profile of Premier Li: he referred to the

initiative itself less often than the other two politicians (see Table 3) but talked about the initiative's main goals in a quite extensive manner, too.

Finally, the examination of the goal-specific references with regard to their actual contents (see Appendix C: Code Book – Speeches) exhibited the following thematic preferences of the OBOR discourse produced by the three Chinese politicians.

(1) Goal of Financial Integration

The references to the OBOR goal of financial integration were dominated by allusions to the sub-topics "Financial Institutions" (n=44, representing 53% of all references to this goal) and "Funds" (n=33, representing 40%). The latter aspect was addressed in 29 speeches, out of which 25 texts (representing 86%) also featured references to the former. The two sub-topics thus did not only account for 93% of all references to the goal of financial integration but were also often mentioned together. It can further be said that they almost exclusively dealt with the launch of both the AIIB[51] and the Silk Road Fund as well as their roles in the promotion of regional infrastructure development. This not only explains the close connection between the goals of financial integration and facilities connectivity observed in this research; it is also in line with OBOR serving as "a focus for the new financial architecture that China is creating" (Leverett & Wu, 2017, p. 127) and with Yeh (2016) who noted that China likes to discursively stress the role of the AIIB in its development and investment strategies in Asia.

(2) Goal of Facilities Connectivity

The highest number of references to the goal of facilities connectivity dealt with the general promotion of connectivity and (transport) infrastructure projects ("Other" category: n=26, representing 32% of all references to this goal), and the construction of infrastructure networks (n=23, representing 28%). Thereby, special emphasis was given to the BCIM and China-Pakistan Economic Corridors—i.e. those two corridors that China generally attaches the most importance to (Aoyama, 2016, p. 15). After all, they are vital for the energy security of Xinjiang and Yunnan (Wang, 2016, pp. 459–460), i.e. two core areas under the OBOR

[51]Strictly speaking, the Action Plan only mentioned the establishment of the AIIB in section "IV. Cooperation Principles". This restriction, however, got lost in the process of applying van Dijk's macro-rules of semantic derivation; which was accepted since the AIIB is widely regarded an integral part of China's OBOR initiative anyway (see e.g. Ye 2015; Franchineau 2016).

scheme. It is further noteworthy that the only sub-topic that was addressed not even once in the speeches by President Xi, Premier Li and FM Wang was that of "Energy Infrastructure". This, however, could be a tactical move to avoid losing bargaining power by publicly acknowledging the importance of this aspect for China's own economic development.

(3) Goal of Policy Coordination

The main sub-topics of the goal of policy coordination referred to in the speeches were that of "Economic Development" (n=26, representing 53% of all references to this goal) and "Regional Cooperation" (n=11, representing 22%). The first one almost exclusively dealt with bi- and multilateral cooperation agreements, and the alignment of various development strategies with OBOR in order to form mutually beneficial synergies. The references to the second sub-goal basically conveyed the same content, however, with a stronger emphasis on regional aspects. Swaine (2015, p. 6) made a similar observation, as he noted that Chinese authoritative sources often stress the complementary nature of OBOR. All other sub-topics were also addressed, however, considerably less often.

(4) Goal of Unimpeded Trade

The highest number of references to the goal of unimpeded trade were made to the general promotion thereof ("Other" category: n=11, representing 26% of all references to this goal) as well as to the sub-topics "Maritime Industries"—especially the strengthening of maritime cooperation—and "Support Systems & Capacity", more specifically to the strengthening of cooperation in production capacity (n=6, representing 14% each). However, they accounted for only 54% of all references to the goal of unimpeded trade. The bulk of other statements relevant to this goal dealt with some sort of trade and investment facilitation, such as the removal of trade barriers, the implementation of FTAs or the establishment of industrial parks. In fact, all three sub-topics covering these aspects taken together (i.e. the categories of "Investment & Trade Facilitation (General)", "Trade Facilitation" and "Investment Facilitation") accounted for another 28% of all references to the goal of unimpeded trade. With only the sub-topics "New Areas & Forms of Trade", "Service Industries" and "Other Industries" not mentioned at all, it can be said that the OBOR discourse on the goal of unimpeded trade was not as clearly dominated by only a few topics as the previous three goals.

(5) Goal of People-to-people Bond

Finally, the goal of people-to-people bond was also dealt with primarily in general terms, i.e. by simply mentioning the aspect of people-to-people exchanges in the speeches ("Other" category: n=7, representing 33% of all references to this goal). This is followed by references to the sub-topic "Areas of Public Interest" (n=5, representing 21%), for instance, regarding deeper cooperation in the field of humanitarian disaster relief. Apart from the sub-topics "Sports", "Tourism", and "NGOs & Volunteer Services"—which were not addressed in a single speech—all other sub-topics were mentioned at least once. When talking about the goal of people-to-people bond, the three politicians thus seemed to advance a narrative that includes as many people as possible; which is in line with China's official notion of this goal providing "the public support for implementing the Initiative" (NDRC, 2015).

Illocutionary Acts

Overall, 56 speeches (79% of all speeches) featured illocutionary acts. President Xi used them in all his speeches apart from the one he gave at the B20 Summit in September 2016. Premier Li performed illocutionary acts in 27 of his speeches (80%), and FM Wang in 9 (53%). In total, 119 illocutionary acts could thus be identified: 70 commissives (59% of all illocutionary acts), 39 directives (33%), and 10 expressives (8%). Neither assertives nor declarations were used by any of the three politicians, which can be ascribed to the rather "straightforward" kind of utterances generally required for the performance of such illocutions (e.g. "to conclude something" or "to declare war") and their resulting inappropriateness for the speeches considered in this thesis. It can further be said that the two types of directive and commissive illocutions were used in all four years; that of expressives, however, only in the latter three (see Table 7). Apart from 2013, where 2 more directives were performed than commissives, the commissive type of illocutionary acts accounted for the highest number of illocutions performed each year; followed by the number of directives and expressives. The usage of all three types of illocutionary acts, however, peaked in 2015 (in total n=58 representing 49% of all illocutionary acts), with the number of expressives performed per year remaining relatively stable. All in all, the usage of illocutionary acts is thus in line with the general trend of the OBOR discourse observed in this analysis.

Table 7. Illocutionary Acts – Speeches

Illocutionary Acts	2013		2014		2015		2016		Total	
Directives	4	*10.26%*	8	*20.51%*	22	*56.41%*	5	*12.82%*	**39**	***100.00%***
Commissives	2	*2.86%*	19	*27.14%*	32	*45.71%*	17	*24.29%*	**70**	***100.00%***
Expressives	0	*0.00%*	3	*30.00%*	4	*40.00%*	3	*30.00%*	**10**	***100.00%***
Total:	**6**	***5.04%***	**30**	***25.21%***	**58**	***48.74%***	**25**	***21.01%***	**119**	***100.00%***

Note: Compiled by the author.

The data further shows that Premier Li performed the most illocutionary acts in each category (in total n=63, representing 53% of all illocutionary acts; see Figure 14). President Xi ranks second, and FM Wang third. This suggests that Premier Li exhibited the most "engaging" speech behaviour, which fits quite well with his role as the head of the Chinese government—i.e. the role of a statesman whose primary concern is the day-to-day management of the Chinese economy more so than the indulgence in diplomatic chitchat. All three politicians, however, performed more commissives than directives, and more directives than expressives. This is quite striking since it is generally expected that politicians only sparingly make use of commissives due to their self-committing character (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, pp. 220–221).




Figure 14. Illocutionary Acts by Speaker (compiled by the author).

The politicians' preference for the performance of commissives and directives—i.e. two comparatively strong, future-oriented types of illocutionary acts—in their OBOR narratives thus convey they image of a self-confident and determined China. This observation is in line

with Leverett and Wu (2017, p. 130), who see OBOR as a showcase of China's foreign policy becoming "more self-directed and forward-looking" in an effort to create an international environment favourable to its actions.

Taking a closer look at the instances of commissives, however, reveals that they were mainly formulated in the simple future tense and thus rather weak. Other forms of commissive illocutions simply expressed China's readiness, willingness or intention to do something (see e.g. MOFA, 2016a: "Not only do we want to build a corridor through the Eurasian continent, but also a pan-Asian railway network."). Just like the other two categories of illocutionary acts, they usually took "China" or "we" as the subject in first person. The three politicians thus did not commit themselves as private persons to a certain course of future action; they acted on behalf of the Chinese state in performing their roles as high-ranking politicians and representatives of the Chinese government. It can further be said that the three politicians made use of commissives when talking about China's OBOR-related actions to the benefit of all parties involved, or in direct connection with the OBOR goals of facilities connectivity (to express China's commitment to infrastructure development, e.g. by forging corresponding cooperation agreements) and financial integration (in reference to China's financial contributions and general commitment to the smooth implementation of the AIIB and special funds). The common usage of commissives in the Chinese OBOR discourse can thus be explained by their weak nature. With the exception of China's monetary commitments, they are neither overly binding nor claimable or easily verified. They, therefore, represented an important means for the three politicians to show China in the best light possible without getting the country into a predicament. In addition to that, they arrange for China to implicitly become the (momentary) focus of attention in the Chinese OBOR discourse.

The directives performed by the three politicians were also of the weaker, less outspoken kind (e.g. "to welcome someone to do something" or "to encourage someone to do something"). Even in cases where more straightforward wording was used, the directives were softened by means of modal verbs such as "should" or "may", or by taking on the form of constative orders that were directed at a larger group of addressees—including China itself (see e.g. State Council, 2014g: "we need to facilitate the clearance of customs"). In general,

the directives sought to get various parties—countries, enterprises and international institutions alike—to actively participate in OBOR. In case they were used in direct connection with an OBOR goal, they were mainly related to aspects of facilities connectivity (invitation to jointly develop infrastructure networks) and financial integration (invitation to participate in or promote and make use of the AIIB and various funds). The only countries that were singled out as addressees of such directives were the US, Serbia, Latvia and Afghanistan. Yet again, the three politicians never asked for anything that would conflict with the core interests of the addressees, or that would require them to make sacrifices of any kind. On the contrary, directives were primarily used to stress the cooperative nature of OBOR whilst presenting China as one amongst many OBOR countries. Such rhetoric is in line with Swaine's (2015, p. 7) observation that "many Chinese sources […] use the metaphor of a 'symphony,' involving the participation of many countries, and not a 'solo' effort by China alone" when talking about the initiative. Whereas—in principle—directives were thus not used in the Chinese OBOR discourse to assign specific responsibilities to individual actors, the simple invitation for more engagement and cooperation alone can be seen as an expression of China's power and central role in OBOR. After all, it implies that China is the "project owner" in charge of the initiative's promotion, with the authority to bring (potential) member states to the table and, consequently, to determine the initiative's scope.

Finally, the illocutionary type of expressives was almost exclusively used to express hope for an early launch of the AIIB and fruitful cooperation in jointly advancing the OBOR initiative. At two instances, however, not hope but belief (see MOFA, 2015ak: "we believe the proposal to establish a US$100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank […] is most opportune.") and personal confidence (see State Council, 2014g: "I [Premier Li] am confident that the construction of the railway line will be of high quality and efficient.") were expressed. Overall, however, expressives were mainly used in direct connection with the OBOR goals of financial integration (see above) and policy coordination (regarding the complementarity of different development strategies). It can further be said that they were exclusively used by the three politicians to stress *positive* developments revolving around the implementation of OBOR. However, since expressives represent the weakest type of illocutions (see Vanderveken, 2001, p. 45) that were not used that often by the three

politicians, anyway, their influence on the Chinese OBOR discourse can be considered negligibly low.

General Tenor

All in all, the Chinese OBOR discourse produced by President Xi, Premier Li and FM Wang did not provide an overly detailed account of the initiative. The speeches merely dealt with OBOR as a sub-topic, with the three politicians only briefly touching upon the initiative every now and then by seemingly rattling of a list of key words or simply citing the initiative and its two main components as examples of successful cooperation. The information content of the OBOR references was thus generally low. Consequently, a higher number of references to any particular aspect of OBOR did not necessarily translate into a higher level of detail provided on the initiative; it also did not mean that more illocutionary acts were performed since the usage of all three types of illocutionary acts—directives, commissives and expressives alike—was confined to a relatively small ambit.

Nevertheless, it can be said that the initiative was often mentioned in the context of China's own (economic) development, past and future alike. President Xi and FM Wang, in particular, evoked the notion of the ancient Silk Road, especially its spirit of peaceful co-existences and mutual learning. This suggests that the politicians did indeed seek to use the ancient Silk Road—"the only symbol of the common cultural heritage […] of most countries in Asia, Europe and Africa"—as a kind of "'soft' basis for international cooperation" (Liu & Dunford, 2016, p. 326). It also resonates well with the "China model" discourse and its central idea of non-intervention (Summers, 2016, p. 1637). It is further noteworthy that Premier Li and FM Wang both addressed the situation in the SCS in many of their speeches but only rarely linked it to OBOR. Since the initiative had already been met with great scepticism outside of China, however, it would not have been wise to cause OBOR to be associated with yet another controversial topic revolving around China's behaviour on the international stage, anyway. Nevertheless, at two instances the suspicion of the international community that OBOR may actually serve as a means to conceal China's geopolitical expansion were openly addressed; namely in FM Wang's speech at the 14th Lanting Forum in September 2015, and in President Xi's speech at the B20 Summit in September 2016.[52] At both occasions, the

[52]In the latter case, however, not within the scope of the speech's OBOR paragraph.

speakers sought to dispel the concerns by assuring the audience of the initiative's primary purpose to achieve inclusive, common and mutually beneficial development, instead. As a matter of fact, however, it does not seem to be that unusual after all for authoritative Chinese sources to address international criticisms on OBOR whilst elaborating on the initiative's win-win nature (Swaine, 2015, p. 9).

In the actual OBOR passages of the speeches, the three politicians repeatedly mentioned the progress that had already been achieved in the implementation of the initiative by citing, for instance, the number of parties who had already joined.[53] As expected, they also linked the initiative to President Xi himself by stressing that it was *him* who proposed the SREB and the MSR in the first place. Only Premier Li slightly deviated from this pattern, by stating that they were *China's* (and not President Xi's) proposals, instead. Premier Li also referred to the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund as examples of financing platforms that should be used to boost international cooperation on production capacity and facilities connectivity, whereas President Xi and FM Wang merely talked about their establishments. This again points to Premier Li's rather practical attitude on the one hand, and President Xi's and FM Wang's primary concern with the general representation of China and OBOR abroad on the other hand. What is more, the goal of facilities connectivity was set apart from the other four goals as it was most outspokenly referred to in the speeches as a major component of OBOR; more so than any of the other four goals. It is further noteworthy that Indonesia was barely mentioned in direct connection with the initiative. None of the two speeches delivered by President Xi in Indonesia (which both touched upon the goals of financial integration and unimpeded trade) explicitly linked OBOR with the Southeast Asian country. Only the Jakarta-Bandung railway project was brought up in relation to the initiative—namely as an example for jointly promoting regional connectivity and the construction of a pan-Asian railway network—in two other speeches by Premier Li and FM Wang, respectively.

Finally, the analysis of the speeches revealed a few more speaker- and role-specific characteristics. President Xi referred to the main goals of OBOR at every single occasion but also touched upon the most diverse range of topics in his speeches—ranging from China's own path of peaceful (economic) development, to its bilateral relations and the

[53]This figure ranged in the speeches from 60 to more than 100 parties.

general importance of good neighbourliness. More so than the other two politicians, he thereby placed OBOR in the context of regional security and provided an encompassing yet comparatively shallow insight into the initiative. Premier Li, by contrast, exhibited a clear thematic preference for economic matters. He mainly talked about China's economic performance and the general need to deepen economic cooperation and promote common development, especially in the context of China's relations with major regional institutions such as ASEAN. He thereby placed special emphasis on the synergetic nature of OBOR and offered the most in-depth information by not only mentioning one OBOR-aspect after the other but also elaborating on their purposes; or by naming, for instance, specific projects—albeit in rather short statements. What is more, Premier Li was the only one to talk about environmental aspects of OBOR by referring to China's plan of the green Silk Road envoys; and the only one to explicitly turn to Chinese companies in a call for active engagement in OBOR-related projects. These peculiarities—taking care of economic matters in due consideration of the environment and the handling of multiple parties—are largely agreeable to his political function and role as "the public face of China's economic policy" (The Economist, 2015). Last but not least, it can be said that FM Wang was primarily concerned with China's diplomatic agenda. He made clear that the implementation of OBOR is crucial for China's own development and that the initiative is, therefore, considered an integral part of China's foreign diplomacy. FM Wang also stressed "the core tenets" of OBOR—i.e. "wide consultation, joint contribution and shared benefit" (MOFA, 2016w)—in his speeches. His speech behaviour is thus reflective of his role as one of China's leading foreign policy diplomats. Since FM Wang talked about the initiative in a general yet comparatively extensive manner, his account of OBOR further seems to sort of fill a gap between President Xi's general overview and Premier Li's detailed information.

10.2. Indonesian Perspective: Text Corpus – Part 2

Part 2 of the text corpus consists of 33 newspaper articles that were published in 5 newspaper sections run by the Jakarta Post (see Figure 15). The highest number of articles pertained to the Business section (n=8). This is followed by the number of articles published in the sections of National and Southeast Asia (n=7 each), Academia – Opinion (n=6) and World (n=5). Three of the newspaper articles of the Southeast Asia section were further specified

by characterising them as articles dealing with Brunei (n=1) and Malaysia (n=2, both written by Louise Watt), respectively. Overall, however, there is no clear tendency towards one or the other newspaper section primarily dealing with OBOR. In consideration of the dates of publication, however, it can further be said that one third of the articles was published in 2015, and two thirds in 2016. The Jakarta Post, therefore, did not report on OBOR in the initial stages of its development. Taking the number of articles dealing with the initiative as an indicator for journalistic and ultimately also Indonesian interest, it can be presumed that Indonesia first adopted a "wait and see" approach and only became interested in the initiative once it had taken form. The fact that all OBOR-related texts of the two sections Southeast Asia and Academia – Opinion were only published in 2016 does not only back this inference but also indicates Indonesia's acknowledgement of the initiative's significance for the ASEAN region.




Figure 15. Articles by Newspaper Section (compiled by the author).

The data further shows that the articles under scrutiny were written by 30 different people.[54] With the exception of 2 texts that were compiled by teams of two, all texts (n=31, representing 94%) were written by only one person each. It can further be said that—apart from those 4 texts that lack a specific authorship and were thus attributed to the Jakarta Post—only two authors, namely Louise Watt and Vincent Lingga, contributed not only one but two relevant articles to the text corpus each. What is more, the authors can generally be

[54]Articles that did not state a specific person as the author (n=4) were assigned to the Jakarta Post, which was then treated as an artificial person with assigned authorship.

split into two groups. Group 1 consists of those 19 people who work for the Jakarta Post on a full-time or at least a regular basis (e.g. Vincent Lingga, senior editor). It is thus reasonable to assume that, by and large, the contents of their texts (n=24, representing 73% of all articles) are in line with the Jakarta Post's point of view. Bearing in mind the peculiarity of newspaper discourses with regard to the conflation of personal and institutional authorship, the OBOR coverage by members of Group 1 may thus be seen as particularly representative of the Jakarta Post's attitude towards the initiative. The members of Group 2, by contrast, are not that closely affiliated with the newspaper. Their main occupations are in the fields of academia (7 people, e.g. Anwar Nasution, emeritus professor of economics), politics (3 people, e.g. Elizabeth P. Buensuceso, Ambassador of the Philippines to ASEAN), and banking (1 person, namely Noel P. Quinn, CEO of Global Commercial Banking HSBC Group). They contributed 5, 3 and 1 article/s, respectively, and—owing to their backgrounds—account for a more independent, "external" perspective published by the Jakarta Post. Based on this additional classification it can be said that all articles pertaining to the sections Southeast Asia and World were written by members of Group 1, and that members of Group 2 primarily wrote for the sections National and Academia – Opinion (n=4 each, accounting for 57% and 67% of all articles published in the respective sections). All in all, the authorship of the articles is thus quite varied, which suggests that the Jakarta Post sought to provide for a comprehensive coverage of OBOR without, however, assigning a specific (group of) author(s) to the initiative.

OBOR Aspects and Terminology

Just like the speeches by the Chinese politicians, the newspaper articles of the Jakarta Post can be analysed regarding three different types of reference to the initiative. Does it deal with OBOR as a whole, in parts or a combination thereof? As it turned out, 30 newspaper articles (91%) referred to OBOR as one entity, 12 texts to the MSR (36%), and 7 articles to the SREB (21%). Most of those texts that mentioned the initiative in its entirety did so without referring to any of its two major components (n=18, representing 60% of the respective articles); 6 articles (20%) also referred to the MSR, 2 articles (7%) addressed the entire initiative as well as the SREB; and the remaining 4 texts (13%) mentioned all three aspects. What is more, 2 articles exclusively dealt with the MSR, 1 article solely referred to the SREB, and not a single text dealt with only the two major arms of OBOR. These figures

already suggest that the OBOR coverage of the Jakarta Post was rather general in the sense that it often did not differentiate between the initiative's two main arms. The fact that more articles dealt with the MSR than with the SREB can further be seen as a reflection of the very location of Indonesia and the resultant greater interest in matters related to the maritime stretch of OBOR.

When referring to the initiative in its entirety, the authors mainly used the terms "One Belt, One Road" and "Belt and Road Initiative".[55] The former appeared in 21 articles, out of which 16 articles (76%) did not feature any other term denoting the initiative; and the latter was used in 10 articles, out of which 5 texts (50%) did not exhibit any alternative terms. It can further be said that the phrase "Belt and Road Initiative" was exclusively used by members of Group 1, and that only 3 newspaper articles featured a mixed terminology using both of the phrases stated above. This is quite startling. After all, the term "Belt and Road Initiative" was coined and propagated by China as the new, one and only standard English translation of the initiative to replace the "old" term of "One Belt, One Road"[56]—a term which, however, is still in common use in the media and professional circles alike (Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2016). Since it is reasonable to assume that people working in the news know of such subtleties and consciously choose their wording, it can be expected that those 7 articles featuring the term "Belt and Road Initiative" but not the phrase "One Belt, One Road" were written by authors that act upon the Chinese guideline and, therefore, reflect a certain affinity to China by adopting a particularly positive attitude towards OBOR. In any case, the continental part of the initiative was exclusively referred to as "Silk Road (Economic) Belt",[57] and the maritime stretch primarily as "(21st Century) Maritime Silk Road" (n=10, representing 83% of the respective newspaper articles). Overall, it can therefore be concluded that the articles published by the Jakarta Post adopted the English-language terminology commonly used when referring to China's News Silk Road initiative.

News Schema Categories and Speech References

The analysis of the newspaper articles regarding the news schema categories showed that only 5 articles explicitly referred to OBOR in their headlines: 2 headlines mentioned the

[55]Or variations thereof, such as "One Belt-One Road" or simply "Belt and Road".
[56]With a view to avoiding misinterpretations regarding the actual number of routes covered by the framework.
[57]Or simply "Belt".

entire initiative, 1 headline addressed the SREB and the MSR each, and another headline referred to the Belt and Road Summit of May 18, 2016. Out of these, however, only 4 articles dealt with the initiative as their main topics and thus main events. The fifth article titled "Yunnan at the Core of Modern-day Silk Road" (published August 23, 2015, see Mariani, 2015) was mainly concerned with the Chinese province of Yunnan; OBOR was only dealt with in terms of additional background information. Then again, 1 out of those 5 newspaper articles that featured OBOR as their main topic did not explicitly indicate so in its headline ("Three Brilliant Chinese Initiatives", published on June 4, 2015, see Nasution, 2015). It can further be said that 4 of these articles were published between March 11 and August 5, 2015 and are thus amongst the earlier works on OBOR published by the Jakarta Post. The fifth article also primarily dealt with OBOR, however, only in the context of the above-mentioned Belt and Road Summit hosted by Hong Kong's government on May 18, 2016. All other 28 articles dealt with the initiative as a mere side event. These findings substantiate the impression that the Jakarta Post reported on OBOR in a rather superficial, sketchy manner. What is more, not a single article explicitly stated the author's personal opinion on the matter. Whereas this is to be expected from "ordinary" newspaper articles, those texts published in the Jakarta Post's Academia – Opinion section can be regarded as implicit yet evident reflections of the authors' personal point of view. They thus deserve a closer examination (see section "Overall Tenor of the Newspaper Articles" at the end of this chapter).

In any case, 6 articles were identified that referred to speeches accounting for the Chinese OBOR discourse examined in this thesis.[58] Most of these texts (n=4), however, only briefly mentioned President Xi's initial proposal of the OBOR initiative and thus implicitly referred to his landmark speeches at Nazarbayev University and the Indonesian Parliament in 2013. Only 2 speeches featured explicit references—namely to President Xi's latter speech in Indonesia. The Jakarta Post thus did not specifically report on the contents or speech situations of any of the 71 speeches given by China's President Xi, Premier Li or FM Wang—let alone on any (re)actions on the part of Indonesia. This indicates that they were deemed too insignificant by the Jakarta Post to direct its readership's attention to them.

[58]One news article (see The Jakarta Post, 2016a) mentioned Premier Li's speech at the LMC Leader's Meeting on March 23, 2016. Upon review of the direct quote cited in the article, however, the referenced speech turned out to be not the one covered by the specialised text corpus used in this thesis.

It is thus all the more interesting to find out whether the OBOR messages published by the Jakarta Post deviate from those of the Chinese politicians, or align with them anyway.

Main Goals of OBOR

Out of all 33 news articles, 5 texts (15%) did not touch upon any of the main goals of OBOR. Their only common characteristic is, however, that they dealt with the initiative in a side note. It can thus be said that 28 articles (85%) referred to at least one of the five main goals of OBOR. Most of these texts (n=19, representing 68% of all goal-related articles) dealt with the goal of facilities connectivity (see Table 8). This is followed by the goal of financial integration (n=13, representing 46%), the two goals of policy coordination and unimpeded trade (n=9, representing 32% each)—which both rank third—and the goal of people-to-people bond (n=4, representing 14%). Comparing these results to the number of goal-specific references corroborates the top-3 rankings for the goals of facilities connectivity, financial integration and unimpeded trade. It does, however, also reveal the following peculiarity: whereas the number of *articles* referring to the goal of policy coordination (n=9; rank no. 3) is higher than the respective figure for the goal of people-to-people bond (n=4; rank no. 5), the number of *references* to the goal of policy coordination (n=16, representing 12% of all references to the main goals of OBOR) put it in the last position (rank no. 5) and thus behind the goal of people-to-people bond (n=20, representing 15% and thus rank no. 4). It can therefore be concluded that the OBOR goal of facilities connectivity was clearly most extensively reported on by the Jakarta Post; followed by the goals of financial integration and unimpeded trade.

Table 8. OBOR Goals – Articles (No. of Articles, No. of References)

OBOR Goal	No. of Articles*		Ranking	No. of References		Ranking
Policy Coordination	9	*32.14%*	③	16	*12.21%*	⑤
Facilities Connectivity	19	*67.86%*	①	42	*32.06%*	①
Unimpeded Trade	9	*32.14%*	③	23	*17.56%*	③
Financial Integration	13	*46.43%*	②	30	*22.90%*	②
People-to-people Bond	4	*14.29%*	⑤	20	*15.27%*	④
			Total:	**131**	***100.00%***	

*Related to the total no. of articles dealing with at least one OBOR goal (n=28).

Note: Compiled by the author.

These thematic preferences in the newspaper's OBOR coverage go well together with Indonesia's envisioned role in the initiative, as it was contemplated to leverage the country's manpower and education to "become a manufacturing hub of OBOR" (Siu, 2017). They are also in line with the country's foreign policy under President Joko Widodo, who seemed to have chosen China—and not any of the other two major powers in the region, the US or Japan—as Indonesia's main partner for the attraction of foreign investment to boost infrastructure development, in particular (Pattiradjawane, 2016). Furthermore, although the goal of people-to-people bond was addressed in the lowest number of articles and therefore probably regarded as the least important OBOR goal to Indonesia, the data suggests that—once raised—it was discussed in comparatively much detail.

In addition to that, it can be said that the majority of articles touching upon the main goals of OBOR did so by referring to only one (n=13, representing 46% of all goal-related articles) or two (n=9, representing 32%) goals in the text (see Figure 16).




Figure 16. Articles by Number of Goals (compiled by the author).

Most articles that exclusively dealt with one OBOR goal did so by referring to the goal of facilities connectivity (n=7 out of 12 such articles). The goal of people-to-people bond, by contrast, was not subject to such exclusivity at all. Examining the most popular co-occurrences of at least two OBOR goals in one and the same article further shows that the highest number of eligible texts referred to the goal of financial integration in combination with either the goal of facilities connectivity or the goal of policy coordination (n=7 each). Only 1 article—namely that by Xu Bu, Ambassador of China to ASEAN—touched upon all

five main goals of OBOR. This article also takes the lead in the number of references to the main goals of OBOR per text (n=40, compared to an average of 5 goal-specific references per article touching upon at least one OBOR goal). It is, however, not surprising that a member of the Chinese diplomatic corps accounted for the most detailed report on OBOR and its main goals; he seems to have taken the opportunity to disseminate *China's* OBOR messages via a non-Chinese medium—the Jakarta Post—to the outside world. In any case, the findings presented in this paragraph reinforce the impression of the Jakarta Post's OBOR coverage hitherto gained.

A look at the years of publication further revealed that much more articles addressing the goals of policy coordination (2015: n=3; 2016: n=6), facilities connectivity (2015: n=6; 2016: n=13) and financial integration (2015: n=3; 2016: n=10) were published in 2016 than in the previous year. The goals of unimpeded trade and people-to-people bond, however, were raised in an equally high number of articles each year (n=5 and n=2, respectively). In consideration of the absolute number of texts published by the Jakarta Post per year, it can be inferred that the latter two goals have become comparatively less reported on over time—which in turn may indicate that they became less important in the eyes of the Indonesians. In addition to that, the analysis of the Jakarta Post's news sections with regard to the OBOR goals showed that the highest number of texts referring to the goal of unimpeded trade were indeed published in the Business section (n=5); and that none of these articles touched upon the goal of people-to-people bond. Apart from this thematic match, however, the goal-specific examination of the news sections did not yield any significant results.

Finally, the analysis of the goal-specific references with respect to their actual contents (see Appendix C: Code Book – Speeches) revealed the following thematic preferences.

(1) Goal of Facilities Connectivity

The goal of facilities connectivity was mainly addressed through allusions to the sub-topics "Transport Infrastructure (Land)" (n=13, representing 31% of the references to this goal) and "Infrastructure Network" (n=10, representing 24%). The respective text segments dealt with the construction of express highways, high-speed railways, and economic corridors linking China with other regions of the world. All other sub-topics were referred to at least once. The newspaper's coverage of such a broad range of facilities-related topics with,

however, with a slight preference for on-land infrastructure is easily explained. After all, Indonesia may be "in a key position for realising [the] MSR"; it does, however, lack adequate infrastructure and has therefore invited cooperation with China to finance, for instance, "Indonesia's first high-speed railway" (Yosephine, 2017).

(2) Goal of Financial Integration

The highest number of references to the goal of financial integration were made to the establishment of the AIIB and its role in advancing OBOR through the provision of financial support (category "Financial Institutions": n=17, representing 56% of all references to this goal), and to the various funds that are involved (category "Funds": n=8, representing 27%). Other sub-topics were barely touched upon. Again, the heightened interested in these two aspects can be ascribed to Indonesia's own experience since it has already started to profit from financial support provided by the AIIB, e.g. through the Indonesia Regional Infrastructure Development Fund project (see Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank [AIIB], n.d.).

(3) Goal of Unimpeded Trade

The references made to the goal of unimpeded trade, however, did not show a similarly clear thematic focus. They mainly dealt with OBOR-related investment activities of individual players in- and outside of China (category "Investment Facilitation": n=6, representing 26% of all references to this goal), the access to new markets and the general advancement of economic relations (categories "New Areas & Forms of Trade" and "Other": n=4, representing 17% each). However, four sub-topics—namely that of "Energy & Resources Industries", "Service Industries", "Other Industries" and "Customs"—were not touched upon at all.

(4) Goal of Policy Coordination

The goal of policy coordination was mainly addressed in statements related to the sub-topic "Economic Development" (n=9, representing 56% of all references to this goal), commenting on the complementarity of OBOR with the development plans of individual countries (e.g. Brunei's Vision 2035) or international organisations (e.g. ASEAN's 2010 Master Plan on Connectivity). This is followed by the number of references dealing with political trust and other policy-related issues (categories "Political Interests & Trust" and

"Other": n=3, representing 19% each), which basically stated that it is difficult yet important for China to create confidence in the initiative. Other sub-topics were barely raised, which further confirms the dominance of references to the synergetic nature of OBOR in the policy-related OBOR coverage of the Jakarta Post.

(5) Goal of People-to-people Bond

Last but not least, the highest number of references to the goal of people-to-people bond was made to cultural aspects such as media cooperation (category "Culture": n=5, representing 25% of all references to this goal), and to people-to-people exchanges and cooperation in general (category "Other": n=4, representing 20%). With the exception of the sub-topics "Public Health" and "Sports", all other sub-topics were addressed at least once in the articles published by the Jakarta Post which suggests a broad but not particularly deep interest in the matter.

General Tenor

All in all, the newspaper articles published by the Jakarta Post did not offer an overly extensive coverage of China's OBOR initiative. Most articles only briefly touched upon the initiative to put the main event (e.g. specific infrastructure construction projects) into context or to provide a bit of extra information adding depth to the news story (e.g. by referring to OBOR as a point in case). The OBOR references in the news articles were thus generally short and did not provide much detail. Only earlier publications—those dealing with the initiative as their main events—gave more comprehensive insights into OBOR, its two main routes, ancient origins and China's rationales. This suggests that the Jakarta Post first needed to introduce—not to say educate—its readership to (about) the initiative; only after such an introductory phase, it seemed practical to work with less extensive yet more specific references to OBOR. In any case, the articles were primarily concerned with economic matters and reported on issues involving ASEAN or individual Asian countries (e.g. India, Brunei or Malaysia). Thereby, OBOR was often brought up not only whilst referring to the views of business- or statesmen alike but also as an important factor influencing the actions of key actors in the SCS conflict.

The OBOR coverage of the Jakarta Post, however, also showed some minor flaws. For instance, one article falsely portrayed the MSR and OBOR as two separate initiatives (see

Sharma, 2015), and both articles by Vincent Lingga stated 2014 (not 2013) as the year of OBOR's initial launch (see Lingga, 2016, 2017). In fact, the author did so by using exactly the same paragraph in both of his articles; just like Louise Watt did with a relevant paragraph in her two contributions (see Watt, 2016a, 2016b). These inaccuracies and instances of inattentiveness certainly do not change the whole story; they do, however, somewhat negatively reflect on the newspaper's quality of reporting.

It can further be said that the texts written by members of Group 2 differ from those written by members of Group 1 in exhibiting a more speculative style, e.g. by assuming different actors' points of view without backing their claims with direct quotes. Two articles that were written by such "externals" and published in the National section of the Jakarta post deserve special mention—namely the text written by China's Ambassador to ASEAN, which provided the most detailed and positive account of OBOR; and the article written by the Philippine counterpart, which sees the initiative as an attempt by China "to lure ASEAN and other countries" and distract from the country's "atrocious activities" in the SCS (Buensuceso, 2016). These contributions clearly reflect the two countries' opposing attitudes towards OBOR and thus represent instances of a pro-OBOR and contra-OBOR discourse, respectively. This further shows that the Jakarta Post serves as a platform for the dissemination of not only factual news but also texts with an ideological spin that adopt an outright positive or negative attitude towards China, respectively. It is yet striking that all articles that featured the term "Belt and Road Initiative" were written by people working for the Jakarta Post and—as hypothesised—did indeed abstain from negatively reporting on the initiative. The Jakarta Post itself may thus have a rather positive stance on OBOR (and China) after all.

In any case, the articles published in the Jakarta Post's Academia – Opinion section were written by members of Group 1 and Group 2 alike and paint a particularly differentiated picture of OBOR. They addressed concerns about the initiative's geopolitical impact but also cautioned, for instance, that China's behaviour in the SCS provokes "its neighbors' resentful patriotism" which may then lead "to what they fear—the potential obstruction of China's vast 'New Silk Road' project" (Nurbaiti, 2016). Utama and Kim (2016) further pointed out that even though "[t]he politicized premise behind China's foreign economic investments is

[…] not as altruistic as it seems", it is still more of "an economic necessity" for China than "a politicized tactic". Along similar lines, Marthinus (2016) concluded that "Western powers must not resort to Sinophobic rhetoric of inflated security threats simply because they are […] too distracted to outmaneuver [sic] its [China's] 'One Belt, One Road' diplomatic offensive". These opinion pieces certainly do not report on OBOR in a purely objective manner. However, they also adopt neither an overly positive nor an overly critical attitude; they rather examine the initiative from different angels, taking the wider context as well as the authors' personal impressions into consideration.

Finally, the OBOR coverage of the Jakarta Post regarding Indonesia itself portrayed the country as a part of the MSR—even of its ancient predecessor—and as the place where the maritime stretch of the initiative was initially announced. Not least owing to synergies between the initiative and the country's own development plans, Indonesia was further said to be a major destination for international and especially Chinese investment under the OBOR framework. In addition to that, the country was viewed as an important regional economic power and the crucial connecting piece between China and ASEAN. Some articles, however, also briefly reported on the controversies revolving around the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway project. After all, it "could potentially be viewed as primarily benefiting China by building local infrastructure unrelated to the OBOR route" (Lingga, 2016) and serves as an "example of the issue of trust, of Indonesians toward their government and toward China" (Nurbaiti, 2016). All in all, the Jakarta Post coverage thus suggests that Indonesia is not blindly buying into China's win-win rhetoric of OBOR. Indeed, "Indonesia plays it cool" as it decided to initially put up only two to three regions for cooperation under China's Silk Road framework (Sundaryani, 2017).

11. Conclusion

Rooted in constructivist thinking, the research project presented in this thesis conducted a qualitative content analysis of 71 speeches by three high-ranking Chinese politicians (President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, and FM Wang Yi) and 33 articles published by the Indonesian newspaper the Jakarta Post that all dealt with China's OBOR initiative in one way or another. Its overarching goal was to shed light on the actual focal points of OBOR as *envisioned* by China's political elite and as *perceived* by the international community (illustrated by the example of Indonesia) by examining the respective OBOR discourses. To this end, a category system reflecting the main goals of the initiative as set out by the Action Plan—the initiative's official blueprint document released by the Chinese government in March 2015—was developed to serve as the centrepiece of analysis. These five main goals are: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bond. The analysis itself was guided by three sets of RQs (see Chapter 1.3).

RQ-Set 1: The Chinese OBOR Discourse

The analysis of the OBOR-related speeches by the three Chinese politicians showed that they mainly dealt with the initiative as a sub-topic, making short allusions to its major components and main goals. They were thereby primarily concerned with the (1) goal of *financial integration*, especially with regard to the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund; followed by (2) the goal of *facilities connectivity*, more precisely the general promotion and construction of (transport) infrastructure networks; (3) the goal of *policy coordination*, particularly with respect to cooperation agreements and the alignment of development strategies; (4) the goal of *unimpeded trade*, especially regarding the general promotion and facilitation of trade and investment cooperation; and (5) the goal of *people-to-people bond*, which was mainly addressed in general terms and in the context of greater cooperation in areas of public interest such as humanitarian disaster relief. The OBOR discourse produced by President Xi, Premier Li and FM Wang therefore suggests that China's political elite sees financial integration and facilities connectivity as the two priority areas to be primarily pursued under the OBOR framework; with greater connectivity at the people-level ranging lowest on the agenda. It thus seems that China prioritises aspects of "hard" over "soft"

connectivity, to employ the wording of Brown and He (2016)—at least according to its OBOR messages conveyed to the international community.

It can further be said that both the general and the goal-specific Chinese OBOR discourse gradually evolved to clearly peak in 2015. President Xi's engagement significantly decreased in 2016 which, however, was somewhat compensated for by a comparatively active FM Wang; and Premier Li only got involved from 2013 onwards but henceforward contributed a consistently high number of speeches. In each of the four years under scrutiny, the highest number of speeches were delivered in Asia. Thereby, a certain division of labour could be observed: Northeast Asia was primarily travelled by FM Wang, Southeast Asia by Premier Li, and all other sub-regions of Asia by President Xi. All in all, however, most speeches were held in China, which can be seen as an indication of China's efforts to establish itself as a central platform and discursive power for the promotion of OBOR. The analysis further showed that the goal of financial integration was addressed in the highest number of speeches each year. It is also the goal primarily addressed by President Xi and Premier Li; FM Wang, however, focused on the goal of facilities connectivity instead.

Even though the above-stated observations might not be attributable to the political functions of the three speakers, the analysis did indeed reveal some role-specific characteristics. President Xi was the only one to deliver speeches on four different continents, touching upon the most diverse range of topics. Premier Li, by contrast, primarily dealt with economic matters; and FM Wang's speeches exhibited a clear focus on diplomatic issues. It can further be said that observers of the Chinese OBOR discourse are well-advised to turn to President Xi for rather general information on the initiative; to Premier Li for specific details; and to FM Wang (especially his annual speeches at MOFA's New Year Reception) for the most balanced account of OBOR. All in all, the speech behaviours of the three politicians are thus in line with their respective roles as the head of the state attending to largely ceremonial and representative duties (President Xi), the head of the government whose main concern is the pragmatic handling of economic affairs (Premier Li), and the head of MOFA—a true diplomat responsible for the portfolio of China's foreign affairs (FM Wang).

RQ-Set 2: Illocutionary Acts

This appraisal is substantiated by the politicians' respective performance of illocutionary acts. Generally speaking, however, the Chinese OBOR discourse only saw the usage of commissives, directives and expressives that were all of a weaker type—i.e. neither particularly binding nor especially demanding or passionate. Commissives and directives, the two types of illocutions most extensively used, served the primary purpose of presenting China in the best light possible whilst encouraging deeper engagement with OBOR. They thereby not only stressed the cooperative nature of the initiative but also implicitly presented China as *primus inter pares*. Even though the illocutionary acts were not used to directly assign responsibilities to specific actors, they were still suggestive of China's central role and power in overseeing the implementation of OBOR and defining its scope. Owing to this largely self-directed kind of role allocation, however, it would be out of place to speak of a "grand strategy" at work. Nevertheless, the findings of this research confirm the notion of a Chinese charm offensive vis-à-vis (potential) OBOR countries by making full use of China's "political, economic and diplomatic resources in order to forge a positive image of the New Silk Road strategy among the international community" (Yu, 2016, p. 1).

RQ-Set 3: The Indonesian Perspective

Unfortunately, the analysis of newspaper articles published by the Jakarta Post was less rewarding. Most articles dealt with OBOR as a side event, and none of the speeches delivered by the Chinese politicians—neither their contents nor any reactions to them—were properly reported on. The Jakarta Post's OBOR coverage, therefore, cannot be directly related to the illocutionary acts performed by the Chinese politicians. Nevertheless, the newspaper attended to its role as intermediary between the political and the public sphere by reporting on the initiative and disseminating its own OBOR messages. It thereby mainly dealt with (1) the goal of *facilities connectivity*, especially the construction of on-shore transportation networks; followed by (2) the goal of *financial integration*, in particular with regard to the AIIB and various investment funds; (3) the goals of *unimpeded trade* and *policy coordination*, which were addressed in an equal number of articles and dealt primarily with the investment activities of individual actors, the access to new markets and the general promotion of unimpeded trade on the one hand, and the complementarity of development plans and general trust- and policy-related issues, on the other hand; and finally (5) the goal

of *people-to-people bond*, which was largely concerned with general and cultural aspects of people-centred cooperation.

By and large, the thematic focus of the Jakarta Post's OBOR coverage is not only in line with Indonesia's main interests in the initiative but has also taken up the finance- and facilities-related focal points of OBOR (including the neglect of people-to-people bonds) as promoted in the Chinese discourse. What is more, China's narrative of OBOR as President Xi's signature foreign policy initiative featuring a high complementarity with other development strategies has also expanded into the Indonesian newspaper discourse. Overall, however, the OBOR coverage of the Jakarta Post exhibited a clear focus on economic matters and—compared to the Chinese discourse—provided more detailed information by extensively elaborating, for instance, on concrete projects of infrastructure development. The initiative itself was thereby portrayed in a neither extremely positive nor particularly negative manner. In fact, the newspaper turned out to be a platform for the dissemination of both pro- *and* contra-OBOR discourses alike. The Jakarta Post further presented Indonesia as an integral part of the MSR that thrives on a great fit between its own development strategies and OBOR but does not blindly buy into China's win-win rhetoric. Indonesia's OBOR stance as reported on by the Jakarta Post therefore does not give reason to suspect a hampering effect on China-ASEAN cooperation under China's OBOR scheme; it does, however, suggest that China's central role is accepted and that Indonesia—just like many other countries—is indeed interested in getting more involved in the initiative along the envisioned lines.

Concluding Remarks

All in all, the results presented in this thesis may not be all too controversial. Nevertheless, they provide novel insights into the OBOR initiative and its primary aims as envisioned by China's political elite. This research thus not only adds to the academic discourse on OBOR but also hopes to reduce the lack of clarity involved. After all, even this brief glimpse into the OBOR discourse showed that the confusion about the focal points of the initiative is large (see e.g. MOFA, 2015ak; Quinn, 2016; and Xu, 2015 for different statements on the initiative's supposed priority areas).

The findings, however, are subject to several limitations and must thus be considered with caution. First, the methodological approach is inherently biased towards rather explicit allusions within a narrowly defined scope. Important information beyond these boundaries may thus be missed out on. Second, the composition of the specialised text corpus used in this research is significantly affected by the data published online by the Chinese government—which is "characteristically scarce" for key speeches on China's diplomacy (Callahan, 2016, p. 228)—and the Jakarta Post themselves. The text corpus is thus relatively unbalanced with regard to the number of texts per speaker, author and year; it forms part but is not representative of the respective discourses. The quantitative findings presented in this thesis are therefore to be merely understood as rough indicators and "anchor points" for qualitative interpretations. Third, it must be noted that the notion of illocutionary acts was borrowed from SAT to allow for more profound insights. This thesis, however, did not strive to perform a full-fledged SAA.

All in all, the findings of this thesis represent valuable avenues for further research, for instance, by repeating the analysis with a more comprehensive text corpus or an extended focus of analysis. There may also be more practical ways to allow for a reality check of discursive events than the one presented in this thesis. After all: whereas "[f]ew doubt that in OBOR, all Silk Roads lead to China" (Sidaway & Woon, 2017, p. 1), it is yet to be seen whether the parties involved merely talk the talk or also walk the (envisioned) walk.

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Appendix A: Text Corpus

Text Corpus – Part 1: Speeches

No.	Date	Location	Occasion	Speaker	Code	Page
1.	07/09/2013	Astana, KAZ	Nazarbayev University	Xi Jinping	Xi_1	48
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3.	11/12/2013	Beijing, CHN	New Year Reception for 2014	Wang Yi	Wang_1	81
4.	16/12/2013	Beijing, CHN	Symposium "New Starting Point"	Wang Yi	Wang_2	81
5.	01/04/2014	Bruges, BEL	College of Europe	Xi Jinping	Xi_3	49
6.	10/04/2014	Boao, CHN	Boao Forum for Asia 2014 – Opening Ceremony	Li Keqiang	Li_1	63
7.	21/05/2014	Shanghai, CHN	4th CICA Summit	Xi Jinping	Xi_4	50
8.	28/06/2014	Beijing, CHN	60th Anniversary of the Five Principles	Xi Jinping	Xi_5	50
9.	22/08/2014	Ulaanbaatar, MNG	State Great Khural of Mongolia	Xi Jinping	Xi_6	51
10.	12/09/2014	Dushanbe, TJK	14th Meeting of the SCO Council – Heads of State	Xi Jinping	Xi_7	51
11.	16/10/2014	Milan, ITA	10th ASEM Summit	Li Keqiang	Li_2	63
12.	29/10/2014	Beijing, CHN	10th Lanting Forum	Wang Yi	Wang_3	82
13.	31/10/2014	Beijing, CHN	4th Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan	Li Keqiang	Li_3	64
14.	13/11/2014	Nay Pyi Taw, MMR	17th APT Summit	Li Keqiang	Li_4	64
15.	13/11/2014	Nay Pyi Taw, MMR	17th ASEAN-China Summit	Li Keqiang	Li_5	65
16.	13/11/2014	Nay Pyi Taw, MMR	9th EAS	Li Keqiang	Li_6	66
17.	15/11/2014	Brisbane, AUS	9th G20 Summit	Xi Jinping	Xi_8	52
18.	17/11/2014	Canberra, AUS	Parliament of Australia	Xi Jinping	Xi_9	52
19.	11/12/2014	Beijing, CHN	New Year Reception for 2015	Wang Yi	Wang_4	83
20.	15/12/2014	Astana, KAZ	13th Meeting of the SCO Council – Heads of Government	Li Keqiang	Li_7	66
21.	16/12/2014	Belgrade, SRB	4th China and CEEC Economic and Trade Forum	Li Keqiang	Li_8	67
22.	16/12/2014	Belgrade, SRB	3rd Meeting of China and CEEC – Heads of Government	Li Keqiang	Li_9	67
23.	20/12/2014	Bangkok, THA	5th GMS Summit	Li Keqiang	Li_10	68
24.	21/01/2015	Davos, CHE	World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2015	Li Keqiang	Li_11	69
25.	12/02/2015	Islamabad, PAK	Year of China-Pakistan Friendly Exchanges	Wang Yi	Wang_5	84
26.	23/03/2015	Beijing, CHN	China Development Forum 2015	Wang Yi	Wang_6	84
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27.	28/03/2015	Boao, CHN	Boao Forum for Asia 2015	Xi Jinping	Xi_10	53
28.	28/03/2015	Boao, CHN	Boao Forum for Asia 2015	Wang Yi	Wang_7	85
29.	13/04/2015	Beijing, CHN	54th Annual Session of AALCO	Li Keqiang	Li_12	69
30.	21/04/2015	Islamabad, PAK	Parliament of Pakistan	Xi Jinping	Xi_11	54
31.	22/04/2015	Jakarta, IDN	Asian African Summit	Xi Jinping	Xi_12	55
32.	28/04/2015	Beijing, CHN	11th Lanting Forum	Wang Yi	Wang_8	86
33.	27/06/2015	Beijing, CHN	4th World Peace Forum	Wang Yi	Wang_9	86
34.	29/06/2015	Brussels, BEL	China-EU Business Summit	Li Keqiang	Li_13	70
35.	10/07/2015	Ufa, RUS	15th Meeting of the SCO Council – Heads of State	Xi Jinping	Xi_13	55
36.	10/09/2015	Dalian, CHN	9th Annual Meeting of the New Champions	Li Keqiang	Li_14	70
37.	16/09/2015	Beijing, CHN	14th Lanting Forum	Wang Yi	Wang_10	87
38.	22/09/2015	Seattle, USA	Welcome Dinner	Xi Jinping	Xi_14	56
39.	22/09/2015	Seattle, USA	3rd China-US Governors' Forum	Xi Jinping	Xi_15	57
40.	26/09/2015	New York, USA	UN Sustainable Development Summit	Xi Jinping	Xi_16	57

41.	01/11/2015	Seoul, KOR	Luncheon of the Business Community of Korea	Li Keqiang	Li_15	71
42.	06/11/2015	Hanoi, VNM	National Assembly of Vietnam	Xi Jinping	Xi_17	58
43.	07/11/2015	Singapore, SGP	Singapore Lecture	Xi Jinping	Xi_18	58
44.	15/11/2015	Antalya, TUR	10th G20 Summit	Xi Jinping	Xi_19	59
45.	18/11/2015	Manila, PHL	APEC CEO Summit	Xi Jinping	Xi_20	59
46.	19/11/2015	Manila, PHL	23rd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting	Xi Jinping	Xi_21	60
47.	21/11/2015	Kuala Lumpur, MYS	18th China-ASEAN Summit	Li Keqiang	Li_16	71
48.	21/11/2015	Kuala Lumpur, MYS	18th APT Summit	Li Keqiang	Li_17	72
49.	22/11/2015	Kuala Lumpur, MYS	10th EAS	Li Keqiang	Li_18	73
50.	24/11/2015	Suzhou, CHN	5th China and CEEC Economic Trade Forum	Li Keqiang	Li_19	73
51.	24/11/2015	Suzhou, CHN	4th Summit of China and CEEC	Li Keqiang	Li_20	74
52.	09/12/2015	Islamabad, PAK	Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process	Wang Yi	Wang_11	88
53.	15/12/2015	Zhengzhou, CHN	14th Meeting of the SCO Council – Heads of Government	Li Keqiang	Li_21	75
54.	06/01/2016	Beijing, CHN	New Year Reception for 2016	Wang Yi	Wang_12	89
55.	16/01/2016	Beijing, CHN	Opening Ceremony of the AIIB	Xi Jinping	Xi_22	61
56.	25/02/2016	Washington DC, USA	CSIS	Wang Yi	Wang_13	89
57.	02/03/2016	Beijing, CHN	Promotion Event – Ningxia	Wang Yi	Wang_14	90
58.	23/03/2016	Sanya, CHN	1st LMC Leaders' Meeting	Li Keqiang	Li_22	76
59.	24/03/2016	Boao, CHN	Boao Forum for Asia 2016 – Opening Ceremony	Li Keqiang	Li_23	76
60.	01/04/2016	Washington DC, USA	Nuclear Security Summit	Xi Jinping	Xi_23	61
61.	28/04/2016	Beijing, CHN	5th Foreign Ministers' Meeting of CICA	Wang Yi	Wang_15	91
62.	27/05/2016	Beijing, CHN	Promotion Event – Guangxi	Wang Yi	Wang_16	91
63.	15/07/2016	Ulaanbaatar, MNG	11th ASEM Summit	Li Keqiang	Li_24	77
64.	03/09/2016	Hangzhou, CHN	B20 Summit	Xi Jinping	Xi_24	62
65.	07/09/2016	Vientiane, LAO	19th China-ASEAN Summit	Li Keqiang	Li_25	77
66.	07/09/2016	Vientiane, LAO	19th APT Summit	Li Keqiang	Li_26	78
67.	08/09/2016	Vientiane, LAO	11th EAS	Li Keqiang	Li_27	79
68.	21/09/2016	New York, USA	71st Session of the UN General Assembly	Li Keqiang	Li_28	79
69.	05/11/2016	Riga, LVA	6th China-CEEC Business Forum	Li Keqiang	Li_29	80
70.	05/11/2016	Riga, LVA	5th Summit of China and CEEC	Li Keqiang	Li_30	80
71.	03/12/2016	Beijing, CHN	Symposium on International Development and China's Diplomacy	Wang Yi	Wang_17	92

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4.	27/05/2015	China, ASEAN – NGO Network	World	Dwi Atmanta	-	News_4	95
5.	04/07/2015	Three Brilliant Initiatives	National	Anwar Nasution	Emeritus professor of economics	News_5	96
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7.	23/08/2015	Yunnan at the Core of the Silk Road	National	Evi Mariani	-	News_7	97
8.	15/09/2015	Beijing Airport's 4th Runway	Business	Zhao Lei	-	News_8	97
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19.	22/04/2016	Belt and Road Summit – ASEAN Connectivity	Academia – Opinion	Vincent Lingga	Senior editor, Jakarta Post	News_19	102
20.	19/05/2016	Indonesia & Hong Kong – Investment Promotion	Business	Vincent Lingga	Senior editor, Jakarta Post	News_20	102
21.	17/06/2016	Indonesia's SCS China Policy	Academia – Opinion	Pierre Marthinus	Executive director, Marthinus Academy	News_21	103
22.	27/06/2016	Maritime Implications of China's Investment	Academia – Opinion	Julius Utama; Michelle Kim	Student at Department of Applied Psychology, New York University; IR and Chinese student at Emory University; Interns at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta	News_22	103

23.	02/07/2016	China-Philippines Ties	Southeast Asia	Deng Yanzi		News_23	104
24.	18/08/2016	China's Weakening Soft Power	Academia – Opinion	Ati Nurbaiti	Journalist, the Jakarta Post	News_24	104
25.	06/09/2016	Stalling G20	Academia – Opinion	Kishore Mahbubani	Singaporean diplomat, Lecturer of Public Policy at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Diplomacy, National University of Singapore	News_25	104
26.	22/09/2016	Bank of China – RMB Usage	Southeast Asia	Ayomi Amindoni	-	News_26	105
27.	17/10/2016	China Paves Road to Growth	Academia – Opinion	Noel P. Quinn	CEO, Global Commercial Banking, HSBC Group	News_27	105
28.	22/10/2016	ASEAN – China's Being Misunderstood	World	Tama Salim	-	News_28	106
29.	31/10/2016	Malaysia-China Relations	Southeast Asia	Jakarta Post	-	News_29	106
30.	01/11/2016	Malaysia's Prime Minister Seeks Better Image with China	Southeast Asia – Malaysia	Louise Watt	-	News_30	106
31.	02/11/2016	China & Malaysia – Closer Cooperation	Southeast Asia – Malaysia	Louise Watt	-	News_31	107
32.	14/11/2016	Malacca Harbor Plan	Southeast Asia	Shannon Teoh	-	News_32	107
33.	31/12/2016	Xi's New Year's Eve Address	World	Jakarta Post	-	News_33	107

Memo: Preparation of Text Corpus Data for MAXQDA Plus 12

All data of the text corpus (incl. the Action Plan) needed to be prepared for further processing within MAXQDA Plus 12. The data was thus copied into individual Microsoft Word files and adjusted in a way that only pure text representing the actual contents remained. This means that for

- … the Action Plan: the main heading, the date of publication, information on the issuing authorities and the current edition, and the table of contents were deleted.
- … the speeches: the main headline(s), background information on the publication (introductory sentence, date of publication, date of last update, editing authority, notes on translation) and the respective speeches (date and venue), and any non-verbal data (e.g. pictures) were deleted. When workable data had to be extracted from documents initially published online in .pdf-format, page numbers were deleted, too.
- … the news articles: background information on the publication (place, date, time and newspaper section) and the author (name, occupation), and non-verbal data (e.g. pictures) were deleted.

In preparation for the paragraph count, a consistent formatting was applied to all texts in Microsoft Word. The font Arial (size 10.5) and the default margin setting aligning the content left were used. Furthermore, blank lines were added in between paragraphs, with (sub-)headings being assigned to the subsequent paragraphs by making use of manual line breaks to maintain thematic coherence.[59] Similarly, forms of address and farewell were assign to the subsequent or preceding paragraphs, accordingly, through the use of manual line breaks, too. Any formatting of the (sub-)headings in bold or italics are kept because they are of no effect to the analysis with MAXQDA Plus 12.

Whether (sub-)headings are written in bold or not and any formatting in italics are kept since they are of no effect to the analysis with MAXQDA.

[59]At two instances (Action Plan and Xi_1), the original texts showed incorrect paragraph breaks in the middle of a sentence. To allow for a meaningful paragraph count, this formatting error was adjusted prior to processing the data in MAXQDA Plus 12.


Appendix B: Code Book – Action Plan

Memo: Inductive Category Formation – Action Plan

To create a category system reflecting the main goals of OBOR, only those passages of the Action Plan that elaborate on the focus areas of the initiative in a detailed yet concise manner are to be considered (selection criterion). The entire section "IV. Cooperation Priorities" (paragraphs 18-41) is thus deemed relevant. The subheadings of this section—consisting of two-word phrases (noun-noun or adjective-noun combinations)—serve as umbrella terms at the highest level of abstraction (main categories). Actual data, however, is to be coded only to the second, lower level of abstraction (sub-categories). These sub-categories must allow for an accurate thematic summary of all aspects of the cooperation priorities mentioned in the Action Plan. They represent the propositional macro-structures of the text and consist of a minimum of two expressions (a predicate and at least one argument, restated in terms of noun phrases).

The actual coding process pursues a top-down-bottom-up strategy. First, the main categories denominating the cooperation priorities—i.e. OBOR goals—are created based on the document's sub-headings (top-down approach). Second, the relevant passages—i.e. noun phrases up to an entire sentence—are coded to the respective goals, using the in-vivo mode of MAXQDA Plus 12 (bottom-up approach). Next, those in-vivo categories that deal with the same sub-topic of an OBOR goal are grouped together; i.e. they are paraphrased in a way that takes them to the desired level of abstraction, whilst still allowing for an accurate reflection of their main contents. Thereby, priority is given to the interpretation of the segments within the logic of the sentence and the paragraph themes, respectively, taking the immediate context—i.e. the surrounding sentences—into consideration. Finally, the first draft of the category system is revised and checked against the original data to make sure that all aspects of the OBOR goals are properly covered by the scheme. This means that at the end of the coding process, a two-level category system (featuring two levels of abstraction) is created that denotes the five major goals of OBOR and their main aspects. Any additional information below the above-mentioned levels of abstraction that is needed for a proper definition of each category is transformed making use of van Dijk's macro-rules of semantic derivation and put down in form of memos in MAXQDA Plus 12.

Category System: OBOR Goals* – Organigram



Note: Screenshot from MAXQDA Plus 12 (taken by the author).
*The five "Other" sub-categories do not originate from the primary data. In view of the highest level of abstraction, however, they were added to allow for all aspects of any of the OBOR goals to be considered at the ensuing stage of content structuring (see Appendix C: Code Book – Speeches and Appendix D: Code Book – Newspaper Articles).

Appendix C: Code Book – Speeches

Memo: Content Structuring – Speeches

Akin to the approach applied for the inductive category formation, propositional phrases of at least two connected concepts (usually a verb and its direct object, or a noun and an adjective specifying it) dealing with OBOR serve as the minimum coding units. The context units cover all relevant sentences (subject to thematic coherence) of an OBOR paragraph.

Category System: Speeches

The category system for the analysis of the speeches consists of two parts. The first part deals with the main goals of OBOR. The thematic categories reflect all aspects of the initiative's goals and are predetermined by the category system extracted from the Action Plan. Since the main categories serve as mere "umbrella terms", all relevant text passages are to be coded to the respective sub-categories. These sub-categories are mutually exclusive[60] and defined making use of the memo function of MAXQDA Plus 12. A text fragment is to be coded to a sub-category only if the propositional content expressed in the definitional sentence or at least one of the key aspects mentioned in the sub-category's definition are addressed. The definitions, prime examples[61] and encoding rules (only formulated if needed to avoid ambiguity) of each sub-category are recorded in tabular form (see "Category System: OBOR Goals" below).

The second part of the category system reflects Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary acts. It works with five main categories (no sub-categories) representing the five types of illocutionary acts. Again, the respective definitions and examples are recorded in tabular form (see "Category System: Illocutionary Acts" below). Encoding rules are not needed because the definitions alone allow for unambiguous coding. A text fragment is to be coded to a main category only if it corresponds to the propositional content expressed in the definitional sentence and the respective key aspects mentioned in the category's definition.

[60]This means that each text fragment may only be coded to *one* sub-category, taking the respective sentence (and paragraph) theme(s) into consideration.

[61]The prime examples of the category system are text passages directly taken from the primary data of the specialised text corpus.

The same sentences considered for the thematic analysis regarding the main goals of OBOR are considered for the examination of illocutionary acts.

Category System: OBOR Goals

Main Categories	Sub-categories	Definitions	Examples	Encoding Rules
1. Policy Coordination	Political Interests & Trust	All text passages that deal with shared political interests and mutual trust of OBOR countries.	the "Belt and Road" initiative […] will serve the common interests of relevant parties	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with the bridging role of communication and exchanges between legislative bodies, parliaments, political parties and political organisations, and the exchanges/cooperation amongst cities (to be coded to 5. People-to-people Bond/Politics).
	Cooperative Principles	All text passages that deal with the general principles of cooperation amongst OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - cooperation consensus - negotiations to solve cooperation-related issues	initiated by China on the basis of the principle of wide consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits	
	Policy Support	All text passages that deal with the policy support of OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - (macro-)policy exchange and communication mechanism - implementation of large-scale projects and practical cooperation in the field	form synergy between our respective policies and work faster to build demonstrative projects	
	Economic Development	All text passages that deal with the coordination of (economic) development strategies and policies of OBOR countries.	to help countries align their development strategies and form complementarity	
	Regional Cooperation	All text passages that deal with the drawing-up of plans and measures for regional cooperation between OBOR countries.	work out plans, build projects, […] establish a new model of regional and south-south cooperation	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with the development of regional (service) industries (to be coded to 3. Unimpeded Trade/Support Systems & Capacity, or 3. Unimpeded Trade/Service Industries).
	Other	All text passages that deal with any aspect of policy coordination not already covered by the other sub-categories of the main category "1. Policy Coordination".	realize the connectivity of […] policies	

2. Facilities Connectivity	Infrastructure Network	All text passages that deal with the construction of an infrastructure network for/by OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - connectivity of infrastructure construction plans and technical standard systems - construction of international trunk passageways - infrastructure network connecting (a) sub-regions in Asia (b) Asia, Europe and Africa - green and low-carbon infrastructure construction and operation management (taking into account the impact of climate change)	progress has been made in building the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor	
	Transport Infrastructure (Land)	All text passages that deal with the construction of land-based transport infrastructure for/by OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - focus on key passageways, junctions and projects - removal of transport bottlenecks - road network connectivity - road safety facilities, traffic management facilities and related equipment	realize the connectivity of roads	
	Transport Infrastructure (Air)	All text passages that deal with the construction of aviation infrastructure for/by OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - aviation infrastructure - platforms and mechanisms for comprehensive civil aviation cooperation	work together to […] expand exchanges and cooperation on civil aviation	
	Transport Infrastructure (Water)	All text passages that deal with the water-based transport infrastructure of OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - Ports: (a) construction of port infrastructure (b) port cooperation - Information technology (IT) cooperation in maritime logistics - land-water transportation channels - increase of sea routes and number of voyages	need to expedite major projects including […] the China-Myanmar land-water transportation facility	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with a unified coordination mechanism for whole-course transportation (to be coded to 2. Facilities Connectivity/International Transport Facilitation) and the MSR cruise tourism program (to be coded to 5. People-to-people Bond/Tourism).
	Energy Infrastructure	All text passages that deal with the energy infrastructure of OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - connectivity of energy infrastructure - cross-border power supply networks and power-transmission routes - security of energy transport routes (e.g. regarding oil and gas pipelines) - regional power grids	to build a network of overland […] oil and natural gas pipelines	

	Information Infrastructure	All text passages that deal with the information infrastructure of OBOR countries Key aspect(s): - international communications connectivity - communications trunk line networks (e.g. of cross-border optical cables or transcontinental submarine optical cables) - spatial (satellite) information passageways - Information Silk Road	information connectivity is also a major part	
	International Transport Facilitation	All text passages that deal with the facilitation of international transport amongst OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - unified coordination mechanism for whole-course transportation - connectivity of customs clearance, reloading and multimodal transport - formulation of compatible and standard transport rules	implement the GMS Agreement on Facilitation of Cross-border Transport of Goods and People	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with land-water transportation channels (to be coded to 2. Facilities Connectivity/Transportation Infrastructure (Water)), customs clearance facilities of border ports (to be coded to 3. Unimpeded Trade/Customs), and industrial/supply chains (to be coded to 3. Unimpeded Trade/Industrial Chains & Convenience).
	Other	All text passages that deal with any aspect of facilities connectivity not already covered by the other sub-categories of the main category "2. Facilities Connectivity".	strengthen cooperation with Vietnam in connectivity and other infrastructure projects	
3. Unimpeded Trade	Investment & Trade Facilitation (General)	All text passages that deal with investment and trade facilitation for OBOR countries in general terms. Key aspect(s): - integrated trade and investment/trade through investment - removal of trade and investment barriers	discuss a proper arrangement for trade and investment facilitation	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with non-tariff barriers, technical trade measures, the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and China's role in discussing FTAs with other OBOR countries (to be coded to 3. Unimpeded Trade/Trade Facilitation), and with investment barriers, the protection of investors, mutual investment areas, new modes of investment cooperation (such as industrial parks) and China's role in encouraging mutual investments (to be coded to 3. Unimpeded Trade/Investment Facilitation).

	Trade Facilitation	All text passages that deal with trade facilitation and liberalisation for/of OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - lowering of non-tariff barriers - transparency of technical trade measures - implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement - China's role: discussions with OBOR countries to open FTAs	the negotiations on upgrading the China-ASEAN FTA have completed	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with the general integration of trade and investment and the removal of trade and investment barriers (to be coded to 3. Unimpeded Trade/Trade & Investment Facilitation (General)).
	Investment Facilitation	All text passages that deal with investment facilitation for OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - elimination of investment barriers - protection of investors: (a) bilateral investment protection agreements (b) double taxation avoidance agreements - expansion of mutual investment areas - new modes of investment cooperation (e.g. industrial parks such as overseas economic and trade cooperation zones and cross-border economic cooperation zones) - China's role: encouragement (a) of other countries to invest in China (b) of Chinese enterprises to make industrial investments/participate in infrastructure construction in OBOR countries	explore the possibility of establishing border area economic zones, industrial parks, investment zones	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with the general integration of trade and investment and the removal of trade and investment barriers (to be coded to 3. Unimpeded Trade/Trade & Investment Facilitation (General)).
	New Areas & Forms of Trade	All text passages that deal with new areas and forms of trade for OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - modern business models (e.g. cross-border e-commerce) and innovative forms of trade - entrepreneurial and investment cooperation mechanisms - improvement of trade structure and trade balance - expansion of trading areas (incl. exploration of new areas) - cooperation in emerging industries (e.g. new-generation IT, biotechnology, new energy technology and new materials industries)	to deepen trade relations with neighboring countries and open new markets	
	Energy & Resource Industries	All text passages that deal with cooperation between OBOR countries in the fields of energy and resources. Key aspect(s): - exploration and development of metal minerals and conventional energy sources (such as coal, oil, and gas)	put in place new cooperation platforms in such priority areas as […] energy	

		- clean, renewable energy sources (e.g. hydropower, nuclear power, wind power, and solar power) - integrated industrial chain of energy and resource cooperation: (a) deep-processing technology, equipment and engineering services (b) processing and conversion of energy and resources at/near the places of exploitation		
	Maritime Industries	All text passages that deal with cooperation between OBOR countries in maritime industries. Key aspect(s): - marine-product farming - deep-sea fishing - aquatic product processing - seawater desalination - marine biopharmacy - ocean engineering technology - environmental protection industries - marine tourism	develop maritime partnership in a joint effort to build the MSR	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with aspects of maritime connectivity (to be coded to 2. Facilities Connectivity/Transportation Infrastructure (Water)), maritime cooperation centres (to be coded to 5. People-to-people Bond/Science & Technology) and the MSR cruise tourism program (to be coded to 5. People-to-people Bond/Tourism).
	Service Industries	All text passages that deal with the service industries of OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - development of modern service trade - service trade support system - openness of service industries/development of regional service industries	[no example found in primary data]	
	Other Industries	All text passages that deal with cooperation between OBOR countries in one of the industries stated below. Key aspect(s): - agriculture and agricultural machinery manufacturing - forestry - animal husbandry - fisheries - farm produce processing	[no example found in primary data]	
	Customs	All text passages that deal with the customs of OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - customs cooperation (e.g. regarding information exchange, mutual recognition of regulations, and mutual assistance in law enforcement) - improvement of customs clearance capability - customs clearance facilities of border ports (establishing a “single-window” in border ports) - reduction of customs clearance costs	need to facilitate the clearance of customs	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with the connectivity of customs clearance (to be coded to 2. Facilities Connectivity/International Transport Facilitation).

	Industrial Chains & Convenience	All text passages that deal with the cooperation of OBOR countries regarding industrial chains and convenience. Key aspect(s): - supply chain safety and convenience - concerted development of entire industrial chain and related industries (to improve division of labour and distribution of industrial chains) - industrial cluster development - coordination of cross-border supervision procedures - bi- and multilateral cooperation regarding (a) inspection and quarantine (e.g. online checking) (b) certification and accreditation (b) standard measurement (c) statistical information - mutual recognition of Authorized Economic Operators - China's role: support of localised operation and management of Chinese companies (to boost local economy, increase local employment and improve local livelihood)	improve the international supply chain and border crossing rules	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with the coordination of whole-course transportation, the connectivity of reloading and multimodal transport, and the formulation of compatible/standard transportation rules (to be coded to 2. Facilities Connectivity/International Transport Facilitation).
	Support Systems & Capacity	All text passages that deal with support systems and capacities for/of OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - establishment of research and development (R&D), production and marketing systems - improvement of industrial supporting capacity - improvement of competitiveness of regional industries	promote […] industrial capacity cooperation with countries along the Belt and Road	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with a service trade support system (to be coded to 3. Unimpeded Trade/Service Industries).
	Environment-friendly Approach	All text passages that deal with an environment-friendly approach of OBOR countries to trade and investment. Key aspect(s): - promotion of ecological progress in trade and investment - cooperation in (a) conservation of eco-environment (b) protection of biodiversity (c) tackling of climate change - China's role: to encourage Chinese companies to take social responsibilities in protecting local biodiversity and eco-environment	work with countries along the routes with focuses on green development	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with environmental protection of maritime industries (to be coded to 3. Unimpeded Trade/Maritime Industries).
	Other	All text passages that deal with any aspect of unimpeded trade not already covered by the other sub-categories of the main category "3. Unimpeded Trade".	promote unimpeded trade	

4. Financial Integration	Financial Regulation Cooperation	All text passages that deal with financial regulation cooperation between OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - bilateral MOUs on cooperation in financial regulation - regional regulation coordination mechanisms - cross-border exchange and cooperation between (a) credit investigation regulators (b) credit investigation institutions (c) credit rating institutions	[no example found in primary data]	
	Financial Risk & Crisis Management	All text passages that deal with the establishment of a system for OBOR countries to management (cross-border) financial risks and crises. Key aspect(s): - exchange and cooperation mechanisms - regional financial risk early-warning system	[no example found in primary data]	
	Investment, Financing & Credit Information System	All text passages that deal with the establishment of an investment, financing and credit information system for OBOR countries.	tap the pan-European investment cooperation platform, China-CEEC framework for investment and financing	
	Currency Stability & Swaps	All text passages that deal with the establishment of a currency stability system and the expansion of bilateral currency swaps and settlement for/amongst OBOR countries.	need to further expand the size and scale of bilateral currency swap arrangements	
	Bond Market	All text passages that deal with the development of the bond market in Asia. Key aspect(s): - China's role: (a) support of governments of OBOR countries and their companies/financial institutions (with good credit rating) to issue RMB bonds in China (b) encouragement of Chinese financial companies/institutions (1) to issue bonds in RMB and foreign currencies outside of China and (2) to use thus collected funds in OBOR countries	[no example found in primary data]	
	Funds	All text passages that deal with funds related to OBOR. Key aspect(s): - role of Silk Road Fund and sovereign wealth funds of OBOR countries - encouragement of commercial equity investment funds and private funds to participate in construction of key projects of OBOR	make good use of the Silk Road Fund	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR—even if funds are assignable to specific industries covered by other sub-categories (e.g. Maritime Cooperation Fund).

	Financial Institutions	All text passages that deal with banks and interbank associations related to OBOR. Key aspect(s): - banks: (establishment of) (a) AIIB (b) BRICS New Development Bank - cooperation of China-ASEAN Interbank Association and SCO Interbank Association - establishment of SCO financing institution - multilateral financial cooperation in form of syndicated loans and bank credit	China […] hopes that the AIIB could be launched at an early date	
	Other	All text passages that deal with any aspect of financial integration not already covered by the other sub-categories of the main category "4. Financial Integration".	realize the connectivity of […] finance	
5. People-to-people Bond	People Exchanges & Practical Cooperation (General)	All text passages that deal with people exchanges and practical cooperation amongst OBOR countries in general. Key aspect(s): - exchanges of (a) personnel (b) youth (c) women - promotion of practical cooperation (esp. regarding cultural and people-to-people exchanges) - spirit of friendly cooperation of the Silk Road	carry forward the silk road spirit and enhance public support	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with the exchange of students and sci-tech personnel (to be coded to 5. People-to-people Bond/Education or 5. People-to-people Bond/Science & Technology).
	Areas of Public Interest	All text passages that deal with cooperation of OBOR countries in areas of public interest. Key aspect(s): - youth employment - entrepreneurship training - vocational skill development - social security management - public administration/management - organisation of public interest activities concerning (a) education (b) health care (c) poverty reduction (d) biodiversity (e) ecological protection - production and living conditions of poverty-stricken areas of OBOR countries	host training programs on disaster relief and reduction	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with the training of medical professionals (to be coded to 5. People-to-people Bond/Public Health).
	Public Health	All text passages that deal with cooperation of OBOR countries in the field of public health. Key aspect(s): - epidemic information sharing - exchange of prevention and treatment technologies - training of medical professionals	work with countries along the routes with focuses on […] public health improvement	

		- capability to jointly address public health emergencies - China's role: (a) provision of medical assistance and emergency medical aid (b) practical cooperation in maternal and child health, disability rehabilitation and major infectious diseases (incl. AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria) (c) cooperation in traditional medicine		
	Politics	All text passages that deal with (people-centred) cooperation of OBOR countries in the field of politics. Key aspect(s): - bridging role of communication and exchanges between (a) legislative bodies (b) parliaments (c) political parties (d) political organisations - exchanges and cooperation amongst cities (incl. encouragement to establish sister cities)	China's competent department will send working groups to have thorough consultation with Afghanistan on specific cooperation programs	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with the expansion of mutual political interests and trust (to be coded to 1. Policy Coordination/Political Interests & Trust).
	Education	All text passages that deal with cooperation of OBOR countries in the field of education. Key aspect(s): - exchanges of students - jointly running schools - China's role: provision of 10,000 government scholarships to OBOR countries a year	set up "China-ASEAN maritime silk road scholarships", and provide 1,000 to ASEAN students next year	Encode all text passages relevant to this aspect of OBOR except those dealing with entrepreneurship training and vocational skill development (to be coded to 5. People-to-people Bond/Areas of Public Interest) and the training of medical professionals (to be coded to 5. People-to-people Bond/Public Health).
	Science & Technology	All text passages that deal with cooperation of OBOR countries in the field of science & technology. Key aspect(s): - exchanges of sci-tech personnel - establishment of (a) joint labs (b) research centres (c) international technology transfer centres (d) maritime cooperation centres - tackling of key sci-tech problems - improvement of sci-tech innovation capability - China's role: encouragement of think tanks in OBOR countries to jointly conduct research and hold forums	work with countries along the routes with focuses on […] think tank collaboration	
	Culture	All text passages that deal with cooperation of OBOR countries in cultural fields. Key aspect(s): - cultural and media cooperation and exchanges	put in place new cooperation platforms in such priority areas as [...] cultural exchanges	

		- culture years, arts festivals, TV weeks and book fairs in other OBOR countries - applications for/protection of World Cultural Heritage sites - production and translation of fine films, radio and TV programs - leveraging positive role of the Internet and new media tools		
	Sports	All text passages that deal with cooperation amongst OBOR countries in the field of sports. Key aspect(s): - sports exchanges - support of OBOR countries in their bids for hosting major international sports events	[no example found in primary data]	
	Tourism	All text passages that deal with cooperation of OBOR countries in the field of tourism. Key aspect(s): - expansion of scale of tourism - tourism promotion weeks and publicity months in other OBOR countries - establishment of competitive international tourist routes and products with Silk Road features - increase of convenience to apply for tourist visa in OBOR countries - MSR cruise tourism program	China is willing to take building the 21st Maritime Silk Road as an opportunity, to […] build tourism circles in Pan-Beibu Gulf and along the Maritime Silk Road	
	NGOs & Volunteer Services	All text passages that deal with NGOs and volunteer services of OBOR countries. Key aspect(s): - exchanges and cooperation between NGOs - promotion of volunteer services	China will send more volunteers to ASEAN nations	
	Other	All text passages that deal with any aspect of people-to-people bonds not already covered by the other sub-categories of the main category "5. People-to-people Bond".	put in place new cooperation platforms in such priority areas as […] people-to-people […] exchanges	

Note: Compiled by the author.

Category System: Illocutionary Acts

Main Categories	Definitions	Examples
(1) Assertives	All text passages that seek to commit the speaker to the belief that the propositional content of an utterance is true. Key aspect(s): - words-to-world direction of fit - sincerity condition of "belief"	[no example found in primary data]
(2) Directives	All text passages that seek to commit the hearer to a certain course of future action. Key aspect(s): - world-to-words direction of fit - sincerity condition of "want"	we *welcome* all countries […] to take an active part
(3) Commissives	All text passages that seek to commit the speaker to a certain course of future action. Key aspect(s): - world-to-words direction of fit - sincerity condition of "intention"	China *plans* to hold workshops
(4) Expressives[62]	All text passages that express the speaker's psychological state as specified in the sincerity condition about what is stated in the propositional content. Key aspect(s): - empty direction of fit	I am *confident* that the construction of the railway line will be of high quality
(5) Declarations	All text passages that bring a state of affairs into existence by the speaker declaring it to exist. Key aspect(s): - double direction of fit - no sincerity condition	[no example found in primary data]

Note: Compiled by the author.

[62]The examples of expressives extracted from the primary data do not conform to the standard syntactical form of this type of illocutionary acts described by Searle (1976, 12, 18). They do, however, meet the propositional requirements of expressives and are thus treated as such in this thesis.

Appendix D: Code Book – Newspaper Articles

Memo: Content Structuring – Newspaper Articles

The same coding units used for the content structuring of the speeches apply (see Appendix C: Code Book – Speeches: "Memo: Content Structuring – Speeches"). The context units, however, cover not only all relevant sentences of an OBOR paragraph but also those of the directly preceding and subsequent paragraphs (i.e. the respective pre- and post-OBOR paragraphs).

Category System: Articles

The first part of the category system reflecting the five main goals of OBOR is used for the analysis of the newspaper articles, too. It is thus not restated here (see Appendix C: Code Book – Speeches: "Category System: OBOR Goals"). However, an extension is added to the category system to allow for the consideration of any references made to the speeches covered by Part 1 of the specialised text corpus as well as the application of the news schema categories. To this end, two umbrella categories called "Speeches" and "News Schema" (1 main category, 4 sub-categories) are added. Regarding the speeches, all relevant text fragments are to be coded to the main category. Regarding the news schema, all relevant text fragments are to be coded to the respective sub-categories. A text fragment is to be coded to a respective main/sub-category only if it corresponds to the propositional content expressed in the definitional sentence and at least one of the key aspects mentioned in the category's definition. The definitions and prime examples of this supplementary part of the category system are recorded in tabular form (see "Category System: Add-on Articles" below). They allow for unambiguous coding; additional encoding rules are not needed. It must be noted, however, that the news schema sub-categories of "Main Event"/"Side Event" and "Commentary" are *not* mutually exclusive; one and the same text fragment may qualify as commentary on OBOR as an article's main or side event and is thus to be coded to two sub-categories, accordingly. Finally, the text passages coded to the categories of "Main Event" or "Side Event" only make sense in relation to an article's main theme.

Category System: Add-on Articles

Main Categories	Sub-categories	Definitions	Examples
Speeches	-	All text passages that refer to any of the speeches covered by Part 1 of the specialised text corpus used in this thesis. Key aspect(s): - by naming (a) the speaker (b) the speech date/location/occasion - by referring to the speech contents and reactions to it	President Xi Jinping announced China's Maritime Silk Road […] for the first time in Indonesia's legislature back in 2013.
News Schema	Headline	All text passages of the main headline of an article that explicitly refer to OBOR by featuring a combination of at least two of the keywords "silk", "belt" and "road". Key aspect(s): - references to the entire initiative - references to the SREB - references to the MSR - references to any combination of the three aspects mentioned above	High hopes for the "Belt and Road" initiative
	Main Event	All text passages that deal with OBOR as the main theme of the article. Key aspect(s): - entire initiative - any of the aspects covered by the "Category System: Speeches"	China's the "Belt and Road" initiative could offer a new growth engine for the country's economy
	Side Event	All text passages that deal with OBOR as the sub-topic of the article. Key aspect(s): - background information about main event - event prior to/following after main event - entire initiative - any of the aspects covered by the "Category System: Speeches"	growth highlights in the region come from the bold moves spearheaded by China, such as the high-profile Belt and Road Initiative
	Commentary	All text passages that explicitly state the author's personal opinion of or attitude to OBOR in the article. Key aspect(s): - entire initiative - SREB - MSR - any combination of the three aspects mentioned above - any of the aspects covered by the "Category System: Speeches"	[no example found in primary data]

Note: Compiled by the author.

Appendix E: Abstract – English

Abstract

This thesis deals with *the* flagship initiative of open win-win cooperation currently propagated by the People's Republic of China (PRC): its New Silk Road vision, also known as "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) or "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI). The initiative's fuzzy nature, however, has caused some confusion—not to say suspicion—in the international community. The overarching goal of this thesis therefore is to shed light on OBOR's actual focal points as *envisioned* by the PRC and *perceived* by the international community. To this end, the English-language OBOR discourse produced by three high-ranking Chinese Politicians (President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi) and the Indonesian newspaper the Jakarta Post between September 2013 and December 2016 is analysed. A qualitative content analysis of relevant speeches and newspaper articles is conducted, borrowing the notion of illocutionary speech acts to allow for a better understanding of the roles and power relations involved. The five main goals stated in the official Action Plan on OBOR released by the Chinese government in March 2015 (policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bond) serve as analytical basis. The findings of this thesis allow for deeper insights into China's OBOR initiative that not only add to the academic discourse but also help to reduce the lack of clarity revolving around the initiative.

Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); China; Discourse Analysis; Indonesia; One Belt, One Road (OBOR); People's Republic of China (PRC); Qualitative Content Analysis; Silk Road; Speech Act Analysis

Appendix F: Abstract – German

Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit *dem* Vorzeigeprojekt für internationale Zusammenarbeit, das seit einiger Zeit von der Volksrepublik China (VRC) propagiert wird: die sogenannte Neue Seidenstraßeninitiative, auch bekannt als „One Belt, One Road“ (OBOR) oder „Belt and Road Initiative“ (BRI). Nicht zuletzt aufgrund ihres schier grenzenlosen Umfangs herrscht jedoch große Verwirrung—um nicht zu sagen Misstrauen—in der internationalen Gemeinschaft über die tatsächlichen Ziele der Initiative. Diese Arbeit untersucht daher, welchen OBOR-Aspekten China selbst die größte Bedeutung beimisst und wie dieser chinesische OBOR-Diskurs von internationaler Seite aufgefasst wird. Zu diesem Zweck wird eine Analyse des englischsprachigen OBOR-Diskurses von drei hochrangigen Chinesischen Politikern (Präsident Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, und Außenminister Wang Yi) und einer indonesischen Zeitung, der Jakarta Post, für den Zeitraum von September 2013 bis Dezember 2016 durchgeführt. Dabei werden entsprechende Reden und Zeitungsartikel einer qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse unterzogen und das Konzept von illokutiven Sprechakten zu Hilfe genommen, um ein besseres Verständnis der Rollen- und Machtverhältnisse zu ermöglichen. Als Analysegrundlage dienen jene fünf Kernbereiche (Strategie, Infrastruktur, Handel, Finanzen und zwischenmenschliche Kontakte), die in dem offiziellen Maßnahmenplan zu OBOR, der von der chinesischen Regierung im März 2015 veröffentlicht wurde, angeführt werden. Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit gewähren neue Einblicke in Chinas OBOR Initiative, die sich nicht nur in den akademischen Diskurs einfügen, sondern auch dazu beitragen die Ungereimtheiten rund um die Neue Seidenstraßeninitiative zu verringern.

Schlagworte: Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); China; Diskursanalyse; Indonesien; One Belt, One Road (OBOR); Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse; Seidenstraße; Sprechaktanalyse; Volksrepublik China (VRC)