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Master Thesis

Ideologies of Identities

in the Global Cultural Economy

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Capitalism as an economic system is really cultural because it comprises moral meaning structures such as religion and ethics for individual identity. Historically Adam Smith in his theory of economics has attributed a moral value to economic agency that was sought to refine and 'civilize' the act of material accumulation. His ethical notion of self-interest has been lost during the transformation of economics into a separate academic field as well as during the rise of the Western European economic cultural system of capitalism. Identity is the site of contestation for the global economy because economic globalization induces a sense of self-reflexivity and self-awareness provoking a fear of losing one's cultural distinctiveness. A case study of two Turkish fashion designers reveals their different ideologies of identities that serve as business philosophy. A second, shorter case study about an Arabic talk show illustrates the fluid nature of Muslim identity that comes to blend traditional and progressive aspects for a unique cultural system that is bound to become reflected in capitalist culture. It is concluded that economic theory must be reformulated in order to entail the cultural dimension of capitalism as a meaning structure for man.

Der Kapitalismus ist ein ökonomisches System, das von kultureller Natur ist und moralische Wertmaßstäbe sowie Religion und Ethik für die persönliche Identität beinhaltet. Adam Smith in seiner historischen ökonomischen Theorie hat der ökonomischen Tätigkeit einen moralischen Wert verliehen, welcher den Akt der Kapitalakkumulation veredeln und ‚zivilisieren' sollte. Sein ethisches Konzept von der Ökonomie ging im Laufe der Verwandlung der Ökonomie in ein Weltsystem und im Zuge der akademischen Abtrennung der ökonomischen Disziplin von den Geisteswissenschaften verloren. Identität ist der zentrale Konfliktpunkt und zugleich neue Angriffsfläche in der globalen Ökonomie, da mit der ökonomischen Globalisierung Selbstreflexivität und Selbstwahrnehmung geschärft werden. Es gilt, die Einzigartigkeit einer jeden Wertekultur gegenüber der gefürchteten Vereinheitlichung durch das ökonomische Weltsystem zu verteidigen. Ein Fallbeispiel von zwei türkischen Modedesignern zeigt, wie deren unterschiedliche Vorstellungen von türkischer Identität ihre jeweiligen Unternehmensphilosophien prägen. Ein zweites, kürzeres Fallbeispiel, handelt von einer arabischen Talkshow, welche die Fluidität von Identität veranschaulichen soll. Es wird festgestellt, daß die ökonomische Theorie umformuliert werden muß, um die kulturellen Dimensionen, die der Kapitalismus als Wertekultur innehat, in ihr Selbstverständnis zu integrieren.

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Preface

Earlier this year on his official visit to Germany Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish Prime Minister and head of the AKP, the Turkish Justice and Development Party, declares that 'assimilation is a crime against humanity'[1]. He is addressing formerly Turkish nationals that have emigrated from Turkey to Germany for work and a better life. When he points to the challenge of preserving Turkish identity and culture in Europe, Erdogan alludes to one of the most contested and remarkable phenomena of economic globalization, namely the processes of re-affirmation, hybridization and substitution of traditional identity.

The question of 'who are we' has become predominant in an intensifying globalizing world. Globalization that refers to the 'the sum total of connections and interactions political, economic, social, and cultural that compress distance […] and increase flow of goods, capital, people, ideas, and information'[2] is by no means limited to economic processes. But because production and technological innovation require new markets, natural resources and labor, the economy is a central force of the global networking. As it penetrates into new markets and regions and interconnects them through the flows of goods, technology and ideas, it initiates processes of self-reflexivity. Through the confrontation with foreign products and different value systems and ideologies, 'old' identities are re-evaluated and sometimes re-modeled because of the exposure to alternative, different selves. However next to experiencing different realities globalization is a force that indoctrinates market rationality into the minds of people and politicians alike affecting 'the [modern] state, society and culture'[3]. The 'imperialism of the economic'[4] force of globalization has over time led to popular understanding of a universality and omnipotence of market rules. When economic science split from the Humanities it separated the nature of man from his actions. Man's nature ridden by emotions and irrational thinking came to be seen inferior to the sheer perfection and uncompromised efficiency of the

[1] Erdogan, Recap Rayyip. 'Erdogan: Türkische Identität bewahren'. *Die Stuttgarter Zeitung online*. February 10, 2008. http://www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de/stz/page/detail.php/1632469, accessed May 3, 2008.
[2] Haass, Richard N. *Sovereignty: existing rights, evolving responsibilities*. Speech at the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center for International Studies at Georgetown University, Washington. January 14, 2003. U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/16648.htm, accessed May 13, 2008.
[3] Beck, Globalisierung, 27.
[4] Ulrich Beck. *Was ist Globalisierung?* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag 1997) 27.

market model. An economic ideology called capitalism arises in the 18th century that is held to cure man from his fallibility. Over time in the 20th century this ideology becomes more and more pervasive on the political level. Man-made structures like the state are advised to interfere less, social protectionist layers are reduced and man is individuated thinking 'there is no society; there are just individuals'[5]. This historical process as it will be argued here has led to an alienation of man from his work and from himself. He seeks to retrieve the unity experienced between his needs for spiritual meaning and work by asking the question of identity with more ferocity than ever. In a synthetic way of analysis, which seeks to maintain rather than reduce the complexity of globalization, the focus of this thesis is the human being that challenges current political, social and economic realities by a novel imagination of difference. The plurality of identities and values globalization entails gives impetus to challenging or rejecting current imperial, entrepreneurial mentality that is void of meaning and moral structures and that ignores social and cultural variances in its attempt to standardize people for consumption, production and organization.

It is hypothesized that capitalism is really a cultural system that must be theorized in an interdisciplinary way where social and cultural aspects of man, most profoundly identity, are conceptualized in respect to their interaction with economics. Please consult Appendix one for a visual illustration of the hypothesis. The author is motivated by the prospect that a comprehensive theory of economics that accounts for the human need for identity and ethics, many negative consequences of capitalism can be prevented in the future. In other words when economic theory has a dimension of morality built into it, it will be more likely to consult the social and cultural factors affected by capitalist expansion, production and restructuring. An underlying assumption of the thesis is that identity, as aspect of culture, is central to economic globalization because identity provides sense, stability and security but is similarly challenged in an era of 'new self-perception of transnationality communicated by the media, consumerism, tourism [and] the non-excludable perception of the other in one's life with all the conflicting certainties'[6]. Man strives to make his identity dignified and meaningful by relating it to moral principles and ethical

[5] Margaret Thatcher. Interview with Douglas Keay, Woman's Own. *Margaret Thatcher Foundation.* September 23, 1987. http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106689, accessed July 3, 2008.
[6] Beck, Globalisierung, 31.

values that are permanent unlike the temporal nature of capitalism that favors one action over another based upon cost calculations and market conditions that are ever-changing and erratic. Man yearns for moral and ethical values beyond the material promises of global capitalism. Numerous previous approaches to the study of economic globalization either tend to analyze global capitalism in neo-Marxist fashion regards producer and consumer relations, or reductionist economic theory of rationality isolating economic realities and transformations from the socio-cultural context they are embedded in. This thesis is undertaking a third approach to economic globalization that favors a new or broader economic theory to include the social and cultural dimension.

The author applies a critical theory approach to the way economics has been theorized historically and scrutinizes the basic human element of economic agency, namely self-interest regards its qualitative transformation from being morally constraint by Adam Smith' notion of 'sympathy'[7] to unrestrained amoral egocentrism. Because 'communities were sucked into the rules and rhythms of capitalist production' [8] and capitalism is fragmenting and disjunctive, social, cultural and political realities are until today not adequately addressed by economic theory. The rationale for the thesis is the interdisciplinary nature of globalization and its effects on local economies, cultures, politics, and identities that must be part of economic theory in the first place. Concerning the methodology a qualitative approach is taken including case studies applying a phenomenological and hermeneutic perspective[9]. This method allows to critically analyze the phenomena of economic globalization in respect to identities and their ideologies as well as to interpret them focusing on the subject. When reviewing scholarly, secondary literature, those aspects that connect the meaning for the subject and its identity to the economic field of entrepreneurship are extracted. This way the perspective of subjective experience or phenomenology is taken to establish a general, multi-dimensional framework for recognizing the experiential features and subjectivities of economic globalization for a new economic theory based upon an improved understanding of the individual and socio-cultural

[7] Adam Smith. *The theory of moral sentiments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press 2002) 13.
[8] William I. Robinson. *A theory of global capitalism: production, class, ad state in a transnational world'* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 2004) 40.
[9] Kathleen M. Eisenhardt. Building theories from case study research, in: *Academy of Management Review 14* (4) (1989).

phenomena of the economy. In the end the author wishes to replace the conventional view on economics with a more complex and integrative framework.

Literature and theoretical background stem from postmodern, economic, sociological, and psychological theories consulting scholars like Amartya Sen, Mahmood Mamdani, Homi Bhabha, Adam Smith, Zygmunt Bauman and Leon Festinger on identity and the moral dimension of economics. A postmodern perspective will be applied to identity in order to highlight the substantial shifts in the way identities and ideas of selfhood are becoming subject to instability, insecurity and ambiguity projected by the deconstruction of modern ideals. The author embraces the legacy of being an interdisciplinary scientist to capture the overlapping and disjoining forces that are political, cultural, economic *and* social. Only under the condition that the complexity is conserved, the analysis of business as a space for identity construction and imagination is feasible. In order to draw some cross-cultural conclusions the author adheres to the ethics of pragmatic universalism which emphasizes the phenomenology of individual experiences. 'Pragmatic universalism' [10] allows for universalizing those aspects that can be considered human in the most general sense and are thus relatively stable across time and space and are useful for thinking complex relationships and interdependencies that are global. The concept of identity would be such a universal in this case. But nonetheless the specificities of certain times are acknowledged and the conclusions drawn do 'not claim to be eternal truth'[11].

[10] Martin Albrow. *Do organizations have feelings?* (London: Routlegde 1997) 8.
[11] Albrow, Do organizations have feelings, 8.

Thesis Outline

The thesis is structured so that in the first chapter the reader is made aware of the qualitative changes in economic theory and practice over time. In form of a concise historical outline that is only meant to nuance highlights that are indicative for the different ways individuals relate to economic activity and of how economists reason about the world around them, a widening gap between economic and social theory is made apparent. The historical analysis commences with the industrialization and enlightenment period of the 17th and 18th century whilst making remarks to earlier periods only where necessary. The narrow time frame and the selective manner in which certain historical shifts are discussed are necessary to adhere to the limited scope of the thesis and second of all meant to highlight only the changes in the concept of self-interest and the aspect of identity in economics historically. Early philosophical re-interpretations of economics, society and man as well as Weber's analysis of the nature of capitalist culture and the ethical underpinning of work during the industrialization period in Britain are consulted. Since the 17th century is arguably the origin of economic *theory* and therefore a sensible starting point for the thesis, economics metamorphoses into what is called 'new'[12] global capitalism of the late 20th, early 21st century. In order to stress the changing nature of global capitalism in the late 20th century, the author suggests the term 'radical capitalism' for apace recognition throughout the paper. It is identical with the terms 'neo-liberalism', 'modern economics' and 'neo-classical economics' found in the literature. All those labels seek to capture the qualitative mutations of economics where 'free' market forces are preferred to state regulation. For the mutation of economics into capitalist ideology and 'culture' Immanuel Wallerstein will be consulted. His world-systems analysis applies a historical critique of how knowledge is categorized for economic theory and how economic thought came to be imperial due to the way in which it represented scientific knowledge.

In the second chapter psychological and postmodern theories of identity are meant to provide a theoretical understanding of the fluid nature of identity and its relation to economics. Arjun Appadurai's theory of the cultural spaces of the global economy is presented here and related to economic agency as process of idealizing a self in

[12] Richard Sennett. *The culture of the new capitalism* (USA: Yale University Press 2006).

cultural terms including religious, traditional, and political aspects. In order to investigate the ideological motivation enmeshed in economic agency, the focus will be especially on the techno-, media- and ideoscapes from the overall five cultural landscapes in Appadurai's model. Whilst Appadurai takes his critique of economic theory to emphasize the underlying cultural flows and their impact on the nation-state, the author utilizes his framework to set the grounds for furthering the understanding of the organic cultural nature of economics. Appadurai's model of landscapes of cultural flows of the global economy is credited for not shying away from a cultural critique of global capitalism[13]. With the help of his multi-dimensional model the author aims at shedding light at the reemergence of 'fundamentalism of local culture'[14] and the aspect of identity that comes to be expressed in the economic and political spheres. At the beginning a case study of two Turkish businessmen with antagonistic identities projected onto their respective businesses is provided. They as agents of economic globalization shape the constantly fluctuating global order according to their ideologies of identity and will serve as illustration throughout the paper. At the end of the second chapter a second case study concerned with how identities are affected by the global media and public discourse is given. An Arab satellite TV show enunciates new imaginations of identity for Muslim women and proves how images as flow of globalization can alter one's self-understanding stimulating processes of self-reflexivity just like the global economic forces do. The media and economics both are projection spaces for identity because they negotiate new identities. Questions like why has the aspect of identity become more important lately and why is the Islamic world attempting to moralize the economy will be tackled.

It is succeeded by a third chapter on ethics that serves to recover the moral dimension of the global economy. It takes up the reasoned need human beings have for a moral sense when dedicating their lives to the disciplining of work and its restriction on time and family life. It also seeks to support the hypothesis that capitalism is a cultural system and that the original ethical foundation of economics must be recuperated.

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[13]Arjun Appadurai. *Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1996).
[14] Gijsbert Oonk. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (review), in: *Journal of World History 11*, (1) (Spring 2000) 167.

The fourth chapter deals with the moral leadership by political parties that have somewhat capitalized on the centrality and importance of identity in a globalizing world. Especially the Turkish Justice and Development Party appears to have benefited from its recognition of the aspect of identity in Turkey's economic integration. Turkey's political economy is taken as an exemplar for it provides a useful background for the case study on the Turkish fashion industry from the second chapter. It once again proves that human beings seek something beyond the material reality, something of cultural significance that is meaningful for identity.

Finally the case will be made for a multi-dimensional global theory of economics that has cultural, social and political dimensions next to economic ones. The study concludes that identity and ethical meaning structures are not separate from the economic sphere, but intertwined and mutually conditioned by one another. A theoretical model should therefore account for the interdependence between ideological beliefs and economic behavior as a means to construct identity and personal meaning at work. Potential weaknesses and strengths of the study are discussed.

1.1. Economic Globalization

Capitalism is a dualistic phenomenon that 'demystifies […] and alienates men'[15]

Appadurai, a prominent theorist of globalization, resumes that economic globalization as 'a contradictory fusion of a territorial logic derived from the use of state power and a capitalist logic that derives from market-driven processes of capital accumulation in space and time'[16] is not a new phenomenon. In fact it can be dated back to the 16th century 'during which our modern world-system came into existence'[17]. This system is in serious crisis according to Wallerstein who is well-known for his world-systems analysis that originated in the 1970s. Globalization for him as well as other world-system analysts is nothing new. Still the artificial separation of knowledge categories and the academic disciplines have contributed to a misperception of what motivates sellers or producers in the world to become economically active. Also they have led to an exclusive economic view on the philosophical concepts of self-interest and rationality. The 'dominant liberal ideology of the 19th century' [18] came to divide knowledge of the world in categories of 'market, state, and the civil society' [19] inevitably narrowing the complexity of world phenomena. Meanwhile those points of view on knowledge became distributed by the economic power of the European nations that satisfied their increasing demand for markets and resources by annexing peripheral, poor regions to their imperial core markets. In these regions they then also distributed their market ideology. Wallerstein's model leans on Braudel's idea of 'world-economy that is not bounded by a unitary political structure […] and contains many cultures and groups'[20]. It is structurally embraced by a world-system that is 'systems, economies, empires that are *a* world' [21] comprising a 'spatial/temporal zone'[22]. For the reason that current deep inequalities of the world-system have a time-space component those should be addressed here.

[15] Anthony Giddens. *Capitalism & modern social theory: an analysis of the writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1971) 215.
[16] David Harvey. From globalization to the new imperialism, in: *Critical globalization studies*, eds. Richard P. Appelbaum and William I. Robinson (New York: Routledge 2005) 91.
[17] Wallerstein, World-systems, x.
[18] Wallerstein, World-systems, 6.
[19] Wallerstein, World-systems, 6.
[20] Wallerstein, World-systems, 23.
[21] Wallerstein, World-systems, 17.
[22] Wallerstein, World-systems, 17.

Economic globalization exists because of the capitalist nature of the modern world-economy. Due to the fact that globalization rests upon capitalist production 'marked by an axial division of labor between core-like and peripheral production processes'[23] there are no territorial boundaries and local socio-cultural realities change according to economic processes. The notions of space change, new boundaries are drawn and truths and ideologies are no longer timeless. Time and space are fluid and transitory in Wallerstein's model of economic globalization because 'historical capitalism as a system […] rests upon global expansionism, social and regional polarization as well as the increasing commodification – the transformation of all things into goods'[24]. Hence, capitalist economic globalization constantly brings about change. His focus on the uneven distribution of power within the production networks across time and space elicits a central notion on the nature of economic globalization that is local and global at once. Wallerstein says that as a 'singular, hierarchical world system, the capitalist world-economy'[25] orders and structures the world in terms of its own logic. It divides the world into more and less important areas and imposes a value system onto it. In accordance with the rise of Europe as world power during colonialism, it was able to combine its worldview with universally-binding claims for social and economic development. Western Europe's spiritual orientation towards Christianity for industrialization was later substituted by a sacralization of technology, scientific progress, and ultimately money, which was to become the capitalist culture transported across space and into the peripheries.

Context-dependent social theory approaches like those of Appadurai and Wallerstein clarify that although economic globalization reassembles localities and introduces new identities and cultures, it does not standardize them. The creation of meaning remains 'specific to locality'[26] as modern lifestyles not necessarily reflect modern thought as conceptualized by the European thinkers. Economic globalization imposes structural constraints forcing people to move and re-adjust their lives and identities to new realities. Yet wearing blue jeans or driving a Mercedes car says nothing about the inner congruency with that sort of liberalism. People are free to buy

[23] Wallerstein, World-systems, 17.
[24] Immanuel Wallerstein,. *Utopistik: historische Alternativen des 21. Jahrhunderts* (Wien, Promedia Druck, 2002) 104.
[25] Wallerstein, World-systems, 128.
[26] Tibi Bassam. *Islamischer Fundamentalismus, moderne Wissenschaft und Technologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag 1992) 171.

and produce material goods without having to consort to the ideologies of the countries that design them[27]. Quite on the contrary, those 'global' products fulfill different purposes across space and are subject to 'indigenization'[28] where they come to convey a particular meaning for identity for the individual consumer. For some it is no contradiction to wear blue jeans and to believe in arranged marriage at the same time. This reveals the limitation to the European expansionism of its capitalist culture across the world. It hints to the fact that people will integrate into the world-system on their own terms and by their very own concepts of economics and identity. The global village scenario of globalization is therefore a myth and gives way to the idea of villages that are better connected, but nonetheless characterized by unique cultural norms and traditions. Limitedly the better connections according to Komlosy do not reach the so-called 'terrae incognitae'[29] or unknown lands that are like white spots on a map for they do neither exist nor matter for the 'new geography of center and periphery'[30]. However also for those people in these 'blind' spaces identity is at stake because for them even more so it is a unique identity they are establishing and defending against the discriminating absorption of spaces by the power of money. Differences not only remain, but are more pronounced due to psychological needs for boundaries that originate from an attestation of selfhood that is unique *and* embedded in a wider collective. By no means is the globalizing world characterized by the unconditional recognition of equality of identity, dignity and respect. Power relations based on identity and specific cultural values remain and are instrumentalized along economic means, which is why the Wallerstein model of hierarchies is very relevant for thinking about economic globalization. Structurally-speaking Wallerstein asserts the market as a platform of liberalism that is 'both a concrete local structure in which individuals or firms sell and buy goods, and a virtual institution across space where the same kind of exchange occurs'[31]. Time and space are hence relative constructs in the world-system. The link between ideologies of identities and the global economy is entailed in the economic power game about who is to rule over the peripheries for cheap production, resources and market

[27] Bassam, *Islamischer Fundamentalismus.*
[28] Arjun Appadurai. Disjunctures and difference in the global economy, in: *Public Culture 2* (2) (1990) 295.
[29] [29] Andrea Komlosy. Global village als optische Täuschung, in: *Die Ich-Ressource: zur Kultur der Selbstverwertung,* ed. Jan Verwoert (München: Volk Verlag 2003) 170.
[30] Komlosy, Global village als optische Täuschung, 172.
[31] Wallerstein, World-systems, 25.

opportunities. It appears that the conceptions of time and space rise and fall according to whoever holds power in the capitalist world-system.

In conclusion the radical economy resonates on individual, cultural and political planes. It has been argued that economic globalization is a network of territorially-dispersed production lines still resembling the core-periphery structures of colonial periods. Power and hierarchy are hence a defining characteristic of globalization. The question that arises then is whether the argument for a new epoch within economic globalization dated to the late 20th, early 21st century is correct. Are we experiencing a continuation of a 'historical pattern'[32] or does the world today face a novel reality? This question is really a structural one in reference to Wallerstein's world-systems theory and can be answered by distinguishing 'internationalization' from 'transnationalization' of capital. Whereas the former is merely 'the extension of trade and financial flows across national borders'[33], the latter is concerned with 'the functional integration of internationally dispersed activities'[34] so that one can speak of economic globalization today as a 'single unit in real time'[35]. The world-system is still singular and hierarchical, yet it has deeper integration of its production sites with the core as well as more complex structures amongst its peripheries and the core than before. Furthermore it has become radicalized to engage more directly with individuals rather than states, which marks the onset of a re-appraisal of identities and a qualitative shift in economic globalization overall. Today it is individuals who are to decide whether to converge with the dominant Western ideals of its version of free markets, or to endeavor an economically-integrative path of their own that incorporates their traditions and cultures whilst preventing economic isolation. The present chapter is thus a deconstructive critique of capitalist culture in respect to individual needs for meaningful motivation for self-interested behavior. The perspective taken is derived from 'pragmatic universalism [that does not rest upon] scientific or religious certainties, but on the daily lived experiences of human beings'[36]. Furthermore it reasons for certain generalizations that still have validity for the analysis of the conditions of human existence affected by economic globalization.

[32] Robinson, A theory of global capitalism, 11.
[33] Robinson, A theory of global capitalism, 14.
[34] Robinson, A theory of global capitalism, 14.
[35] Robinson, A theory of global capitalism, 14.
[36] Albrow, Global age, 5.

The individual plane emerges as a powerful force because political stances either lag behind or are unable to provide a clear, single direction. Often the political discussion over how best to integrate into the global economy without losing one's cultural roots has no single but a plurality of options and possibilities, so that it is left to the individual which one to realize. Because capital has no religious concern for introducing women into the workforce and propagates the accumulation of wealth by rational self-interest across cultures, it places the individual in a position of translating the language of capital carefully and considerately. The apparent indifference and naivety of money is re-assessed and reflected upon as it has large socio-cultural, economic and political consequences. Because money has no morality, the individual has to re-formulate traditions, ideologies and identities into a meaning structure that supports and legitimizes economic integration.

1.2. The Transfiguration of Capitalism

A historical anecdotal recollection of major shifts in the nature of capitalism is necessary to point out how economic globalization has historically had links to ethics and morals and, as it is argued, is ontologically intertwined with them. However, a generic definition of capitalism does not reflect the cultural, ethical aspect of economics and persists instead on a purely functional account. There it says that capitalism is a 'system in which the production and distribution of goods is entrusted primarily to the market mechanism, based on private ownership of property, and on exchange between legally free individuals'[37]. This one version of capitalism entails the major elements of the legal, political and economic aspects capitalism in a rather simplistic way. It serves here to illustrate that it is flawed because it is too technical and end-oriented. Ignoring the social implications of widening income gaps, poverty, child labor and people trafficking it is not set out to provide holistic understanding of the processes it instigates and the consequences it has on socio-cultural and political levels.

When looking at capitalism historically in order to understand the Western dominating principles of rationality and secularism for the global economy *today*, one must take

[37] Jerry Muller. *The mind and the market: capitalism in Western thought'* (New York: Anchor Books 2002) xvii.

Europe as geographical site. The author will generalize the aspects of protestant European nations, particularly Britain, during the time of industrialization and concentrate on the cultural aspects of history in order to extract those historical relations between morals and work that can explain the malaise of global capitalism at present. The author acknowledges that there is a wide variety amongst protestant, angelical churches and apologizes for eventual generalizations that for the scope of the thesis are necessary at times. Still the author hopes to alleviate these shortcomings by offering a novel insight of the meaning the selected events have for reconsidering aspects of identity and morals in economic theory today.

Whereas world-economies have emerged in different world regions at different times, currently it is predominantly Western values of the market economy that expand alongside with the expansion of markets. At the time when European world-economy became capitalist, dominant and sustainable, its epistemological understanding of the world and the economy also infiltrated the minds of the peripheries. In the Western European context, the particular notion of rationality led to the emergence of modern capitalism transferring power from 'rulers, priests, [scientists], and entrepreneurs'[38] to functionally organized bodies like 'state, church, university, and the factory'[39], respectively. Moral constraints on self-enrichment disappeared over time and were replaced by functional, secular or non-religious symbols of money. But before the affiliation of ethics with capitalism of the 17th and 18th century is evaluated, it is useful to take a short detour into the time from 1100 to 1300 when Europe's economy was more dynamic than ever, cities were prospering and socio-economic realities improved.

The prevailing negative view on accumulating wealth for one's own sake began to change under the important influence of Thomas Aquinas who somewhat naturalized the formerly stigmatized economic aspect of human life[40]. Gradually it was socially accepted that work 'was a part of creation'[41] and private property a social necessity. However the pursuit of wealth continued to be seen by the spiritual authority, the

[38] Patricia Crone. Max Weber, das islamische Recht und die Entstehung des Kapitalismus, in: *Max Webers Sicht des Islams, ed.* Wolfgang Schluchter (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag 1987) 311.
[39] Crone, Max Weber und islamisches Recht, 311.
[40] Muller, Mind and market.
[41] Muller, Mind and market, 7.

church, as boundless and therefore leading to 'pride and anger'[42], as well as endangering the frugal life that was considered prerequisite for salvation. In the 12th century Roman civil law entered European civil jurisprudence in a time of 'revival of learning'[43]. The protection of private property induced a sense of individualism that had not been there before. With the religious wars over territories and the Lutheran reformation of the 16th century, the Catholic Church's prior leading role declined. The thinkers of the 17th century, Hobbes, Locke and Spinoza discovered the necessity to redirect man's focus from religious salvation after death to the happiness found in life, which one is now believed to be able to influence by mundane deeds. According to the new thinking individuals themselves defined their goals instead of the church and the criteria for a satisfactory life were also individuated. Generally however society remained divided over the ethical nature of economics. The question of whether commercial life does counteract a purposeful life dedicated to sacred principles remains unanswered. Also Catholic clerics continued to emphasize the development of virtues and the participation in 'political life'[44] and warned that a shift in focus from the polis onto one's self would destroy civilization. Finally, apart from these few early revolutionary attitudes towards money-making, being commercially active and handling money is opposed to moral refinement and civility still.

With Voltaire in the 18th century, an intellectual who admires luxury, the formerly strict conceptual and ideological separation between civilization and economic prosperity is abandoned. 'Abundance [is] the mother of the arts'[45]. This signifies the point of transition from religious to secular self-understanding of Western civilization that allows for indulgence in luxury and other temporary pleasures without having to fear spiritual condemnation. Capitalism arises in Western Europe as a world-system paralleled with secular ideals that are 'thought to be virtually a natural law, universally applicable and morally right'[46]. Western Europe as the center embarks on explorative missions resulting in permanent settlements of colonialism annexing the periphery into a more or less global production pattern, an international division of labor and settlements. The West views itself as particularly advanced and therefore somehow

[42] Muller, Mind and market, 8.
[43] Muller, Mind and market, 14.
[44] Muller, Mind and market, 4.
[45] Muller, Mind and market, 42.
[46] Mark Juergensmeyer. *Terror in the mind of God: the global rise of religious violence* (California: The University of California Press 2003) 228.

'chosen' to spread the universal achievement of secular economics. The omnipotence of economic theory and thought is 'legitimized' by enlightenment philosophy that reforms the identity of the West and its attitude to wealth. The world becomes gradually disenchanted by man himself for he forges his own destiny according to the newly arising humanistic and materialistic attitude. The shift of intellectual leadership in the world from the East to Western Europe is illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1: The westward shift in economic centre of gravity [Source: Mehmet, Ozay. *Islamic identity and development: Studies of the Islamic periphery* (London: Routledge 1990) 37.]

In the 18th century Adam Smith, a moral philosopher, turns economic behavior into a theory that is based upon the scientific principles of rationality and reason[47]. So-called 'classical' economy as a science presupposes self-interest, individual freedom, rationality and division of labor, which initiates a functionalistic understanding of

[47] Adam Smith. *The wealth of nations* (New York: Modern Library 2000).

society and human labor as benefiting an overall whole[48]. The 'enlightened' authority of reason is applied to the economic model that, consequently, is stylized humanistic achievement. However if one was to understand Immanuel Wallerstein, Émile Durkheim and Max Weber as early anti-globalization critics, the European-rooted particular economic system and thought are dependent on distinct cultural, historical processes conditioned by specific inner-European, cultural transformations. The universality of European capitalist culture and its worldview is therefore nothing but imagined, but nonetheless real for they represent enforced systems of reality[49]. In conclusion European thought paves the way for the elevation of the mind and establishes the basis for a scientific investigation of the universe and human life. Now no longer God, but man's reasoning capacity is the authority for handling the metaphysical questions of good and evil, truth and God. Contrary to historically religious morality, ethical principles are being derived from the mind by reasoning that it is sensible to act according to the highest maxims[50].

With the laws of rationality and efficiency taking prevalence in philosophical thought the conceptualization of work changes dramatically. The notion of self-interest plays an ethical role in the study of economics, yet is re-formulated over time. Especially once the philosophical discipline is cut off from the 'more scientific disciplines'[51] like economics, medicine and law, the concept of self-interest is rationalized according to a material world view. Technological progress, standardization of labor and scientific innovations substantiate the new mentality of the market and repress its ethical basis. In the early 20th century Max Weber foresees existential problems that the resulting utilitarian moral framework creates[52]. For him, once ethics become adjusted to economic maxims a person's integrity and authenticity is threatened. Once only those aspects of ethics are pronounced that promise economic value, such as punctuality and diligence, ethics cease to restrain the materializing nature of capitalism seeking to turn everything into a commodity. For capitalist culture anything works as long as it produces profit. Weber's concern for authenticity and his apprehension of unconstrained self-interest foreshadows the contemporary malaise

[48] Smith, The wealth of nations.
[49] Benedict Anderson. *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and the spread of nationalism* (London: Verso 1983).
[50] Immanuel Kant. Foundations of the metaphysics of morals, in: *Kant: selections*, ed. Beck, Lewis White (New York: Prentice Hall 1998).
[51] Wallerstein, World-systems, 5.
[52] Max Weber. *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* (Erftstadt: Area Verlag 2007).

of radical capitalism. Money exposes a natural 'conflict between religion and the world'[53] and as the 'economic medium for rationalization'[54] has become the new center of meaning. As an early visionary of the substitution of ethics through capitalist culture, Franklin abandons moral concerns of money having to serve higher ends. Once material wealth, or plainly money, is en route to symbolize an end in itself, it becomes transcendental but for Weber, irrational[55].

1.3. Theology of Capitalism and the Cultural Specificity of Rationality

'It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God'[56]

Before capitalist culture comes to unfold, there is a general notion that the consideration of work as God-given task is 'filthy'[57]. Obviously, a meaningful moral existence is still not thought to be compatible with capitalism. Yet over time working hard symbolizes man's duty for gaining God's benevolence. Now it is one's predestination to realize one's calling into a certain profession on earth and fulfill it by adhering to the work ethics of discipline, punctuality and diligence. The rationalization of religion into a work ethic entails an intricate contradiction as professional life is simultaneously liberated from and infused with spiritual aspects. Work is referred to as 'calling'[58], a 'God-imposed task'[59] that provides satisfaction and a sense of acquittal. Man is free to choose his own destiny, but bound anew by the spiritual working principles. For the reformer Martin Luther, work is a moral conduct that qualifies for God's appreciation. Luther's more traditional view on work as religious service is replaced by the rise of Calvinism. It establishes a whole 'new relation between religious and mundane life'[60]. The Calvinists propose a new value system that reflects a 'puritan world attitude'[61]. It can be said that historically 'religious and

[53] Christoph Deutschmann. Die Verheißung des absoluten Reichtums: zur religiösen Natur des Kapitalismus (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag 2001) 34.
[54] Deutschmann, Verheißung des Reichtums, 32.
[55] Weber, Protestantische Ethik.
[56] New Testament Mark 10:25 in Muller, Mind and market, 6.
[57] Weber, Protestantische Ethik, 59.
[58] Weber, Protestantische Ethik, 66.
[59] Weber, Protestantische Ethik, 66.
[60] Weber, Protestantische Ethik, 74.
[61] Weber, Protestantische Ethik, 75.

qualitative influences'[62] are part of the expansion of capitalism. Moreover it appears that there are particular aspects of religious ethics that are especially advantageous for economic growth, particularly in Calvinism. Weber has coined the term 'Wahlverwandtschaften' [63] or elective affinity whereby certain aspects of religion benefit economic development. He recognizes the particularity of the Western European cultural and religious adaptations and is convinced of the cultural-dependency of capitalism. However when he analyzes the cross-cultural differences in moralizing wealth, he also indirectly, questions the universality of economics and its assumed cultural indifferent principles like rationality and self-interest. Somewhat contradicting his own findings on the cultural specificity of economic development in the Islamic world Weber manifests an absence of rationality in Islamic law as the reason for much of the economic underdevelopment there at the time[64]. Perhaps not on purpose, Weber recuperates the Western illusion of superiority when he holds the cultural and not the structural factors accountable for the Islamic world's economic inferiority of the time. He falls short of applying his discovery of economics' dependence on cultural factors to his own terminology, which he uses to scrutinize other cultural contexts invariably. Especially Islamic states and Muslim intellectuals protest against a narrow definition of rationality and self-interest. They attempt to harmonize mundane and sacral life by 'Islamic economics [that is] founded on Islamic principles'[65] and 'distinctively Islamic identity'[66]. Again cultural factors purport the kind of capitalism that will unfold so that it supports a specific worldview and a sense-making structure legitimizing material accumulation. The problem of global capitalism today is to be found in the plurality of capitalisms that seek to integrate into the world-system that however is dominated by Western notions of rationality and self-interest. This explains why Islamic economics as an overarching anti-model to Western capitalism remains an alternative only in theory so far. Simply the world-system is dominated by a few mostly Western cores that have the power to impose *their* interpretations of capitalist culture that are also propagated by the supra-national institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)[67]. For

[62] Weber, Protestantische Ethik, 78.
[63] Weber, Protestantische Ethik, 78.
[64] Crone, Max Weber und islamisches Recht.
[65] Charles Tripp. *Islam and the moral economy: the challenges of capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006) 103.
[66] Tripp, Islam and the moral economy, 104.
[67] Wallerstein, World-systems.

Wallerstein the crisis of the 21st century is really one of the 16th century[68] because the 16th century gave rise to the current world-system founded on a specific, material motivation of self-interest. The greed for profit and the very nature of capitalism as 'endless accumulation of capital' [69] finally produce socio-cultural and political resistances. An illustration is given in chapter four that deals with the Turkish political leadership on Turkey's identity for economic integration.

Since the 1980s capitalism has reached an intolerable level of domination on people's lives everywhere. People and markets are in direct confrontation through production, consumption and sophisticated technology enabling global media to broadcast the experience of simultaneity. Increasingly unique, culturally-adapted 'rationalizations' of spiritual life in respect to economic structuring are sought. Calvinism may validate Western European and American socio-cultural adjustments to capitalism, yet it does not hold for other parts of the world. Turkey, the geo-political site for one of the case studies is in the process of finding a Turkish rationalization and integration into the world-system. There religion is increasingly re-infused into the political and economic sphere, contrary to the Western rationalization and modernization model. Islam and economic growth together are to achieve what secularization and privatization of religion have done in Europe. Arguably then this Turkish kind of capitalist culture is 'rational' despite the fact that this economic ideology is not secular and rational in the European sense.

The inconsistency of Weber's concept of 'rational' self-interest has led to conflate secularism with rationality[70]. The originally ethical underpinning of self-interest is lost and disappears behind the economic sciences' understanding of self-interest as something that is secular and functional. Patricia Crone argues that Weber conflates functionality with rationality in his definition[71]. And because functionality is 'immune'[72] to religious and ethical principles, it is exclusively end-oriented. It 'reduces value to function'[73]. And functionality as such is no ethical measure that would satisfy moral concerns about economic principles changing societies and identities on their behalf.

[68] Wallerstein, World-systems.
[69] Wallerstein, World-systems, 92.
[70] Weber, Protestantische Ethik.
[71] Crone, Max Weber und islamisches Recht.
[72] Crone, Max Weber und islamisches Recht, 311.
[73] Crone, Max Weber und islamisches Recht, 311.

In conclusion, 'formal rationality'[74] is nothing but a result of the particular, European historical evolution of economics as a science. Yet it has been driving the world-system and the major supra-national organizations. The historical progression elucidates how self-interest has been ontologically mutated from an ethical concept to a self-serving, functionalized understanding legitimizing the current Western dominated world-system.

1.3.1. Theorizing Economics: Is It Right to be Self-interested?

Self-interest as sole ethical paradigm plays a critical role for how economic behavior is motivated. It also explains why there are cultural differences in the philosophy of economics and the desire to adapt it to personal, cultural realities. Ancient philosophers like Aristotle but also the present-day terrorist al-Qaeda group, reject a functional self-interested view on capitalism[75]. But the West continues to dominate the world-system generalizing the rational choice paradigm as if it were a universal principle and propagates a particular worldview that is rationality-based and consequentialist or end-oriented[76].

Western capitalist culture as already mentioned is derived from economic theory that has over time separated itself from the Humanities and Social Sciences. Indeed over the centuries, the scientific study of economics has been modified considerably. Today the strict departmental separation of social and economic sciences creates the impression that economics is independent of ethics, despite the natural linkage of ethical factors and work by the disciplining values of dedication, diligence and punctuality. Those ethical constraints on behavior require justification beyond the material benefits just like the Protestant ethic used to provide. Ignoring the conditionality of a healthy cultural and social environment for economic behavior to unfold, economic theory becomes reductionist implying that capitalism is only concerned with 'money as an exchange medium'[77]. The notion of ethical principles to guide behavior and interpret working life comes to be seen as irrelevant for money itself is sought to replace the spiritual needs. Walter Benjamin views money as

[74] Weber, Protestantische Ethik, 314.
[75] Aristotle. *The Nichomachean Ethics* (London: Penguin Books 1976).
[76] Deutschmann, Verheißung des Reichtums.
[77] Deutschmann, Verheißung des Reichtums, 39.

guarantor of freedom, autonomy and opportunities. He indeed was a forerunner in conceptualizing economics as independent of ecclesiastic approval. Approximately since the 19th century economics considers itself no longer ontologically encapsulated by ethics, but manifests itself as universal theory indebted to the principles of European enlightenment of secular rationality. The 'disembedding of the economy from the society during the 19th century in Europe and the liberation of the market from social constraint'[78] has thus been another historical turning point in the metamorphosis of capitalism. However religion and morals continue to play a significant role in the individual's relationship to the world of work and money.

1.4. The Money Economy as Threat to Social Continuity

From a political economic perspective there are 'qualitative differences between the world in the early 20th and the world in the early 21st century'[79]. Those differences are the 'fragmentation and decentralization of complex production chains and the worldwide dispersal and functional integration of the different segments in these chains'[80]. Notably this fragmentation together with the 'centralization of command and control of the global economy in transnational capital'[81] are what the author calls the radical global economy. The radicalizing global capitalism is an emerging new phase in the world-system pointing to 'the supersession through transnational integration of national economies'[82]. It is radicalizing because it further fragments 'production processes and [and fosters] their geographic relocation on a global scale in ways which slice through national boundaries'[83]. Furthermore the radical nature of global capitalism has influenced national governments to restructure local economies and societies to suit 'the needs of transnational capital'[84]. It can be said that capitalist culture has come to dominate man on all other non-economic levels as well. The new emerging 'class relations of global capitalism'[85] will not be further discussed as this thesis is not a systemic analysis on global production relations. The term neo-liberalism is used here interchangeably with radical capitalism and the global

[78] Robinson, A theory of global capitalism, 40.
[79] Robinson, A theory of global capitalism, 15.
[80] Robinson, A theory of global capitalism, 15.
[81] Robinson, A theory of global capitalism, 15.
[82] Robinson, A theory of global capitalism, 16.
[83] Peter Dicken in Robinson, A theory of global capitalism, 16.
[84] Robinson, A theory of global capitalism, 109.
[85] Robinson, A theory of global capitalism, 108.

economy as it basically characterizes the same processes of economic deregulation and trade liberalization. Neo-liberalism views the role of the state reduced in favor of an increased focus on the private business sector and is advocated by economists and politicians of the 20th and 21st century like the businessman Kenichi Ohmae, the former president of the World Bank James Wolfensohn, and Britain's former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. This new economico-political mentality has not only structural but 'ubiquitous effects on lives'[86]. Since the 1980s global capitalism causes postmodern deconstructivist processes of alienation from 'classical' sources of self like the nation, the organization, the family, towards an individuation of man in center and periphery alike. This shift is also quantitatively confirmed by Inglehart who speaks of the 'importance of cultural change'[87] in the 1980s that is equivalent to a 'global change in advanced industrial society'[88]. At this point the importance of nationality declines and the global is no longer mere effect but 'objective reality'[89]. The new global economy is 'where human beings assume obligation towards the world as a whole and where they espouse values which take the globe as their frame and reference point'[90]. This marks therefore the point where values and morals are re-integrated into the economy because the global exposure makes individuals more conscious of the negative effects of the functionalist, rational kind of capitalism. For Appadurai this is the 'global now'[91] meaning global presence within the local instigating self-reflexive processes for new meaningful identities in the material world. Individuals as agents are 'able to contest and sometimes even subvert the imagined worlds of the official mind and of the entrepreneurial mentality that surround them'[92], which will be discussed in the second chapter.

Money as central instrument of economics encourages the spread of the neo-liberal capitalist logic because it is non-contextual. In other words, money is the same everywhere in the world, yet money 'is never just money'[93]. Money is most of all ambiguous as it produces ecological and social miseries alongside an abundance of wealth and autonomy for the few. The power of money is analyzed in various studies

[86] Sergio Fielder. Review of modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization by Arjun Appadurai, in: *Social Analysis 46* (2) (2002) 164.
[87] Martin Albrow. *The global age* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1996) 195.
[88] Albrow, Global age, 195.
[89] Albrow, Global age, 81.
[90] Albrow, Global age, 83.
[91] Fielder Review of Modernity at large, 165.
[92] Appadurai, Difference in the global economy, 237.
[93] Paul Auster in Deutschmann, Verheißung des Reichtums, 7.

by Richard Sennett, a scholar from Yale University[94]. What is called radical global capitalism here Richard Sennett conceptualizes as 'new capitalism'[95] that he dates to the late 20th century, more exactly the 1980s. In his book he analyzes the new social realities according to identity and organizational adaptations in the Western world, which means North America and Europe. Central to Sennett's argument is the adaptation of individual identities according to market logic[96]. As a result a so-called homo oeconomicus internalizes economic fragmentation to successfully manage 'short-term relationships, […] 'develop new skills [alongside technological change, and to be able to] let go of the past'[97]. This 'new' man reminds more of a machine that is tuned to making money than of a human being with emotional and spiritual needs. Sennett's social critique on the relationship between economic ideology and identity states that the new man is not liberated in his being, but rather encased in his function as a worker. Sennett just like the earlier historical critics is concerned about the loss of human dignity and questions whether capitalism whilst leading to wealth and liberty for some sacrifices moral refinement and civilization of the world.

It can be said that the radical global capitalism is amoral and ahistorical because it spreads its materialistic philosophy globally and abandons its historical roots. Radical capitalism becomes a 'life world' where people are expected to socialize and develop a 'sense of belonging'[98] individually. With the end of the 20th century 'the moral prestige of work'[99] declines because 'the social [within work] is diminished'[100]. As work forms become increasingly competitive and harsh, people feel disappointed by the empty promises of money that are not fulfilled on their own but 'necessitate the interpretation of acting individuals'[101]. Those create the meaning structures and role models for which it is worth working hard. Hence money is not just functional, it is substantial. It is meaningfully interpreted by man in order to make its ambiguity of inclusion and exclusion, success and failure, change and stagnation, tolerable. In short money means 'reflexivity'[102] on the basis of cultural and societal continuity.

[94] Sennett, New capitalism.
[95] Sennett, New capitalism.
[96] Sennett, New capitalism.
[97] Sennett, New capitalism, 4.
[98] W. Outhwaite. *Habermas: A critical introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1994), 9.
[99] Sennett, New capitalism, 81.
[100] Sennett, New capitalism, 82.
[101] Deutschmann, Verheißung des Reichtums, 135.
[102] Deutschmann, Verheißung des Reichtums, 105.

1.5. Chapter Summary

In Western Europe economics used to be an 'offshoot of ethics'[103], but it has transformed into a separate scientific field since the enlightenment period under Adam Smith in the 18th century. A little earlier the religious reformation in the 16th and 17th century facilitates the functionalization of self-interest and the rationalization of motivation for making money. Religious aspects are modified into a work ethic to cultivate capitalist culture. During the 20th and 21st century yet another mutation abandons ethics altogether and 'liberates' capitalism from previous ethical concerns. Instead capitalism is sought to fulfill spiritual needs by its promises of wealth and autonomy. This ideology fails as the dream of wealth continues to be realized only for the elites whilst the majority remains peripheral to capitalism's promise. The promise of absolute wealth as a sacred unleashes self-interest, greed and egocentrism that become highly contested within and outside of the world-system. Therefore money's salvation promise still requires a meaningful motive that is not material. The first chapter can be concluded by saying that the Socratic question of 'how should one live' re-emerges with unprecedented urgency in the global economy. The ambiguity of money leads to the challenging of present-day dominant capitalist culture and relativizes European, economic epistemological frameworks. In the meantime this ambiguity has spread to an overall confusion about how to integrate identities and ideologies into the world-system that has exposed its weaknesses.

It is the impact and centrality of the cultural factors of the economy that reveal the true nature of capitalism as a cultural system. The 'epistemological and ethical challenge'[104] posed by radical global capitalism is met with 'own ideas'[105] such as the Islamic banking system. The question of 'who are we' has become a central theme of the globalization debate because the more the world grows together, the greater the fear of losing one's distinctiveness as a people. When globalization is felt as a direct threat to one's unique self, it obtains emotional qualities that can spur violent eruptions no global theorist can afford to ignore. A correct understanding of the nature of the economy as a cultural system is the first step in putting an end to idealizing the scientific character of economics. Instead it will pave the way for a

[103] Amartya Sen. *On ethics and economics* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers 1988), 2.
[104] Tripp, Islam and the moral economy, 195.
[105] Tripp, Islam and the moral economy, 195.

historical reconnection that captures the human aspect of identity and ethics as part of capitalist culture.

2. Case Study One: The Cultural Aspect of the Economy

'It is not our human nature that is universal, but our capacity to create cultural realities, and then to act in terms of them'[106]

This first case study is about two different imaginations of Turkish identity and different ethical interpretations of material accumulation by two entrepreneurs in the Turkish fashion industry. Fashion is itself an instrument for identity where 'fashion unites those of [one] social class and segregates them from another'[107] so that it has relevance not only in an illustrative but deeper sense. Fashion is materializing the inner dualistic nature of human beings that is faltering between 'social adaptation'[108] and differentiation like no other product. The sociality of fashion has caught the attention of Georg Simmel, one of the first German sociologists in the 20th century who has defined the socio-cultural function of fashion as 'the objective characteristic grouping upon equal terms by social expediency of the antagonistic tendencies of life'[109]. Fashion is therefore tied to both, the social and the imaginary aspect of the ideologies of identities within the global economy. Thus the two different fashion styles created by the two designers reflect a more fundamental discrepancy over the values for Turkey's self-image.

In February of 2008 the author came across an intriguing documentary screened by the Public Broadcasting Service, PBS, called 'The new face of Islam'[110]. It presented the largest Islamic-style fashion chain, Tekbir, and another flourishing fashion business brand called Ipekyol that is selling Western-style clothes in Istanbul, Turkey. The documentary itself is subdivided into four parts, 'Faith and prosperity in Turkey', 'Anatolian Tigers', 'The Rise of conservative Islam', 'Faith, Fashion, and the future'[111]. Each part is running between six to thirteen minutes each adding up to the overall

[106] Mintz in Immanuel Wallerstein. Culture as the ideological battleground of the modern world-system, in: *Theory, Culture & Society 7* (31) (1990) 31.
[107] Georg Simmel. Fashion, in: *The American Journal of Sociology LXII* (6) (May 1957) 557.
[108] Simmel, Fashion, 543.
[109] Simmel, Fashion, 558.
[110] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). By Jon Alpert and Matthew O'Neill. August 22, 2006. [Available online: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/turkeys-tigers/full-episode/649/], accessed February 5, 2008.
[111] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.

length of forty 40:33 minutes. The documentary itself can be downloaded from the PBS website and additional information by the film makers is given in Appendix 3.

Turkey is a Eurasian, transcontinental country with a portion of its landmass lying 'west of the Bosporus and [being] geographically part of Europe'[112] as can be seen in Figure 2.



Figure 2: Map of Turkey [Source: Central Intelligence Agency. *The world fact book on Turkey*. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html, accessed June 10, 2008.]

It stretches from south-eastern Europe to south-western Asia bordering the Black Sea, between Bulgaria and Georgia, and bordering the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, between Greece and Syria[113]. It has 81 provinces and borders eight countries, which are Bulgaria to the northwest, Greece to the west, Georgia to the northeast, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iran to the east, and Iraq and Syria to the southeast[114]. It also has access to several waters such as the Mediterranean Sea, the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara, and the Turkish Straits which comprise the Bosporus and the Dardanelles[115]. It is estimated that Turkey's ethnic population is comprised of 80 percent Turkish and 20 percent Kurdish people[116]. Socio-economically Turkey is a country that is secular by law and relies heavily on the state and its jurisprudence for the strict separation of religion and politics. School

[112] *Central Intelligence Agency.* The world fact book on Turkey. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html, accessed June 10, 2008.
[113] Central Intelligence Agency, The world fact book on Turkey:
[114] Central Intelligence Agency, The world fact book on Turkey:
[115] Central Intelligence Agency, The world fact book on Turkey.
[116] Central Intelligence Agency, The world fact book on Turkey.

curricula are under state supervision and so are the Imams and their religious teachings of Islam. Yet there has been a notable reorientation to conservative Islamic principles in recent years that causes a divide within the nation.

The two selected business owners are an illustrative example of that divide where the one, Mr. Karaduman who runs Tekbir, is representing the conservative religious side that is nonetheless economically liberal, and Mr. Ayaydin who is a secular, Western-oriented businessman. Mr. Karaduman follows a strict interpretation of Islam and produces Islamic clothing for devoted Muslim women. Particularly proud is Mr. Karaduman of the full-body swim suit that allows Muslim women to take a bath in the ocean as he says. His mission is to introduce Tekbir, which had a 15 percent increase in sales in 2005, to all women in the world, particularly in Europe, but also in Egypt. For Mr. Ayaydin on the contrary his goal is to be famous and to open stores in Europe and the United States. He argues that Turkey must look west and never look back[117]. By expanding within the home market and abroad however, both business owners seek to simultaneously expand the philosophy they associate with their product. For Mr. Karaduman it is important that the ongoing modernization of Turkey and its participation in the global capitalist system does not change or weaken Islamic culture. He wants to preserve the religion, yet without isolating the country. For Mr. Ayaydin on the other hand Turkey's opening to the world does not erode but strengthen Turkey's identity as a secular, Western-oriented culture. For him Western capitalist culture is hence not a threat as it is for Mr. Karaduman.

When Mustafa Karaduman from the ‚largest Islamic-style fashion chain Tekbir'[118] rises at 4:45 am in the morning he follows his Islamic cleansing rituals. For Mr. Karaduman from Tekbir, his identity within the commercial world is formulated not by Western economic principles of self-interest but by the religion of Islam to which he uncompromisingly devotes and subjugates his entrepreneurial activities to. Mr. Karaduman is a devout Muslim, and his identification with the global economy is based upon religious considerations and as it seems traditional Turkish identity. Religious identity is defined by Grace Davie as traditional cultural phenomenon and cultural continuity so that not much will be said about the particularity of Islam itself[119].

[117] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[118] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[119] Grace Davie. *The sociology of religion* (London: Sage Publications 2007).

When taking a closer look Mr. Karaduman's identity is not traditional because it is not a direct imitation of a former, 'old' Islamic identity. Whilst individual Islamic identities may have existed in Turkey ever since its founding in 1923 until recently never represented a broader collective identity that was politically recognized as such. Therefore Mr. Karaduman has constructed a novel Turkish Islamist identity that seeks economic integration with the West, approves of employing women at work and persists on a traditional role for his wife to stay home. Therefore Mr. Karaduman is a hybrid representation of postmodern identity negotiating self and ideology of identity through entrepreneurial agency. He and other Islamic entrepreneurs exemplify the 'imagined worlds'[120] where ideologies of 'proper' Turkish identity are merged with the economic ambition to establish Turkey in the globalizing economy. Religiously-inspired entrepreneurs like Karaduman pursue 'wealth, faith, *and* fashion'[121] because for them the economic sphere is not separate from how they interpret the world and their role within it. They 'represent a new face of Islam; one that is 'devout and profit-driven'[122]. Karaduman justifies his economically self-interested behavior by the two pillars of Islam that are about business, 'Hajj' and Zakat'[123]. The former requires profit for financing the pilgrimage to Mecca and the latter for paying alms to the poor. Out of the five pillars of Islam the other three are 'Shahadah, Salat, and Sawm'[124]. They are concerned with worship like performing ritual prayers five times a day, fasting during Ramadan and 'reciting the Muslim profession of faith'[125]. Hence, his economic activity is relevant for his religiously-defined self. Moral concerns of self-interest have apparently not disappeared in the Turkish Muslim world that seeks to find its own, particular route into the global economy. For Karaduman faith represents a business opportunity as well as it strengthens his ideology about a strict interpretation of the Koran and the 'appropriate' role of Turkish women. However he eases his strict Islamist identity outside of the home and employs women out of economic necessity. Next to his dream of expansion his mission is to 'make conservative Islam fashionable'[126] and to spread its influence across the world, especially across Europe and the Arab world.

[120] Appadurai, Modernity, 33.
[121] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[122] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[123] British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). *Religion and ethics - Islam*. February 10, 2002. http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/practices/fivepillars.shtml, accessed June 24, 2008.
[124] British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Religion and ethics – Islam.
[125] British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Religion and ethics – Islam.
[126] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.

Consequently his business mission differs from the secular contestations by Western entrepreneurs in the textile industry. Karaduman 'builds his business on his religious mission' [127] and his business activity lays claim to be serving Allah before stockholders and consumers. 'Tekbir' which for Turkish Muslims means 'the one and only God'[128] counters money's absolutist promise mentioned in the first chapter. Money alone is not producing sense for Karaduman and his business. Money in his world can only make sense if it is subjugated to a higher, religious purpose. This implies that capitalism is utilized by individuals with different cultural, identitarian and religious affinities and serves not just the economic principle of profit-maximization, but caters to one's interpreting of society and recuperates identity in a fluctuating and relativizing world.

Islamic entrepreneurs like Karaduman configure a hybrid form of capitalism that appears to mirror their hybrid identities and 'illustrate that Islam, capitalism and globalization can be compatible'[129]. Many of the products that are produced in the export zones of the Kayseri region 'do not match [the] traditional lifestyles'[130] of the devout Muslims working there. But because money has no religious or moral concerns it applies its logic across the peripheries and offshore production centers. The workers from Kayseri however do only superficially agree with this de-contextual and amoral understanding of the economy. According to them one must make his 'own choices according to own cultural, moral values'[131] that apparently are not being transported and automatically ingested by the periphery. The Kayseri region lies in 'Turkey's central province and [is the] Islamic heartland of Anatolia'[132]. It has about '1.1 million inhabitants and a workforce of 150,000'[133] that 'produces 70 percent of all furniture sold in Turkey and 1 percent of the denim worn around the world'[134] 'The industrial zone outside the city spreads out over 2350 hectares and is home to more

[127] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[128] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[129] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[130] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[131] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[132] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[133] Berger, Roland. Strategy consultants. *Welcome to Kayseri.* Published August 9, 2007 in the magazine think:act. [accessed online http://www.rolandberger.com/expertise/client-magazines/2007-08-09-rbsc-news-welcome_to_kayseri.html, July 10, 2008].
[134] Berger, Roland. Strategy consultants.

than 500 production facilities'[135]. Even though Kayseri has no direct access to the sea its 'exports have doubled since 2000 to about €540 million'[136].

The notion that 'industrialization should not change Islamic culture'[137] highlights the re-formulating of meaning structures for different cultures and identities. The sources for rationalizing religion for entrepreneurial activity are resulting in a new face of Islam in Turkey. A *rational* explanation for Turkish workers and businessmen is ultimately faith-bound and a clear contradiction to the concept of rationality stemming from European enlightenment. It is the Islamic culture, which gives Turkey and its entrepreneurs a specific identity that is sought to be preserved and emphasized in economic agency. Because 'you cannot find this culture anywhere else in the world' [138] global economic participation and integration is accompanied by the process of self-reflexivity stressed throughout the paper. As has been illustrated before, the individual now can re-establish identity anew in hybridity, reject the changing of traditional roles altogether, or idealize traditionality like the Islamic entrepreneurs do. But importantly, the emphasis on traditional Islamic rules and lifestyles is in Karaduman's case really the result of a new hybrid identity. Similarly Erdogan Aslan, president from Kar-as, a company within the globally-annexed Kayseri region, says that 'women should play more productive role [in business]'[139]. He also more or less resigns over his wife who next to holding the driver's license becomes more and more independent having her own imaginations and aspirations increasingly outside of the home. So even for devout Muslim women in one of the most conservative regions in Turkey new identities are emerging with the help of economic integration, expansion and transmission of ideas from abroad that provides possibilities and new self schemas. It is 'a new Islamist female identity' [140] that foresees education and a career as well as familial responsibilities for the woman. It is similarly a political expression of an alternative path to Turkish modernity where the 'tesettür'[141] or the new veiling phenomena constructs an identity that is outward and useful economically, yet inward and private socially. It is a space in-between this

[135] Berger, Roland. Strategy consultants.
[136] Berger, Roland. Strategy consultants.
[137] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[138] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[139] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[140] Aynur Ilyasoglu. Islamist women in Turkey: their identity and self-image, in *Deconstructing images of 'the Turkish woman'*, ed. Zehra F. Arat (Hampshire: Macmillan Press 1998) 245.
[141] Ilyasoglu, Islamist women in Turkey, 244.

new Islamic identity occupies and is an attempt to secure an identity that is Islamic and progressive at once. This new female identity could put an end to the under-representation of women in Turkey's workforce where women only 'represent 29 percent of the professionals'[142].

For the mayor of Kayseri it is clear that people 'want to preserve traditions [and] religion [but not at the expense of] being isolated from the world'[143]. If 'the important thing is to make money'[144] then religion and identities must re-establish the historical affinity between capitalism and a meaningful moral existence. This is exactly what the Muslim entrepreneurs of the Kayseri region like Karaduman are motivated for and by. On Fridays workers and company presidents substitute their lunch break for prayer that provides that moral value for business. More than 6000 people overcrowd the mosque there and businessmen continue building more mosques[145]. One can only speculate that with the economic expansion and globalization of Kayseri, the number of mosques will increase exponentially. This would be the direct effect of the Islamic business rule to share the profit with the faithful community. Kayseri and its Muslim entrepreneurs is a perfect example for a theoretical framework of the cultural processes involved in economic activity. The blend between modern and traditional Muslim trends is a response to the engagement of Turkey with the global economy. It serves to confirm that economic integration is also always cultural.

Yalcin Ayaydin the founder of Ipekyol on the other hand embodies the 'typical' secular Turkish business elite with its traditional Western orientation. Ayaydin's fashion chain is called 'Ipekyol', which stands for 'silk road'[146] and hints at the historical trading route between Asia and Europe that transmitted culture and foreign products alike[147]. Ayaydin's mission resembles much more that of a typical Western business man. All he wants is to become 'one of the most famous brands in Turkey'[148]. His ideology and identity he interlaces with his business clashes with that of Tekbir. His daughter is permitted drinking alcohol and lives a lifestyle that is nearly

[142] Isik Urla Zeytinoglu. Constructed images as employment restrictions: determinants of female labor in Turkey, in: *Deconstructing images of 'the Turkish woman'*, ed. Zehra F. Arat (Hampshire: Macmillan Press 1998) 186.
[143] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[144] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[145] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[146] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[147] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[148] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.

identical to that of a wealthy teenager from Hollywood. She does neither possess nor wear a head scarf and already prepares to succeed her father in the successful business as a designer one day. She watches American TV shows and finds 'headscarves not useful'[149]. For her 'the guys at Tekbir are fundamentalists'[150]. Ayaydin distances himself from the religiously-defined entrepreneurial identity of Karaduman and says that 'they [Islamic entrepreneurs like Karaduman] can make that kind of world for themselves'[151]. The contestation of identity in the economic realm is expressed even in a fear of Ayaydin's daughter who says that 'when they [Tekbir] are economically stronger, they want to change the country and make it more Islamic'[152]. The success of secular compared to Islamic businesses and their parallel partaking in the global economy is also part of the divided political attitude towards the structural transformation of the country. It is therefore useful to discuss the politicization of economic and cultural identity, especially in regards to the recent 'Islamization' of Turkey in chapter four.

2.2. Identity as Central Site of Contest for Capitalist Culture

The first chapter on the historicity of capitalism has pointed to the cultural aspect of economics. It appears that historically there has always been an attempt, notably by Max Weber to supply economic changes with a human quality. A meaning structure like the protestant ethic was to be the foundation for managing the ambiguity of capitalism that is progressive and deconstructive at the same time. Rather ironically the ambiguity of capitalist culture deconstructs capitalism as ideology of progress and modernization. Because it emerges with the enlightened philosophy of 'human rights, but also with sexism, racism and ageism'[153] its prognosis of progress is relative and not impartially adopted abroad. Instead it is reflected upon and carefully weighted against its effects on local culture and sociality. For in the global economy capitalist culture is often felt as 'forceful extension of [Western European] definitions of reality'[154].

[149] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[150] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[151] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[152] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[153] Albrow, Global age, 35.
[154] Albrow, Global age, 35.

Weber was fascinated by Fordism of the early 20th century and its 'development dynamic' [155] . For him capitalism meant human progress and technological achievement, but also the crunch down of 'anything that gets in the way of capitalist culture'[156]. The qualitative changes in economic theory and practice have shown the 'human consequences of globalization' [157] . It is the culture of capitalism that is ambiguous because it lays bare the 'naked interests'[158] of human beings that appear to lose their ethical commitment over time as self-interest determines their survival in the competitive environment. Whether one is motivated by a strong work ethic, the promise of salvation after having fulfilled one's duty on earth, or simply money, it all comes down to one purpose: surviving in the competitive capitalist culture. The fascination of wealth, grand projects and fame establish an own culture, the culture of capitalism and of money. For Weber at this point capitalism 'congeals into a steel cage' [159] that comes to dominate man. The freedom of man is significantly compromised and left within a struggle for recuperating meaning beyond the material relations of production inputs and outputs. The meaning of man is lost once material relations reason about 'how to live'. 'Capitalism is cultured'[160] and reasons in ways that are alien to man who desires a sense-making structure and a moral obligation to adjust his life forms and to discipline his behavior in order to subordinate himself to production.

The first chapter concluded by saying that the 'conceptual boundaries'[161] between the social and the economic fail to grasp the phenomena of capitalist culture going global in its complexity. The goal is to evoke a renewed appreciation of aspects of meaning, identity and ideology that are projected onto the economic sphere by man. The thought construct of 'globality'[162] is meant to take the step of economic theory beyond the 'modern' disciplinary isolation into the interdisciplinary field of globalization. The current shortcoming of academic departmental and conceptual separation is meant to be abolished by the prospect of a new thinking stream: global studies. The individual is hence conceptualized as embedded within the economic

[155] Jan Rehmann. *Max Weber: Modernisierung als passive Revolution: Kontextstudien zu Politik, Philosophie und Religion im Übergang zum Fordismus* (Hamburg: Argument Verlag 1998) 22.
[156] Rehmann, Max Weber, 22.
[157] Bauman in Gijsbert Oonk, Review of modernity at large, 126.
[158] Rehmann, Max Weber, 23.
[159] Rehmann, Max Weber, 24.
[160] Albrow, Global age, 133.
[161] Albrow, Global age, 4.
[162] Albrow, Global age, 4.

field that itself again is part of a broader, globality structure. Globality is defined by Beck, a famous sociologist of globalization, as the demarcation of an era where the separation of spaces or territories has come to an end[163]. Beck says that in a time of globality 'different economic, cultural, and political forms clash and the implicitness of the Western model must be newly legitimized'[164]. Worldly relations and phenomena are multi-disciplinary and cross-territorially. Moreover the nature of globalization, that is the 'processes through which orientations, identities and networks undermine nation-states and their sovereignty [whilst being internally] connected with each other'[165] induces a general sense of self-reflexivity'[166]. The market is felt as a global reality exerting competitive forces and pressures across nations and inside localities. This will also be referred to as deterritorialization, which signifies the 'removing of misplaced concreteness from sociological concepts [and the] delinking of community from place' [167]. The concept of deterritorialization serves to 'emphasize the contribution of imagination to social reality [and is related to the thesis' methodology of] radical phenomenology'[168]. It is also related to identity that is sourced from an imaginary capacity 'relativizing old identities'[169]. Importantly it does not argue that the territoriality of core and periphery structures of the world-system has vanished. Rather the 'social construction of reality' [170] has changed from being locally, territorially framed to being global. The second case study is an example of this global social reality and how it comes to affect individual identities. Deterritorialization also explains then why there are peculiar phenomena emerging such as Islamic capitalism. The second chapter on identities seeks to point to the role of identity in the 'realities of global forces, power and markets'[171] in which everyone pursues his own interests. The global forces are ideologies, capital, technology, and values that fluctuate between spaces and affect how people think about themselves and what they do. Boundaries of 'territorial, moral, or aesthetic nature'[172] are broken up and new blends of values systems are the result of reflecting upon old identities defining the strategies and visions taken by economic entrepreneurs.

[163] Beck, Globalisierung.
[164] Beck, Globalisierung, 28.
[165] Beck, Globalisierung, 29.
[166] Beck, Globalisierung, 28.
[167] Albrow, Global age, 158.
[168] Albrow, Global age, 158.
[169] Albrow, Global age, 152.
[170] Albrow, Global age, 80.
[171] Albrow, Global age, 84.
[172] Albrow, Global age, 84.

The problem of identity is central to the global economy because the global forces have changed agency and structure making identity a central site of contest and status in the world. Psychological theory is implicit to the sociology of the individual that makes its 'own selections'[173] about incorporating new aspects of self around which it has the 'ability to construct narratives'[174]. Affirming an identity in the radical global economy is extremely challenging as the social environment is ambiguous due to the relativizing forces of capitalism. An identity in the global economy is situated within fluidity due to 'rapidly changing self-descriptions'[175]. The new category for identity which will be established in this chapter is the imagination. Importantly imagination is not confined to the social sphere because the social is not marginal to economics but integral. The integrality of the social and the cultural to economics is not just due to the social effects economics produce, but to the very nature of economics itself. Clear is that the end of economics is to make profit. But as it is in the nature of human beings to dedicate a moral outlook on what they do that is sense-making to their identity harmonizing self and work, economics is a social and cultural system. The focus will be on the cultural dimension as it comprises of identity, religion and ethics. The cultural and the economic, together create an ethical, moral underpinning and a sense-making structure that affirms and reproduces identity on the way to making profit. As a result a new concept of economics as meaning-generating structure that gives rise to identity arises.

Limitedly identity has 'an abstract quality'[176] that is difficult to empirically evaluate. Nonetheless it is necessary to establish an intellectual access to the phenomena of ideologies of identities in the global cultural economy. Lastly the phenomenological approach to identity is worthwhile because it will change the way in which economics is conceptualized; namely in a purely and exclusively 'scientific', quantitative way. Hence it is argued on a historical and phenomenological basis that economics is a cultural and social structure that gives meaning to the activity of production and wealth accumulation and is thus integral to identity. Identity is to be understood as the component of the personalization and moralization of work. Culture is the broad

[173] Albrow, Global age, 150.
[174] Albrow, Global age, 151.
[175] Albrow, Global age, 165.
[176] Albrow, Global age, 166.

umbrella under which identity and morality can be classified as it gives symbolic meaning to human experiences at work and in general.

2.3. Economics as Cultural System for Identity

'The circuit of culture'[177] helps to classify identity as aspect of culture. Accordingly culture compasses economic, social, and symbolic realms of 'production, consumption and representation'[178], respectively. Identity plays a significant role in a globalizing world and requires difference and boundaries. It has been conceptualized as 'biological essentialism [and] social constructionism' [179] whereas the latter understanding of identity is applied here due to the vast amount of evidence indicating a fluctuation of how identities are constructed that cannot be biologically explained. For instance, when former national units are broken up such as the case in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, new identities are formed based upon a novel perception of self. The non-essentialist idea of identity implies that it is changing over time and shaped by factors such as production patterns, political structures, imagination and symbolism. For example Karaduman's manager serves dates and holy water during a business meeting, which is the kind of symbolism present in economic organizations. Through the power of representation Karaduman's business interprets its economic goal of making profit meaningfully, in this case religiously. For the worker on the other hand, is less powerful than the entrepreneur he is at the receiving end of this economic symbolism. He identifies with the business he works for as his 'identity is the intersection of our everyday lives with the economic and political relations of subordination and domination'[180]. Because it is not static or fixed it provides variable opportunities for establishing 'who we are'. Public discourses, the media, advertisement and the organization of production come to present meaning and possible identification platforms for the individual. An initial human tendency is to make sense of one's experience, which is considered a universal phenomenon here. Hence, in business the entrepreneur is engaged with creating meaningful structures and practices and represents a certain position. His role amongst others is to

[177] Kathryn Woodward. Concepts of identity and difference, in: *Identity and difference*, ed. Kathryn Woodward (London: Sage Publications 1997) 2.
[178] Woodward, Concepts of identity, 2.
[179] Woodward, Concepts of identity, 4.
[180] Woodward, Concepts of identity, 15.

manifest an identity that includes those that identify with the business and excludes those who do not.

The overall political landscape in Turkey has changed encouraging a more Islamic connotation of Turkish identities that becomes reflected also in local businesses that create new identities within these changing circumstances. Business and politics, both are spaces for the imagination and realization of new identity. The 'transnationalization of economic and cultural life' [181] makes entrepreneurs like Karaduman look at Libya and Egypt for establishing an Islamic attitude towards production. The Islamic clothing the fashion brand Tekbir produces is culturally targeting those countries whilst receiving support for Islamic identity from them. Turkish identity politics claim that Islamic identity has been marginalized and is now a 'factor in political mobilization'[182] that spreads to the economic realm. Turkish Islamic identities have appeal for recuperating moral value within politics *and* business. Although Karaduman's business is a culture confined to Tekbir, it has significance also beyond the company for it attempts to redefine Turkish society and construct a new Turkish identity. Tekbir's identity is 'reproduced through symbolic systems'[183] like the spiritual business meetings. Driving a Mercedes car and donating a proportion of the annual profit for building a local mosque is, anthropologically speaking, marking of difference 'as basis of culture'[184]. By ordering his business according to Islamic principles Karaduman's business is a meaning structure and a cultural system. Similarly Ayaydin's fashion brand Ipekyol utilizes symbols such as mixed-gender roundtable business meetings in a luxurious office environment. For him symbols of luxury and wealth are central to his mission of becoming famous. His value system is thus much more outward oriented than Karaduman's is. One could say Ayaydin pursues hedonistic identitarian values whereas Karaduman follows religious Islamic laws for a morally-integer identity. It is hence to be concluded that business is something eminently cultural. It makes a difference to differentiate an identity and value system from another and provides meaning structures that appeal to human beings. This gives a cultural and social quality to business as it combines collectivities based upon 'culturally accepted practice'[185].

[181] Woodward, Concepts of identity, 16.
[182] Woodward, Concepts of identity, 24.
[183] Woodward, Concepts of identity, 29.
[184] Woodward, Concepts of identity, 29.
[185] Woodward, Concepts of identity, 35.

2.4. The Nature of Identity: A Theoretical Approach

It can be said that economic agency, being an entrepreneur or a worker, provides a sense of self. For the purpose of how identities are constructed in general and what challenges in particular they are facing today in terms of a globalizing world, Zygmunt Bauman, the postmodern theoretician, and his concept of fluid self is relevant for understanding the contestation of identities in a changing social and economic environment and the inherent instability of values and declining certainty in the postmodern world[186]. As a brief note on the concept of postmodernism, all that should be said here is that it is simply meant to emphasize the cultural condition of present-day societies and eschews the ongoing historical debate about whether there has been a closure of the modern period or not. The idea of 'post' in modernity should therefore less be understood as periodizing or historicizing the changes since the late 20th century, but rather as a focus on the fragmentations of identities within societies. Identity in the context of globalization and as postmodern phenomenon is a direct opposition to Western traditional thinking of 'one version of self'[187]. Instead experience is bound up with selfhood indicating that with new experiences, new selves are constructed. Similarly the consumption of pictures, magazines and stories affects the mediation of novel experiences and the idea of self. Because the self is a rather ambiguous, 'fluid' construct as the author is bound to explain, it can adjust to these constant inputs and buffer their existential impact. The selected theories of fluctuating identities are part of the overall phenomenological perspective to accentuate the distinctive elements of radical capitalism.

For Bauman the self is fluidity, a fluctuating entity of multiple selves that change according to their environments and experiences steadily[188]. This postmodern style of socio-psychological thinking sees 'public spaces removed beyond the reaches of localized life'[189] and replants identity sourcing and construction from the public onto the realm of intimate spaces that now produce identities that are global for some, whereas some 'remain fixed in their locality'[190]. As a consequence identities within local spaces differ widely where sources for specific identity can stem from outside

[186] Zygmunt Bauman. *Globalization: the human consequences* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1998).
[187] Gabriel Bukobza. The epistemological basis of selfhood, in: *New Ideas in Psychology 25* (2007) 38.
[188] Bauman, Globalization and the human.
[189] Bauman, Globalization and the human, 2.
[190] Bauman, Globalization and the human, 2.

the nation-state or the immediate community. A Turkish woman from the wealthy Istanbul business elite can 'afford' more easily an identity that is a blend of Western and Turkish aspects. She can stay single and childless and 'break' traditional norms of female gender roles. 'Localities are losing their meaning-generating and meaning-negotiating capacity'[191] and there are niches emerging for alternative identities. For instance a female employee at Ipekyol can create a gender identity based upon greater equality than if she was to work with Tekbir. She can transport her more emancipated role at Ipekyol inside her home and develop new aspirations for herself. She may imagine running her own business one day. The potential social disapproval of her un-traditional behavior she can come to offset by blending traditional aspects of Islamic faith with her newly gained freedom and acceptance at work. She represents a new Turkish woman whose deviant lifestyle and aspirations are difficult to attack by traditionalists because her identity is a blend or hybrid of old and new.

Another model for the illustration of the fluidity of identity is given by Homi Bhabha's conception of 'third space'[192]. Third space is 'contradictory and ambivalent space of enunciation […] cultural statements and systems are constructed in'[193]. The idea of enunciation is also central to Stuart Hall's conception of cultural identity and indicates that the 'I' is not an entity separate from or independent of its representation[194]. When we speak of, thus enunciate our experiences of our selves, we and our represented 'I' are never identical Hall says. Instead 'identity is a production'[195] and 'discursive'[196]. The enunciation space is ultimately a position we take towards our selves and our surroundings. It is a space in which we interpret our reality and that comes to be our identity, at least temporarily. Karaduman claims to know what Turkish identity is, and so does Mr. Ayaydin. Both appropriate symbols and translate them in their own way because there is no fixed, static truth about what Turkish identity is. This means that economic agency comes to be motivated by one's idea or imagination of society, social roles and the world as such. The reader should note that this is something rather different from what is stated and theorized by the

[191] Bauman, Globalization and the human, 3.
[192] Homi K. Bhabha. *The location of culture* (London: Routledge 1994) 37.
[193] Bhabha, Location of culture, 37.
[194] Stuart Hall. *Questions of cultural identity* (London: Sage Publications 1996).
[195] Woodward, Concepts of identity, 51.
[196] Bhabha, Location of culture, 37.

economic theories and the economists' self-understanding about their role and function within society. They would and will argue that the sole motivation for their participation in the global economy is to make money.

All that can be said at this stage is that the self as the reflected 'I' is an existential category of one's identity established against an outer world. In other words the self is reliant upon the other, an environment or simply something that lies outside of it. It also is a construction induced by social, cultural and economic factors. Increasingly these factors are ambiguous and fragmented by an array of diverse representations, symbols and productions through globalization. The self is therefore an ever-changing plurality of selves and part of a process of self-reflexivity conditioned by the mosaic cultural circuits of globalization.

2.4.1. The Writing of Identity into Globality

As promised in the outset of this chapter, it is necessary to psychologically theorize this phenomenon of continuous identity construction. Leon Festinger, a famous psychologist of the relationship between identity and cognitive states found that the 'mind strives to resolve contradictory states'[197]. Contradictions for one's self are numerous in globality where workers from Turkey's conservative Kayseri region of Anatolia must endure that their strictly religious identity conflicts with their behavior when they produce sexy fashion for the French Carrefour, for example. Kayseri is the exporting sector for many Western fashion brands and many of its workers' identities are strongly centering on traditional religious values. Their psyche experiences something what Festinger conceptualizes as 'cognitive dissonance'[198]. This means that whenever one's conviction and beliefs contrast with one's behavior in a particular situation, one experiences dissonance. In order to overcome this uncomfortable state, the individual attempts to realign his beliefs with his action, for instance by saying 'I am only doing this so I can survive' or by adding another, new component to the self that comes to feel no longer discomfort with the situation[199]. Somehow the workers of Kayseri must adjust or in a postmodern sense relativize their religious principles

[197] Bukobza, Basis of selfhood, 40.
[198] Festinger, Leon and Carlsmith, James M. Cognitive consequences of forced compliance, in: *Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology 58* (1959) 203.
[199] Festinger and Carlsmith, Cognitive dissonance.

because they depend on the income paid by their employer who is the French Carrefour in this illustration. They must separate their religiously-framed self from their working self and de-problematize the dissonant situation by arguing functionally. In order to relieve the dissonant state and to legitimize the participation in the production of bawdily clothing, the worker can compromise his Muslim self so that he for instance accepts culturally-diverse moral systems. He can also split his religious from his working self and prefer a pragmatic approach whereby his action is legitimate because he and his family depend upon the income that he earns. Similarly, Turkish businessmen have resorted to employing women albeit this stands in conflict with their traditional religious view on womanhood. Women who work for an income outside of the home inevitably become independent from their husbands, spend less time at home and may even develop dreams and imaginations that place them in typical male roles like becoming a director of their own one day. Depending on how strong the imaginary is and how favorable the socio-political environment, new identities gradually alter the societal realities when at some future point Muslim women in Turkey compete with men not only for social imaginaries but also for real positions on the job market.

2.5. A Global Cultural Model

The term 'global cultural economy' stems from Appadurai who is one of the first to attempt a 'general theory of global cultural processes'[200]. His theory conceptualizes mental and physical, immaterial and material, ideological and economic transitions with focus on the 'disjunctures'[201]. His theory is convincing because it does not reduce the complexity of global processes that are in constant move and inherently 'fractal'[202]. So far it is established that identity becomes more and more fragmented and is a permanently changing entity. It is 'becoming and being'[203] that is future and present in one. The past as continuity of self is a narrated myth, a reconstruction. The cultural field within which identity is constructed is comprised of social institutions such as the family, peer groups and work. They all have an 'imaginary'[204] component whereby a self is also a promise, a symbolic aspiration. Identity is individually

[200] Appadurai, Difference in the global economy, 247.
[201] Appadurai, Difference in the global economy, 247.
[202] Appadurai, Difference in the global economy, 247.
[203] Woodward, Concepts of identity, 21.
[204] Woodward, Concepts of identity, 23.

imagined and realized by relating to new interpretations of identities through media, work and technology. Imagination is 'the infinitely renewable source of desire, memory, myth, search and discovery'[205]. As a result identities are influenced by different planes or landscapes as Appadurai calls them. The formation 'of new subjects enables us to discover place from which to speak'[206] and is precondition for understanding the fluidity of identity illustrated in the second case study.

Appadurai's landscape model of the five cultural flows accounts for the different perspectives and dimensions identity is comprised of. Appadurai's approach owes to 'anthropology and area studies'[207] and is limited by his habit of fixating 'practices, spaces, and countries into a map of static differences'[208] when referring to constant fluctuations. Yet this may be forgiven considering the overall difficulty to theorize something as incidental as the cultural flows of globalization. His model investigates global cultural processes along five dimensions which are ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and finally ideoscapes whereby 'the individual actor is the last locus of this perspectival set of landscapes' [209]. Ethnoscapes refer to people trespassing worlds like 'tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles and guest workers'[210] affecting local politics, economics and imaginations. Technoscapes are 'both mechanical and informational'[211] and comprise opportunities that combine 'money flows, political possibilities, and the availability of both un- and highly skilled labor'[212]. Financescapes are extremely difficult to pin down as they deal with 'currency markets, national stock exchanges, and commodity speculations'[213]. Mediascapes refer to the dissemination of information through 'newspapers, magazines, television stations'[214] and 'involve inflections (documentaries) [and a] large repertoire of images, narratives, and ethnoscapes to viewers throughout the world, in which the world of commodities and the world of news and politics are profoundly mixed' [215]. Global media producing imaginations and 'starting new

[205] Woodward, Concepts of identity, 58.
[206] Woodward, Concepts of identity, 58.
[207] Appadurai, Modernity, 18.
[208] Appadurai, Modernity, 18.
[209] Appadurai, Modernity, 33.
[210] Appadurai, Modernity, 33.
[211] Appadurai, Modernity, 34.
[212] Appadurai, Modernity, 34.
[213] Appadurai, Modernity, 34.
[214] Appadurai, Modernity, 35.
[215] Appadurai, Modernity, 35.

conversations'[216] by the general transgression of pictures, images, technologies and finance flows reach the individual and disturb its traditional self-image. Similarly it is 'the image, the imagined, the imaginary [which is] something critical and new in the global cultural processes'[217] and is to have its rightful place in global theory on economic globalization. Lastly ideoscapes 'have to do with the ideologies of state and the counter ideologies of movements'[218]. Ideoscapes are 'composed of elements of the Enlightenment worldview [and its notions on] freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, representation, and the master term democracy'[219]. Similarly ideoscapes are the contested site of an ideology that is particularly European, yet makes universal claims to economically central notions such as self-interest. Ideoscapes have 'lost the internal coherence'[220] due to postmodern critique on the rightfulness of a single episteme for the whole world. Ideoscapes are hence really a plurality of conceptualizations of worldviews regards culture, identity and sociality. The role of ideoscapes, mediascapes and technoscapes will be particularly relevant for suggesting a new theory of economic theory.

Appadurai's model is able of scaffolding the mutual conditionality of these factors on identity and the global economy. Overall these landscapes are best imagined as spatial meaning formations that change their shapes according to 'historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sort of actors: nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, as well as subnational groupings and movements (whether religious, political, or economic) […]'[221].

[216] Appadurai, Modernity, 22.
[217] Appadurai, Modernity, 31.
[218] Appadurai, Modernity, 36.
[219] Appadurai, Modernity, 36.
[220] Appadurai, Modernity, 36.
[221] Appadurai, Modernity, 33.

2.6. The Increasing Role of Identity: Several Paths to Modernity

> *'Self-knowledge – always a construction, no matter how much it feels like a discovery – is never altogether separable from claims to be known in specific ways by others'*[222]

At this point it is useful to return to the initial question of this chapter, that is how identity is important for analyzing economic globalization. Human beings try, and always have tried historically, to recuperate a meaning and sense-making structure in what they do, their work. Classical economics that has evolved into capitalism has over time applied a self-logic by which material means are to replace the former meaning-structures of ethics underlying work. However because capitalism is an ambiguous ideology that has come to dominate man, it has set off a globally-felt identity crisis which is concurrent with postmodernity. Identity is even more critical for understanding economic globalization today because it is 'an escape [from] uncertainty'[223] and ambiguity. It is of increasing importance to any globality scholar because 'one thinks of identity whenever one is not sure of where to belong'[224]. And where people belong, imaginatively, is less and less the nation-state, but an individualized community or place. Only when we achieve a recapitulation of what capitalism is, namely a meaning structure for man and his identity we can understand the role of economics for the Humanities and vice versa.

The increasing exposure to global landscapes, either by the media or foreign production sites opens up alternative lives and choices and similarly induces a process of reflexivity and self-evaluation in comparison to the other. Because globalization brings cultures and identities closer together, it makes Western and non-Western societies more conscious of themselves. In the juxtaposition the role of identity is central. For the entrepreneur in making strategic decisions abut marketing campaigns, research and development, he attempts forecasting the future and inevitably interprets the world. For Mustafa Karaduman affirming religious ideals in his role as entrepreneur proves that there are alternatives to the secular economic rationality model from the West. Similarly this self-consciousness reveals that

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[222] Calhoun in Manuel Castells. *The Power of Identity: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Volume II (USA: Blackwell Publishing 2004) 6.
[223] Bauman in Hall, Cultural identity, 19.
[224] Hall, Cultural identity, 19.

secularization does not flow 'naturally from the progress of science and reason'[225] and that the European model is nothing more but *a* model of modernity. The 'pluralism'[226] of life styles and identities, the coexistence of scientific and religious truths sends troubling message of epistemological uncertainty and ambiguity. The question of culture and identity within the global economy is located at the 'borderlines of the present' [227] and signifies the necessity for more global, interdisciplinary theories.

'How are subjects formed in-between'[228] and 'how do strategies of representation or empowerment come to be formulated in the competing claims of communities'[229] and realities? Competing worldviews attempt to 'bridge home and the world'[230] providing the stability and illusion of 'being right'. Identity in this regard is a powerful manifestation of a particular ideology as it can challenge assumptions and realities that were cemented in an enclosed cultural community before. The 'contemporary compulsion to move beyond'[231] is everywhere and analogous to the opening up of in-between spaces, new social imaginaries. Next to economic sites for identity manifestation 'culture [comes to act] as political struggle'[232]. For instance when the Turkish Prime Minister and his family accept the invitation of Kayseri's mayor to a traditional Islamic wedding, a social act is politicized by the press documenting this social event. Gül might have known that anyone who wishes to rule and influence a nation's people and its politics must also, or fist of all, 'dominate in name of cultural supremacy'[233]. Gül's sensitivity for the tendency of cultural reorientation in Turkey was probably helpful for his electoral victory in 2003 when he was elected Foreign Minister of Turkey. His appeal is his combining of Islamic faith and economic progress. Gül who becomes Turkey's President in 2007 is an educated economist and religious conservative. He stands for a cultural direction, an ideology that has received increasing support from the Turkish population.

[225] Charles Taylor. *Sources of the self: the making of the modern identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1992) 323.
[226] Davie, Sociology of religion, 53.
[227] Bhabha, Location of culture, 1.
[228] Bhabha, Location of culture, 2.
[229] Bhabha, Location of culture, 2.
[230] Bhabha, Location of culture, 13.
[231] Bhabha, Location of culture, 18.
[232] Bhabha, Location of culture, 35.
[233] Bhabha, Location of culture, 34.

The geo-political interest the author has in Turkey that hosts Muslim, Christian, religious and secular identities, emerges out of the divided nature of Turkey as a nation. Being secular by law identity in Turkey, particularly Islamic identity is a central topic. A debate on the political connotation of Muslim or religious identity is purposefully avoided because all too often it is based upon the essentializing of identities ignoring their social constructivist nature. An outcome of this analysis should be a debate amongst global theorists and foreign policy makers on the viability of the foreshadowed 'clashes' of civilizations and cultures. This chapter on identity could help in fostering an understanding of difference, detail and complexity in the individual's integration in a globalizing space. Moreover psychological theories are preferred to religious studies as the former centers around the individual in a non-specific, most general sense without having to make cultural speculations.

2.6.1. Limitations to and of Imagination

This section is concerned with outlining potential negative consequences of cultural flows for identity and cultural belonging in the global economy. Despite shared histories and historically shared meanings, the global cultural economy poses questions of belonging and self anew. Images randomly flutter across cultures, homes and borders representing alternative lifestyles, cultures and identities. Easily they can not only surprise but offend people's self-understanding and question their imagined permanent self [234] meant to be protecting pride and dignity. As a consequence affronts against particular identity are taken seriously as if it were a matter of life or death. More female Turkish-descent immigrants wear headscarves today than they did when they first arrived in Germany in the 1960s. Yet it would be foolish to reason that this is only a reaction to the perception of not being respected in one's particularity. On the contrary drawing on the concept of hybridity it can now be understood as a particular way of merging female and religious with Turkish-German identity. The 'new veiling by the Islamist women alters the social implications of the headscarf'[235] argues Ilyasoglu. The identity portrayed by wearing the veil today should not be equated with the traditional meaning of the headscarf as something rural, backwards and of low social status. At the same time public changes of gender roles and the economic embrace for female assertiveness and individuality is not

[234] Appadurai, Difference in the global economy.
[235] Ilyasoglu, Islamist women in Turkey, 245.

carried inside the private homes. The tesettür or the new veiling acts as a symbolic divide between the public and the private and permits the women to integrate into the public without having to sacrifice private imaginations of their identities.

Identity is social constructivism of complex and negotiated 'cultural hybridities'[236] so that it is an individual, personal process. Everybody wants to have a say in how 'one should live', thus claiming moral and ethical prescriptions for the new space of the global cultural economy. As can be derived from the ongoing discussion and analysis, aligning one's self with the global economy is a personal engagement through the process of self-reflexivity. That is solutions to the right way of life are increasingly found on an individual level. Accordingly the global economy must be characterized by ideological messages and cultural meanings attributed to it and inscribed within its practices. Yet is everybody equally free to assert a certain identity?

The answer would have to be no. There is a class phenomenon of 'culturally-hybrid' [237] identity. As Bauman argues global identities are inevitably a class phenomenon as they are exclusive to the 'elite sphere'[238]. It is undoubtedly the case that for those with money and familial status a whole array of options surfaces. The rich can relocate to a place closer to their imagination. Additionally they have easier access to the local political elites so their potential for directly influencing reality is higher. They can also resort to a transnational elite class with global connections enabling one to live in-between worlds with an in-between identity. One can be a hybrid identity in case one has the financial possibilities and social support for it. Studying in New York, socializing in Dubai and marrying a covered Muslim woman from Kayseri, President Gül's son perfectly represents such elite identity[239]. The class privilege for identity is also refuge for one's hybrid identity that is so different to the ordinary socio-political and cultural realities. It postulates a sort of meta-space that satisfies ideals of lifestyles whilst it protects the unusual demands of such an identity. It is obvious that compared to a factory worker an entrepreneur or the President's son has significantly higher potential to express and realize his or her imagination of identity. But the cultural, economic and political landscapes are first of

[236] Bhabha, Location of culture, 2.
[237] Bauman, Globalization and the human, 100.
[238] Bauman, Globalization and the human, 100.
[239] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.

all immaterial stimulations for reflexivity and differentiation. Products, ideas, news and images reach also the factory worker stirring up his or her understanding of self and reality. The commencing process of self-reflexivity is real for all, except that for many it will remain a dream to reconfigure one's identity in light of revised aspects of self. The case study on Arabian television will demonstrate how everyone has at least the opportunity to *think* one's self across classes and socio-political realities.

Another limitation to the freedom of imagining a self anew is the fear of instability of selfhood. It means that the process of self-reflexivity is cut short due to the feared ambiguity and loss of certainty the postmodern, global world embodies. Mamdani argues that once globalization is perceived as eroding locality and culture it is perceived as destructive force whereby unique identities are washed into a stream of standardization and de-individuation fused into a global network of consumption[240]. The fear of losing one's distinctiveness makes the availability of the other and his ideas intimidating, not liberating. In this case the individual seeks refuge in the promises of stability by religious rules. In order to maintain one's 'dignity and pride'[241], religiosity receives greater recognition for it interprets the purpose of life and identity *for* the individual, usually by discrediting new, alternative sources for identity formation. Considering Regina Polak, a scholar of pastoral theory, the power of traditional sources of self like religion is appealing to many[242]. She is convinced like so many other religious scholars that technological and economic changes alone do not suffice to master the global challenges. Only a 'spiritual or religious rootedness'[243] provides the necessary strength and persistence for a stable, future orientation. In fact throughout human history 'religion [played] a crucial role in man's search for meaning and self-esteem'[244]. Due to its 'integrative function in the complex ego structure [of self]'[245], it may release identity from the discomforting postmodern ambiguity and coexisting, competing meaning structures, however at the expense of asserting a new, self-reflected identity.

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[240] Mahmood Mamdani. *Guter Moslem, böser Moslem: Amerika und die Wurzeln des Terrors* (Hamburg: Nautilus Verlag 2004).
[241] Juergensmeyer, Terror in the mind of God, 82.
[242] Regina Polak. Spiritualität und Religion as Megatrend? in: *Religion und Entwicklung: Wechselwirkungen in Staat und Gesellschaft*, eds. Gerald Faschingeder and Clemens Six (Wien: Mandelbaum Verlag 2007).
[243] Polak, Spiritualität und Religion, 249.
[244] Antoon Geels. The Function of the Koran and the Psychology of Religion, in: *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 7* (4) (1997) 237.
[245] Geels, The Koran and Psychology, 237.

The 'totalitarian extension of the logic [of global financial markets] on all aspects of life' [246] disintegrates worldviews in the light of relativizing forces of sources of production, ideas, meaning and identity causing emotions to run high. The role of imagination performs a liberating, synthesizing role, yet not without limitations. Blurring boundaries, disturbing people's self-understanding as well as relativizing cultural standards is offering opportunities and represents risks at the same time. This will be laid out in the following case study.

2.6.2. Case Study Two: The Production of Ideologies of Identities

This second case study on Arabian television will substantiate the role of imagination and the aspect of fluidity in the construction of ideologies of identities in the global cultural economy. The amalgamation of images and information about the other, the stranger, is opening up new spaces for self-image. The other and his alternative worldviews are no longer marked-off by territorial gates, but seize new territory and minds from within; constantly and permanently. The siege of flowing ideas and plangent knowledge cannot be halted by ordinary means as no army is large enough for guarding against the permeability of fiber-optic cables, digital news and virtual space. The other as the stranger representing alternatives and viciously questioning one's eternality and stability of self has already occupied the lands and minds of all. No one can abscond from this new reality of relativizing one's existential philosophy of meaning by the media and its various images of selves.

'The introduction of satellite television in the Middle East in the early 1990s'[247] has brought alternatives for identities into the majority of homes whereby 'the number of satellite channels has tripled since 2004, and, today, the majority of households in the region have satellite TV'[248]. 'The top ten channels, which reach an estimated 90 percent of Arab homes [facilitate] the creation of new forums [that are] cross-regional

[246] Bauman, Globalization and the human, 66.
[247] 'Dishing Democracy'. *Wide Angle*. Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). By Bregtje van der Haak. 2007. [Available online: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/previous_seasons/shows/cairo/index.html#videoplayer] accessed May 13, 2008.
[248] 'Dishing Democracy'. *Wide Angle*. PBS

[and establish] a virtual on-air community'[249]. Returning to Appadurai's landscape model the case study exemplifies the mutual influencing of media- and ideoscapes. That is because the production and broadcasting of new imaginations of female selves for instance fosters or undermines current ideologies and identities. Mediascapes have ideological valence because they encourage thinking a new self and provoke the 'old' ideology of values and self. Together they can cause the disjunctures and differences Appadurai holds as characteristic of the global cultural economy[250].

The Wide Angle production called 'Dishing democracy' [251] that aired in 2007 demonstrates the way how self-image is targeted by media images. The Arabian talk show, Kalam Nawaem or 'The sweet talk' [252] discusses taboo topics such as homosexuality and infidelity confronting Muslim women's and men's cultural self-understanding. The documentary is structured in five parts: 'Kalam Nawaem', 'A media revolution', 'Raniah and Farah', 'Breaking Taboos', and 'Muna and Fawzia'. It is over 51 minutes long and depicts the transformation of the Arab world by a single media show[253]. The show is looking at social issues from a woman's perspective, yet has a large proportion of male viewers as well. The hosts of the show come from four different countries; Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Palestine and Egypt. One of the four TV hosts has been living in England and her identity hosts aspects of English and Lebanese culture. All four have come to establish a new Muslim female identity for themselves, one that harmonizes having a career and being a devout Muslim, which is causing other women to rethink their identities. The TV host Farah, originally from Palestine, has never left the 'East' but has come to establish a self that contradicts traditional norms and benefits from the mediascapes as a platform to confirm her identity as well as to communicate a new possibility to others. The program runs weekly on Sunday evenings and is 60 minutes long. It airs since 2002 with about 300 million Arabic speaking viewers from Europe, America, Africa, and the Arab world. Ideas of womanhood and identity are translated into the Arab context with the satellite television as a means for its coming to life. One of the hosts states that the

[249] 'Dishing Democracy'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[250] Appadurai, Modernity.
[251] 'Dishing Democracy'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[252] 'Dishing Democracy'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[253] 'Dishing Democracy'. *Wide Angle.* PBS.

'program [is] for the mass, not the elite'[254], which due to its trans-territorial reach bypasses 'control and censorship by the governments'[255]. Satellite TV is a truly independent, transnational media form that instigates public discourse on identity, religion and culture.

Unlike the Arab world that considers itself 'traditional, moral, and ethical [due to its] common value system [that is] resistant to change'[256], mediascapes and ideoscapes challenge any acclaimed eternity and permanence of values, ideas and identities. The female hosts discuss 'what does it mean to be a Muslim' and a woman, for example[257]. Now it seems there are several ways to be a Muslim woman, some of which combine modernity and tradition. The new presented variety of Muslim female identity is an enunciation space for women. The TV show explores a whole spectrum of Muslim identity and sets new examples for family, fatherhood and womanhood. Only one of the four TV hosts wears the veil and her opinion on the discussed taboo topics is especially interesting for the more conservative viewers. But her progressive, 'non-traditional' stance signals that the veiling of the modern Muslim woman can only be interpreted by the woman herself.

To sum up, for capitalism as cultural system the media landscapes are an important dimension because social conception of local reality is increasingly deterritorial and sometimes virtual as in the case of the trans-Arabic TV show.

2.7. Chapter Summary

This chapter has revealed that the 'shapes of cultures are less bounded'[258] and subject to changes that are conventionally labeled 'postmodern'. The section on identity construction demonstrates how ideology is intractably bound up with identity re-construction in the environment of random, volatile and diverse cultural flows. These flows are theorized by Appadurai as landscapes that shape identity formation, yet in rather personal, intimate ways[259]. As a result TV shows like Kalam Nawaem

[254] 'Dishing Democracy'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[255] 'Dishing Democracy'. *Wide Angle.* PBS.
[256] 'Dishing Democracy'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[257] 'Dishing Democracy'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[258] Appadurai, Modernity, 45.
[259] Appadurai, Modernity.

produce new, hybrid identities that can be expected to create new, non-Western paths to cultural and economic integration into the world-system.

The author has referred to psychological theories of cognitive dissonance in order to capture the arising internal contradictions and strategies for managing identity and constructing realities in the global economy. Psychological theories and postmodern concepts of identity were referenced in order to offer a scaffolding of identity in temporality and spatiality of globalization. It was derived that cultural aspects of techno-, ideo-, and mediascapes are leading to identity reformulations and self-reflexivity. Once identity is imagined and newly thought it comes to be affirmed through processes at work as suggested by the first case study. With new ideas, economic opportunities and changing self-concepts former identities become questioned. The same process of self-reflexivity has various outcomes across space as globalization as a fluctuation of networks that are economic, historical, cultural and political means there is 'something very different taking place in many parts of the world'[260]. Economic globalization is a 'social transformation'[261] that necessitates a broader framework than the narrow economic outlook taken by most political economists and economic sociologists. Our knowledge and conception of identity must be revised in order to understand its fluidity seeking constant re-affirmation. The process of reaffirming a self can be via religious means. Yet in any way does it come to be reflected in how one approaches work. This turns work into a central site for identity where especially in the context of the global economy, alternative identities and ideologies challenge one's self persistently.

[260] Davie, Sociology of religion, 105.
[261] Albrow, Global age, 4.

3.1. Disorientation as a Global Sentiment

Global capitalism is confrontational and radical by nature producing social and cultural unforeseen negative consequences. The transformed capitalism has alienated man from work as a meaning structure and his own identity. Historically the concept of self-interest was an ethically restricted motivation for economic behavior. So far a global value system is absent and money on its own does not provide a sufficiently meaningful structure because it follows a narrow self-logic of economic rationality. The reason for the persistence of the current amoral system and its continuous clashes abroad are due to its meaning for identity for the economically dominating West. 'Western rationalism preserves the boundaries of the sense for itself'[262], which explains how the concept of secular rationality has become identity for the West. It further illuminates why it is so vehemently defended abroad. Yet a sense of self based upon secular rationality do not shelter a nation or region from the intruding 'landscapes'[263] of globalization that shake foundations of knowledge just to reclaim truth as something that is plural. How the second case study demonstrated satellite TV reaches the majority of homes challenging the dominant structures and aspects of a culture. Bauman puts the very nature of globalization in a nutshell when he says that 'globalization is not about what we all […] wish or hope *to do* - It is about *what is happening to us all*'[264]. Those effects impact on locality and cultural identity causing 'the growing experience of weakness, indeed of impotence, of the habitual, taken-for-granted ordering agencies' [265] like the nation-state. The forces of globalization are self-perpetuating, anarchic and uncontrolled causing feelings of disorientation.

The radical global capitalism functions now according to self-logic that is foreign to the social, cultural and ethical imbeddedness of economics. The limitation to economics by a moral sense safeguarding human dignity evaporates in thin air. Money cannot replace meaning and morale because it has never been a 'place of pride'[266] since ancient human history. The generalization of a crisis instigated by global capitalism ubiquitously appears to stem from the failure of turning money into

[262] Bhabha, Location of culture, 71.
[263] Appadurai, Modernity, 45.
[264] Bauman, Globalization and the human, 69.
[265] Bauman, Globalization and the human, 60.
[266] Bauman, Globalization and the human, 60.

a global value system. The grand, Eurocentric 'narrative of modernity and the values of progress'[267] must be reconsidered and removed from its 'narcissm of modernity'[268]. The modern concept of rationality has become a 'cultural condition for the West'[269] and explains social, economic, and political phenomena invariably. This 'synchronic essentialism'[270] is a chronic condition for the West. But due to the ambiguity of modernity, there is an unleashing struggle over value reorientation. The looming disorientation is a global sentiment with existential depth. The 'contest for political and social authority within the modern world order'[271] leads to the recent resurgence of conservative religious ideals in officially secular places like Turkey.

3.2. The Ethical Nature of Self-interest as Limit to the Free Market

Obviously 'the moral leadership of the secular state'[272] and the assumption of a single epistemological framework with universal validity is questionable and to be abandoned. The concept of ethics is taken synonymous with morality whereas both are concerned with the proper way of conduct of man in a certain context. Due to the real interdependence of cultural factors and the economic realm the shortcomings of the global economy today are as it seems, direct outcomes of its own misconception as universal, amoral functionality of human behavior. For it lacks 'clear ideological or moral standards'[273] and is culturally dogmatic, it tends to 'sacralize' money and materialistic self-interest. The direct confrontations of identities and their ideologies in 'economic and cultural globalization'[274] have become instrumentalized by terrorist groups like al Qaeda as 'a tacit support for their terrorist acts'[275]. Although the role of terrorism will not be evaluated here, it serves as example of the violence and hatred a perceived threat to one's self can create. The assumed cultural superiority by the West is overcome by the increasing resistances and shortcomings of the Western-dominated world-system. Since Western modernity no longer corresponds to higher

[267] Bhabha, Location of culture, 173.
[268] Albrow, Global age, 2.
[269] Albrow, Global age, 17.
[270] Bhabha, Location of culture, 71.
[271] Bhabha, Location of culture, 171.
[272] Juergensmeyer, Terror in the mind of God, 229.
[273] Juergensmeyer, Terror in the mind of God, 229.
[274] Juergensmeyer, Terror in the mind of God, 225.
[275] Juergensmeyer, Terror in the mind of God, 225.

standards of civility, values and morals, there is a 'loss of faith in the ideological form of that culture and its socio-cultural project of secular nationalism'[276]. 'Greed in the service of reason was to be the driving force of the economy'[277] and is a particular characteristic of the moral inadequacy of European materialist expansionism. European modernity moved from an ethical orientation of self-interest to becoming an egocentric, materialistic motivation that meets repulsion from inside and outside Europe. Secularization and privatization have produced neo-liberal ideals that are perceived as image of crisis instead of as a symbol of success and progress. The legitimization of unrestrained self-interest and the rationalization of faith have resulted in social shortcomings that have called for the reorientation to an 'ethical and practical'[278] foundation for the economy.

Bourdieu, the famous French sociologist, views the social dimension of economics merely as an economic metaphor that overarches the social framework whereby economic interests expand to non-economic goods like culture and gender roles[279]. He comes to the conclusion that the economic and social realm then is quintessentially the same. For him the 'struggle over material and symbolic resources'[280] are all based upon the very same motivation; namely self-interest. Undoubtedly self-interest can be seen as the central motivation for human agency, but it is argued here that it is an ethical category. For capitalism in-itself lacks 'clear ideological or moral standards'[281] it is therefore by nature contingent upon a sense-making structure outside of it, which is an ethical understanding of self-interest. Economic globalization entails the 'distancing of economics from ethics that has occurred with the development of modern economics'[282] states Amartya Sen, an economist and philosopher who was awarded the Nobel Prize of economics in 1998. If one is to conceptualize self-interest as an ethical concept for motivating economic behavior, then the economic is a social sphere where economic interests are side by side with non-economic motivations. Hence, on these grounds Bourdieu's statement must be rejected.

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[276] Juergensmeyer, Terror in the mind of God, 231.
[277] Tripp, Islam and the moral economy, 105.
[278] Tripp, Islam and the moral economy, 104.
[279] Hugh B. Urban. Sacred capital: Pierre Bourdieu and the study of religion, in: *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 15* (2003).
[280] Urban, Sacred capital and Bourdieu, 362.
[281] Juergensmeyer, Terror in the mind of God, 229.
[282] Sen, On ethics and economics, 28.

Since the 1960s 'non-religious ethics'[283] have been systematically investigated. In the West ethics has come to be seen as standing 'at odds with self-interest'[284], which has been depicted in the historical outline of capitalism. The philosopher of ethics Peter Singer states that 'the same assumption of the conflict between ethics and self-interest lies at the root of much modern economics'[285]. He states that an ethical life can be defined as '[identifying] ourselves with the other, and larger goals, thereby giving meaning to our lives'[286]. In other words one's pure dedication to profit maximization misses to describe man's natural tendency seeking something beyond himself and above immediate reality. The reductionist interpretation of self-interest in economics is implausible because it is exclusively 'materialist'[287]. It says that an entrepreneur is led by 'greed […] and has no sense of the common good'[288]. As the radical type of capitalism in the West is 'without serious rivals anywhere in the world'[289], it promotes an ethically degenerated attitude to money-making. It can be concluded that it is not a 'characteristic mentality associated with the market'[290], but that the market produces a certain mentality. Albeit this mentality is heavily contested and alternative mentalities coexist. For the Islamic world the radicalization and rationalization of self-interest according to purely materialist measures, poses direct threat to integrity, cultural autonomy and self. The social domain is hence not to be satisfied by economic means only. Neither can economic rules provide satisfactory results for matters on culture, identity and meaning. The author does not agree with Bourdieu on conflating economic and social domains in regard to their foundation in self-interest. Instead it is argued that Bourdieu defined self-interest essentially as a non-ethical concept and functionalized it conflating value and function similar to Max Weber. However a functional account is not automatically a valuable one. And self-interest as an ethical notion is valuable it restrains the anarchic market forces. Another famous thinker of self-interest is Adam Smith who is usually mistaken as the inventor of the free market paradigm based upon the invisible hand and functional self-interest. Then we would have to revise our current perception of the free market

[283] Peter Singer. *How are we to live? Ethics in an age of self-interest* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), 17.
[284] Singer, Ethics and self-interest, 21.
[285] Singer, Ethics and self-interest, 22.
[286] Singer, Ethics and self-interest, 24.
[287] Singer, Ethics and self-interest, 26.
[288] Singer, Ethics and self-interest, 32.
[289] Singer, Ethics and self-interest, 76.
[290] Muller, Mind and market, xi.

and recognize the contingency of self-interest on the moral sense Smith called sympathy[291]. Sympathy as a capacity to feel what someone else is feeling without reference to one's self underlies all human relations, also the economic ones[292]. This would mean that given the moral capacity of sympathy the free market is constrained by one's sympathy for the other. The market does not work by following one's own desires only, but by acknowledging the other's dignity and identity. The self and the moral sense are bound up with the economy. Smith unlike Mandeville in his Fable of the Bees did not agree that '[only] fools strive to make a great honest hive'[293], but that virtues and wisdom are more respectable than wealth and power.

[291] Smith, Theory of moral sentiments.
[292] Smith, Theory of moral sentiments.
[293] Mandeville, Fable of the bees, 254.

4.1. What is Cultural About the Economy?

> *'It is not our human nature that is universal, but our capacity to create cultural realities, and then to act in terms of them'*[294]

After having established the relationship between economic theory, ethics and identity it is concluded that man seeks to synthesize a meaning structure that is cultural. Culture was used as a broad term covering identity, religion, and tradition to make sense of subjective experiences and to meaningfully interpret them. The case study on Turkey has shown how religion and identity as cultural factors of economics come to play a role for the way business is conducted and legitimized, namely along Islamic ethics. The second case study on the Arab TV show exemplified the role self-image plays for the cultural system of capitalism as shaper of the ideologies of identities. Albeit the social dimensions of the structural inequalities of the global economy are mentioned occasionally, the focus is put on the cultural factors that are concerned with the subjectivities of experiences in economic globalization.

At this point Turkey's geopolitical landscape is analyzed in order to examine the political instrumentalization of identity for Turkey's economic integration into the world-system. Turkey is an extremely interesting socio-cultural region as it is geographically connecting Orient and Occident. For some general facts about Turkey please view Appendix two. Politically Turkey is secular by law and has no state religion. Yet the country is quite religious where 99.8 percent of the Turkish population is Muslim believing in Allah[295]. In 2001 30.4 percent 'agree strongly [that] people who don't believe in God are unfit for public office'[296] contradicting somewhat the country's official position towards religion. In the same year, 33.5 percent 'totally agree that it is better if people with strong religious belief are in public office'[297].

It is said that since the 1970s an Islamic rise has taken place in Turkey dividing the country over its secular, Kemalist historical foundation. For the first time in history

[294] Mintz in Immanuel Wallerstein. Culture as the ideological battleground of the modern world-system, in: *Theory, Culture & Society 7* (31) (1990) 31.
[295] *Central Intelligence Agency.* The world fact book on Turkey. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html, accessed June 10, 2008.
[296] WVS, World values survey on Turkey.
[297] WVS, World values survey on Turkey.

Turkey's business elite is situating itself somewhat in-between the Islamic AK Party and the secular, nationalist parties. Identity is definitely an issue for the business elite for which the 'pluralistic, secular community'[298] is not Turkish enough. Karaduman from Tekbir is one such entrepreneur who idealizes cultural traditionality and imagines Turkish identity to be Islamic emphasizing brotherhood and community over the alienating and individuating forces of global capitalism[299]. Certainly religion and identity play a significant role for Turkish capitalism. As an overarching moral structure Islamic economics allows for prayers during work and legitimizes material accumulation by subordinating economic profits to serving religious principles like financing the building of a mosque. Also on the political level the ideology of Turkish identity increasingly blends 'Islamic values'[300] with capitalism. Economics must hence cease to be seen as being imperatively secular and renounce its exclusively materialistic notion of self-interest. Cultural identity and economic reality condition each other whereby culture is part of economic agency and capitalism is a cultural system of economics. Furthermore the re-capitulation of the nature of economics as something cultural sheds new light on recent religious revival movements in the world. It improves our understanding of those movements as something potentially constructive when it is seeking alternatives for combining faith and wealth.

In order to understand the centrality of identity in the global economy one must look at money[301]. This is so because making money requires active participation in the global economy by which one is establishing a unique identity against another as 'human social forms are […] characterized by drawing boundaries'[302]. On the course of making money an entrepreneur must decide why he is in the business and how he is managing it, in short what his motivations and underlying principles are. An entrepreneur communicates a perspective and an identity when working with a variety of cultures that leads to enhanced self-awareness and self-reflexivity. Different identities and meaning structures underlie and support entrepreneurial activity so that the identity of the Turkish economy must differ from that of Germany,

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[298] Bassam Tibi. *Islamischer Fundamentalismus, moderne Wissenschaft und Technologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag 1992) 219.
[299] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[300] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[301] Ayse Öncü. The myth of the ideal home travels across cultural borders to Istanbul, in: *Space, Culture and power: New identities in globalizing cities,* eds. Ayse Öncü and Petra Weyland (New Jersey: Zed Books 1997).
[302] Komlosy, Global village als optische Täuschung, 180.

for example. Material accumulation and the ambition for wealth have been historically dependent on moral justification indicating that the economic sphere in general implies moral structures. Morality is a human capacity as Adam Smith would say and the outcome of interpreting man's relation with the outside world. As such it is an integral part of culture. The analysis of the case studies and the literature supports the hypothesis that capitalism is a cultural system that necessitates a moral meaning structure, which is influenced by the transmission of images and discourses about alternative values and identities. This necessity does not arise from an ideology of social capitalism, but is due to a natural need of human beings to give meaning to their actions.

4.2. The Moral Nature of Economics

Economic theories have become deprived of moral perspectives and ethical restraints to making profit. Furthermore neo-liberal theory or radical global capitalism simply degenerated into a self-serving, dogmatic functional account with an internal logic and universal embrace. Completely cut off from the socio-cultural domain it cannot explain the global resistances refuting its detrimental socio-cultural effects. Boulding views the problem with neo-liberalism in that it regards economics as a universal set of rules for which morals and ethics have no value[303]. He defines morals as a 'question of a hierarchy of preference between alternatives'[304], thus an ordering instrument that patterns actions according to their intrinsic worth for the individual's place in life, in other words its identity. It is concluded that identity is the result of one's moral justification of self-interest and a central component of economics.

The way an entrepreneur comes to view his mission in business is also a moral decision, a preference for certain actions over others. He might prefer employing skilled female workers over hiring males from abroad because he views it more ethically correct to employ nationals, for example. But because economics and morals today are seen as in opposition, there is no model thus far that can

[303] Kenneth, E. Boulding. Ökonomie als eine Moralwissenschaft, in: *Seminar: Poltische Ökonomie: Zur Kritik der herrschenden Nationalökonomie,* ed. Winfried Vogt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch 1973).
[304] Boulding, Ökonomie als Moralwissenschaft, 103.

adequately describe and evaluate the various normative and moral elements in business[305]. As the economy is about 'two life goods: the pursuit of happiness and benevolence'[306], it has very different meaning for different people. The nature of economics is thus about interpreting happiness and benevolence according to one's culture. Thus it can come to have religious aspects. In conclusion, economic decisions are not only based upon utility maximization, but on one's 'personality structure'[307] and preference for certain values and identities.

4.3. Turkey's Islamic Orientation: Identities Contested

> *'The only way to accede to modernity is by our own path, that which has been traced for us by our religion, our history and our civilization'*[308]

There is a rising importance of identity in economic globalization because when economic power reflects cultural perspectives and ideologies, then the way in which identity is incorporated into economic agency has the potential to shift societal and political structures. The theoretical shortcomings of modern economic theory have politicized the global economy where different ideologies and cultural identities strive to 'cannibalize one another'[309]. They have instigated a political discourse on the nature of Turkish identity and Turkey's 'right' way of integrating into the global economy in order to reflect its cultural power. This section will describe the cultural imagination of Turkish identity by the political parties.

'Externally similar forms of economic organization are compatible with very different economic ethics'[310] states Weber. This similarly implies that 'morality of one type of society is not appropriate to a society of a different type [as] there are no moral ideals which can claim universal validity'[311]. In order to enhance the understanding of the specificity of Turkish identity and Turkish morals, it is important to examine Turkey's political economy to comprehend the relationship between political leadership, Islamic orientation and economic evolution. In combination with religious

[305] Boulding, Ökonomie als Moralwissenschaft.
[306] Taylor, Sources of the self, 323.
[307] Boulding, Ökonomie als Moralwissenschaft, 119.
[308] Rached Gannouchi in Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, 13.
[309] Appadurai, Modernity, 43.
[310] Giddens, Capitalism & modern social theory, 169.
[311] Giddens, Capitalism & modern social theory, 220.

manifestations of identities, Turkish politics tries to influence the meaning structure relevant for the economic outlook of the country. Political interpretation of Turkish identity is meant to define the path for Turkey's integration into the world-system. What is the official Turkish reaction to the influx of foreign products, production patterns, images and ideologies? How do political parties resolve the balance between economic integration and socio-cultural differentiation? When taking a closer look at Turkish politics one can see how it comes to act as normative and moral leadership for the economy.

Öncü argues the 'Islamization' of places like Turkey is 'to prepare for the other world'[312] that makes universalistic claims about the foundations of the economy in terms of the nature of rationality and self-interest. As we know Weber's cultural sensitivity towards the plurality of economic systems based upon different cultures fell short of adjusting his terminology of rationality to other cultures. Rationality in Turkish culture is bound up with the religious dedication to a 'higher purpose'[313] for the economy. The other world is the dominant West that is accused of moralizing its materialist notion of economic principles wishing to homogenize economic cultures. The perceived threat of indifference to cultural particularity and identity makes the discourse on identity and the establishment of unique cultural economic identity central to the political and economic sphere. The Turkish President of 2007 Abdullah Gül who was raised in the religiously-conservative region of Kayseri, is convinced that Turkey just like the United States is able to advance economically whilst remaining religiously-devoted[314]. How are economic changes within the country influenced by politics of identity?

The military defeat of 1683 in Vienna, had led the Ottoman Empire to look at the West and adopt its military and administrative organization. In the 1920s the Republic's founder Kemal Atatürk carried them further when he abolished the old Islamic institutions like 'the caliphate to the Islamic courts'[315]. He also refused to make Islam Turkey's state religion in 1928 so that at least constitutionally Turkey's worldview was not religiously framed. Instead he modeled the Turkish state along

[312] Öncü, The myth of the ideal home, 153.
[313] Juergensmeyer, Terror in the mind of God, 24.
[314] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.
[315] Soner Cagaptay. Secularism and foreign policy in Turkey, in: *Policy Focus 67* (2007) 7.

European, especially French institutions like the military and the educational system. As early as 1950 Turkey's major party, the Kemalist Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP)[316] was defeated by the Democrat Party. A military coup in the 1960s however dissolved the Democrat Party (AP) due to bad leadership, which had led to economic stagnation and democratic deficits. Since the 1960s Turkish identity is increasingly religiously-cast turning towards a 'stronger Turkish identification with Islam'[317]. The MNP, the Milli Nizam Partisi, or National Order Party is an Islamic opposition and the 'first political representation of political Islam in Turkey'[318]. After being outlawed by the state and after the second military coup of 1971, the MSP, Milli Selamat Partisi or National Salvation Party is established as successor of the MNP and becomes the third biggest party in the parliament by 1973. The period of the 1970s marks the Islamic uprising in Turkey. The MSP's strength lies in its presentation of an economic alternative to the import-substitution strategy (ISI) that has been a state promoted development program since the 1960s. ISI as a strategy for industrialization restricts the amount of imports in order to stimulate local industries for exports and national consumption. ISI had become especially unpopular with the rural population that had no direct benefits from the urbanization of the country and its city-centered export zones. But even for the urban local centers ISI in the context of the international work division generally fails to deliver the desired outcomes for industrial development. In fact the local industrial zone is generally subordinated to the world-system's core's economic agenda and its necessity for off-shore mass production facilities requiring cheap, unskilled and abundant labor that is holding local industries back from sophisticating and upgrading their production range.

Central to the uneven economic modernization in the course of ISI was the TOBB, a chamber for commercial matters that originated in 1952 with the initial goal to represent the interests of the private sector as well as broader society[319]. Yet it excluded the Anatolian manufacturers from critical decision-making processes about the socio-cultural and economic structural changes of the industrialization program.

[316] Thomas Patrick Carroll. Turkey's Justice and Development Party: a model for democratic Islam', in: *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 6* (6-7) (2004).
[317] Cagaptay, Secularism and Turkey, vii.
[318] Ilker Atac. Kampf um Hegemonie: Zur Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei in den 1970er Jahren, in: *Religion und Entwicklung: Wechselwirkungen in Staat und Gesellschaft*, eds. Gerald Faschingeder and Clemens Six (Wien: Mandelbaum Verlag 2007) 147.
[319] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei.

The influence of the TOBB dramatically increased with the first five year plan, a state-led economic structural program in 1963. From 1962 until 1976 the Turkish economy expanded by 6.6 percent yearly[320]. At that time the TOBB served more and more the interests of the private-sector industries and overlooked the small farmers. It distributed import quotas in the favor of the industry and took a unilateral stance as economic decision-making power within Turkey neglecting the agricultural and trade segments, which were the traditional and historical pillars of the Turkish economy. Hence it was the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) situated in Turkey's rural regions like Anatolia that feel disadvantaged and overlooked by the ISI program. They perceived the state's industrialization program favoring the cosmopolitan industries from Istanbul and Izmir at the expense of the traditional craftsmanship of the periphery[321]. With the economic transformation, traditional agricultural sectors declined or became superfluous. Similarly impetuous societal changes occurred due to labor migration, urbanization and the new division of labor tailored to the industrialization of the economy. Society reconfigured along a 'corporate system'[322] that represented the various interest groups of the new economy and diffused traditional Turkish identity that used to be based on the nation's agricultural sector.

With industrialization Turkey becomes a nodal point of the global economy opening up new opportunities as well as challenges to traditional identity and the rural economy. Until the late 1960s the SMEs have practically 'no influence on the […] industrial politics of their country'[323]. It is in the early 1970s when those previously neglected traders and craftsmen find political representation in the MSP[324]. Under Necmettin Erbakan, the political leading figure of the conservative MSP, the corporate structures of the TOBB are dissolved and the unheard voices from Anatolia and other Turkish peripheries become politicized. The MSP suggests an alternative path of economic development that is less focused on the global market, and more attuned to the reallocation of resources and profits within Turkey preserving Turkish identity.

[320] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei.
[321] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei.
[322] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei, 148.
[323] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei, 153.
[324] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei.

The MSP's interpretation of economic globalization says that 'the world [is] within the framework of the cultural and economic imperialism of the West'[325]. Due to the economic value and perceived responsibility to defend traditional identity, the party promotes instead a 'third way' [326] to enable 'independent' [327] and *Turkish* industrialization. The party's goal is to find an alternative way to economic integration whilst preserving and differentiating Turkish identity. The third way is an intriguing blend of Turkish values with economic global principles. By depicting the West as a system in decay reflected in the privatization of public services, increasing income disparity and urban poverty political rhetoric functions to alienate the Turkish population from the world-system and to discourage imitation of Western values and principles. As alternative and safeguard from moral vacuity and loss of identity, Islam is presented as the *third* way allowing modernization of the economy whilst maintaining traditional, cultural values. The logic of the MSP in the 1970s is to consider a return to Islamic values a necessary companion of Turkish economic modernization. Atac reasons that by drawing onto religion as a factor for establishing a modern, just society based upon a healthy economy the MSP is able to 'instrumentalize religion as a unifying element […]'[328]. By brand-marking economic globalization as a cultural hegemonic project, the party is able to mobilize people to strengthen the Islamic face of Turkish cultural identity that appears as the clearest and possibly strongest delineation from Western economic culture. In this sense, Turkey's cultural integration into the world economy becomes pivotal for political ideology.

However the MSP's opposition to the radical left in a coalition government of the 1970s causes societal fragmentation and anarchy which is counteracted by another military coup in 1980[329]. After the coup Turgut Özal, leader of the conservative Motherland Party (ANAP) is first Prime Minister[330]. Inspired by American Mormons, he and his brother envision material wealth to be supported by a 'strong religious faith'[331]. Also Erbakan launches a new party after the military had banned all the previous ones. His Welfare Party, Refah Partisi, at first is rather unsuccessful and

[325] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei. 157.
[326] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei, 157.
[327] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei, 157.
[328] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei, 162.
[329] Carroll, Turkey's Justice and Development Party.
[330] Carroll, Turkey's Justice and Development Party.
[331] Carroll, Turkey's Justice and Development Party.

until 1987 unable to enter parliament. But finally the party wins 17 percent of the national vote in 1991. Only four years later in 1995 the party wins 158 out of 500 parliamentary seats [332] and Erbakan becomes Prime Minister in a coalition government. Erbakan suggests a re-orientation to the 'Islamic and Ottoman empire'[333], a time when the region had enjoyed cultural and economic dominance over the West until its defeat in Vienna. New to this politicization of history is the emphasis upon a moral framework that is to accompany the indigenous industrialization project[334]. Importantly the Welfare Party prioritizes religious over national identity and takes over much of the political territory formerly occupied by the secular Turkish left. Erbakan's 'Islamic-led government of 1997'[335] is annulled by the military and fragments the Islamic movement of the time. A fraction of the Welfare Party comes to form the AK Party discussed subsequently.

Generally the moralizing of politics that seeks to leverage on the cultural aspect of economics keeps resurfacing in Turkey to this day whereby the Islamic parties clash with the other, 'secular, Kemalist, and nationalist parties'[336]. This is apparent in the present-day political landscape of Turkey. The oldest political party is the Republican's People's Party (CHP) which has close ties to the army and state bureaucracy receiving 20.88 percent in the 2007 elections. The CHP and the Nationalist Movement Party, MHP, led by Devlet Bahceli form the opposition to the AKP. The CHP is a 'platform that combines vicious hostility to Turkey's Kurdish minority [and supports] an invasion of northern Iraq by the Turkish army'[337] next to promising 'social improvements'[338]. All other political parties fail to pass the 10 percent threshold to enter parliament, so that the AKP, the CHP and the MHP can be considered the main Turkish parties today. Nonetheless '27 independent candidates take up seats in the new parliament [whereby 24 come from the] pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP)'[339].

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[332] Carroll, Turkey's Justice and Development Party.
[333] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei, 158.
[334] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei.
[335] Soli Özel. 'Turkey's transformation', Project Syndicate: An association of newspapers around the world: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ozel3, accessed February 20 2008.
[336] Niall Mulholland. *AKP wins Turkey's election clash, in:* The Socialist Party Magazine (112) (October 2007) [accessed online: http://www.socialismtoday.org/112/turkey.html, July 10, 2008].
[337] Stefan Steinberg. *Washington, EU welcome AKP victory in Turkish elections*. World Socialist Website. July 25, 2007. http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/jul2007/turk-j25.shtml, accessed July 10, 2008.
[338] Steinberg, World Socialist Website.
[339] Steinberg, World Socialist Website.

Finally this glimpse at Turkey's political economy clarfiifes that the attitude of the Turkish farmers and small entrepreneurs from the periphery is intelligible not as anti-globalist per se, but as reaction to the 'complex, overlapping, disjunctive […]'[340] forces a global economic model implies where social practices, ideologies, cultural identities and economic opportunities are intermixed in a chaotic fashion[341]. It can be said that economics is a form of negotiation between sites of agency, individuals, and globally defined fields of possibility'[342].

4.3.1. Turkeys' New Face of Islam

A 'modernist faction of younger Islamist activists, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gül' [343] surfaces with yet another particularity of the Turkish political economy in the early 21st century. The two leaders favor economic integration with the world-system over 'international Muslim solidarity'[344]. They come to form their own party, the AKP, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or Islamic Justice and Development Party in 2002. The AKP, a 'religion-based movement' [345] instrumentalizes this kaleidoscope of intersections and reflections of identity and economic modernization. It also frames the global economy as a Western hegemonic project but does not disapprove of cooperating with the West as long as Turkey has established a strong and culturally unique sense of self to prevent a further 'Westernization' of Turkey'[346].

Erdogan represents a new face of Islam that is congruent with secular state structures whilst being publicly religious. He interprets secularism in a novel way that harmonizes public religiosity like wearing the veil, banning alcohol from municipal buildings and reciting religious poems with his serious dedication to political and economic liberalism. His ideology of liberalism Erdogan calls 'American-style laiklik'[347] which encourages public expression of religious beliefs. Currently wearing the headscarf at University is prohibited by Turkish law, a democratic deficit and

[340] Appadurai, Modernity, 32.
[341] Appadurai, Modernity.
[342] Appadurai, Difference in global economy.
[343] Carroll, Turkey's Justice and Development Party.
[344] Carroll, Turkey's Justice and Development Party.
[345] Cagaptay, Secularism and Turkey, vii.
[346] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei, 156.
[347] Carroll, Turkey's Justice and Development Party.

'illiberal repression of Islam'[348] for Erdogan. He rather sends his daughters to University in America, where they are free to wear the headscarf. Despite his religious conservatism, Erdogan has an economically progressive outlook. It is in a sense ironical that in modern Turkey it is the Islamists who pursue avidly the modernization of the country and introduce 'Western-style reforms'[349]. This development however becomes more comprehensible in face of the 'basic deficiency' Turks experienced by the 'top-down, cultural restructuring'[350] Kemalism imposed onto Turkey since the 1920s. In 1925 Atatürk imposed the 'Hat law'[351] that forbid the 'traditional turban or fez'[352] introducing Western style clothing for 'appropriate' public appearance. The force with which Atatürk conducted his reforms for a new, 'modern' Turkish identity had caused resistance towards the 'total and slavish imitation of a model […]'[353]. Most important of all is that the desired establishment of a new Turkish identity and the attempt to leave the Ottoman past behind by imitating the West was backfiring because the Western model is ultimately one that emphasizes Western identity and cultural values reflected in its economic culture. It becomes much clearer now why a party like the AKP represents both, unique Turkish economic culture *and* integration into the world-system that is appealing to the Turkish population. In the end a Turkish nation that is secure of its identity is less fearful to approach the other world, which explains why the AKP aims at Turkey's economic integration into the world-system.

Returning to the initial question of this chapter then, political parties resolve the balance between economic integration and cultural differentiation through the Islamization that is the politicization of Turkish identities. As a study by TESEV, a Turkish NGO shows there has been a rise of 10 percent of Turks identifying as Muslims since 2002[354]. This increase comes with the rise in political power of the Islam-oriented AKP of the same year. As the Washington Institute for Near East Policy states Turkish secularism is at stake[355]. Even the influential Istanbul business

[348] Carroll, Turkey's Justice and Development Party.
[349] Carroll, Turkey's Justice and Development Party.
[350] Ozay Mehmet. Islamic identity and development: Studies of the Islamic periphery (London: Routledge 1990) 5.
[351] Mehmet, Islamic identity and development, 117.
[352] Mehmet, Islamic identity and development, 117.
[353] Adivar in Mehmet, Islamic identity and development, 119.
[354] Cagaptay, Secularism and Turkey, vii.
[355] Cagaptay, Secularism and Turkey.

community 'now favors a low-profile attitude towards the AKP'[356]. The business community is benefiting from the religious conservative revival in Turkey because the AKP is maintaining a pro-Western, 'pro-big business record'[357] and applies neo-liberal policies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Economics Minister Ali Babacan from 'Turkey's largest business organization declares [that] the message of FDI is that I have confidence in the future of this country'[358]. At present the AKP has 'integrated its Islamist movement into the political mainstream'[359] and represents Turkey's 'new elite'[360]. The APK is 'religiously conservative but economically liberal'[361] and combines wealth accumulation and value conservatism in a unique way. Turkey's economic and social transformation is liable to an 'unprecedented amalgam of Islam, capitalism, and secular liberal democracy'[362]. The appeal for many Turks is the fusion of an envisioned return to Ottoman 'religiously-framed educational institutions and media [to] form a faithful and moral individual […]'[363] that is economically successful and conscious of its cultural roots. Turkey under the AKP promises political stability the Turks have been seeking being traumatized by the numerous military coups. The AKP is probably as successful because it is responsive to the desire of the Turks to fuse their imaginary of Turkish identity with economic development and political stability. The party appears to democratize the country by allowing it 'being religious in public'[364]. It should be noted that the AKP has not held all its promises so far. Its aggressive privatization policies have indeed broadened the Turkish middle class, but also increased poverty and unemployment for the rural population and the urban poor.

Finally Turkey as nodal point of the economic worldwide web applies its own logic and its own meaning structures to the world-system. For Islamic identities within Turkey are affirmations of identity as well as moral critique on the contemporary world-system. They are closely monitored by Turkey's external partners like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States (U.S.) and Europe[365]

[356] Cagaptay, Secularism and Turkey, viii/ix.
[357] Mulholland, The Socialist Party Magazine.
[358] Steinberg, World Socialist Website.
[359] Özel, Turkey's transformation.
[360] Özel, Turkey's transformation.
[361] Özel, Turkey's transformation.
[362] Özel, Turkey's transformation.
[363] Atac, Entstehung des politischen Islam in der Türkei, 158.
[364] Mulholland, The Socialist Party Magazine.
[365] Feroz Ahmad. *The making of modern Turkey* (London: Routledge 1993).

for whom Turkey is a strategic location giving access to the Middle East and the Asian continent. Additionally Turkey is 'NATO's second largest armed force'[366] and its political stability thus critical for NATO. It is seen as a model for a secular, Muslim nation and for that of particular interest to the U.S. and its policies for the broader Middle East. From a European perspective Turkey's application for full membership of the European Union challenges Europe's self-understanding as a geographical, culturally-homogeneous unit. Recent developments in Turkey's political economy are therefore closely monitored. However, NATO, the U.S. and Europe have welcomed Erdogan's political success despite his pro-Islamic stance because the AKP is Islamic *and* pro-Western. It is 'less nationalistic'[367] than the other parties and thus a more stable political ally for Europe, the United States and NATO due to its parliamentary stronghold. Economically the external powers view in the single-party government that needs 'less than the two-third majority of seats to make constitutional changes'[368] an ideal condition for foreign investments and economic alliances.

4.4. Chapter Summary

This chapter was concerned with the cultural aspects of the Turkish economy and the centrality of identity for the political orientation towards Turkey's economic modernization. It has answered how economic change instigates questions of identity and culture that are carried out on the political level also. In Turkey this process has led to a resurfacing of conservative religious values. The significance of political parties to capture the need for an ideology, a point of view that projects values onto the socio-cultural changes of economic development was described in relation to historical and economic major events in Turkey. A modern economy is here combined with arguably new religious Turkish identities and values. The AK Party is presenting the viability of a compromise, a third way. This third way enables religious re-orientation for a unique Turkish identity and economic structural changes for the sake of advancing the country economically that in turn provides 'stability against the shocks from outside'[369] the citizens seek. Due to the hegemony the world-system

[366] Mulholland, The Socialist Party Magazine.
[367] Mulholland, The Socialist Party Magazine.
[368] Steinberg, World Socialist Website.
[369] 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. PBS.

represents economic agents are more than ever important carriers of cultural identity and hence integral to political leaders and strategies.

5.1. The Double-edged Sword

Talking in moral terms, one could say that globalization is both, good and evil, a double-edged sword that frightens and attracts, embraces and alienates us alike. Economic globalization means a simultaneous disintegration and novel reformation of previously remote identities and activities. At the core of the economic globalization debate are the differing perceptions of its effects on local cultures. Already in the 19th century Justus Möser was convinced that market forces tend to cancel out cultural particularities[370]. In fact it seems to persist as one of the fiercest arguments until today that global business destroys local tradition and hence must be tamed. Additionally the negative social effects such as the widening gap between poor and rich, first and third world is morally unsustainable. The sociologist Anthony Giddens defines globalization as 'the intensification of world-wide *social* relations which link distant localities […]'[371]. Due to the differences in opportunities for alternative lives and identities and the plurality of truths in the world, 'it becomes increasingly difficult […] to re-forge social issues into effective collective action'[372]. Effectively the global economy is individuating formerly collective searches and manifestations of cultural identity and meaning making collective resistance more difficult. However as the case studies have shown, it is more and more individual or personal enunciations that threaten 'global' norms and resist standardization.

Every culture seeks to apply its own logic to the processes of globalization and reproduce knowledge that is similarly particular whilst making a claim to universality. For understanding global processes one can therefore hardly rely on a global norm. Economic theories should be revised in order to appreciate the difference and the moral aspects man seeks in being an agent in the world. He wishes to insert his 'native culture into capitalist narrative'[373]. When trying to understand the global relevance of the formation of a capitalist class in Turkey or the popularity of a satellite TV show in Egypt, one must combine psychological, ethical, social, cultural and economic theories to capture the multiple dimensions of globalization.

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[370] Muller, Mind and market.
[371] Ayse Öncü and Petra Weyland. *Space, Culture and power: New identities in globalizing cities* (New Jersey: Zed Books 1997) 3.
[372] Bauman, Globalization and the human, 69.
[373] Arif Dirlik. The postcolonial aura: third world criticism in the age of global capitalism, in: *Critical Inquiry 20* (2) (Winter 1994) 350.

5.2. Making Money is More Complicated

> *'Is there anyone in the world, Meletus, who believes in human activities, and not in human beings?*[374]

This thesis' intention was to embrace the socio-cultural dimension of economic globalization, which the author views of utmost importance for what is at stake when images, technology, people and capital transgress borders. The variety of life styles, the coexistence of scientific and religious truths sends troubling message of epistemological uncertainty and ambiguity. Only if we understand that it is ideologies of identities bound up with the integration and adaptation to the economic web of trade, technology and investments, we can foresee and interpret resistances and counter-ideologies. Expanding economic theory in order to theorize the social and cultural aspects would not only explain its cultural variability, but place the human consequences of globalization in the spotlight.

The creation of 'identities of difference' [375] is ultimately what is cultural about globalization. As we know by now identities are fictional without losing their reality and concreteness for people's lives. National identities are becoming less relevant. Hybrid, constructed identities are on the rise communicated by the media and the vast technological and economic changes that put ideas and ideologies in direct confrontation. A major impetus of this thesis is to sensitize the reader to the fact that capitalism is more than just a functional system that 'glamorizes avarice and admires profit'[376]. It is dependent upon an ethical system which bestows man's life and identity with meaning. Sen argues the market capitalism of today needs to be expanded in order to comprise values in response to the social injustices and unequal distribution of goods in the world[377]. It appears that the first real theorization of capitalism by Adam Smith has been considerably misinterpreted and adjusted to allow for the social polarizations taking place within the world-system today. In other words, we need a model for global justice. A significant step towards such a global model will be made by a new economic theory as suggested in this paper.

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[374] Socrates in Plato's 'Apology' in Albrow, Global age, 184.
[375] Bhabha, Location of culture, 3.
[376] Amartya Sen. *Ökonomie für den Menschen: Wege zu Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität in der Marktwirtschaft* (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag 2005) 317.
[377] Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen.

5.3. Recuperating the Moral Dimension of the Global Economy

The reductionist interpretation of self-interest in economics is implausible because it is exclusively 'materialist'[378]. It says that an entrepreneur is led by 'greed […] and has no sense of the common good'[379]. As the radical type of capitalism in the Western world is 'without serious rivals anywhere in the world'[380], it promotes a certain that is Western attitude to money-making that has left its ancient roots in Grecian thought and Protestant belief behind. Present-day capitalist culture reproduces Western identity because capitalism regards Komlosy is as a 'concept, a theory, a model and a narrative of transformation as well as a mode of operation oriented towards profit maximizing production derived from a European example and a European perspective'[381]. As a result the world market today produces a certain mentality because the more powerful a certain market culture is, the more likely it is to spread its mentality. Albeit as the thesis has shown the imposing force of Western mentality is heavily contested and alternative mentalities coexist. For the Islamic world this demystification of the world through the radicalization, and rationalization of self-interest according to purely materialist measures, poses direct threat to integrity, cultural autonomy and self. Western economic rules fail to provide meaning and identity for non-Western economies.

Economic theory is not only an actual transaction paradigm, but an ideology that functionalizes life. Money imposes a dualism on human life as it liberates from rigid traditions and societal dependencies, yet creates 'new, artificial, social constructs'[382]. It can be said that capitalism functions only because 'it depends, in reality, on an influential system of values and norms'[383]. Sen resumes that ethics in capitalism has been 'completely underestimated'[384]. 'The application of formal, economic models for the understanding of market mechanisms is [undoubtedly] part of the standard methods in economic theory, yet a double-edged sword'[385]. It was argued throughout

[378] Singer, Ethics and self-interest, 26.
[379] Singer, Ethics and self-interest, 32.
[380] Singer, Ethics and self-interest, 76.
[381] Andrea Komlosy. Historischer Kapitalismus oder endlose Kapitalakkumulation? Plädoyer für die Auseinandersetzung mit Andre Gunder Franks ‚Re-Orientierung im Weltsystem', in: *Sozial. Geschichte 2* (2006).
[382] Deutschmann, Verheißung des Reichtums, 23.
[383] Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen, 312.
[384] Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen, 312.
[385] Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen, 312.

the thesis that these models have over time separated themselves from the underlying relations and processes that make it work. Identities and ideologies of moral systems are central to economics as economic 'exchange relations' […] necessitate a solid, institutional fundament […] as well as a morale'[386]. 'Capitalism as a system of mere profit maximization based upon the private ownership of capital ignores many other factors that have contributed to the increase of production and income'[387]. The many 'non-profit oriented motives'[388] are tied to man's natural need for a self that 'takes interest in its own conduct'[389]. The process of self-reflexivity and imagination of identity in the economy is hence inseparable. It was shown in the outset that for the initiation of the 'early capitalist system'[390] it was more than material self-interest and selfishness that gave rise to industrialization in Western Europe. Religious principles and the specific reading of self-interest as moral refinement have bestowed the rationalization of life with a moral value and enabled the drastic socio-cultural changes. The author agrees with Sen's conclusion that capitalism being exclusively based upon self-interest for profit-maximization is 'a myth'[391]. The recipe for economic development is therefore to find a unique cultural nature of capitalism.

Bernard Williams criticizes the inability and failure of contemporary economic theory to reason the 'relations between a man's projects and his actions'[392]. When global capitalism that 'sees agents as no more than nodes in the causal network that is to be manipulated to produce [utilitarian] consequence, we have lost sight of the very idea of agency'[393]. This kind of economic theory takes a view from nowhere and is entirely useless for describing, interpreting and forecasting developments in the global economy. Williams notes that '[the agent] is identified with his actions as flowing from projects or attitudes which […] he takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is about'[394]. Furthermore he is convinced that 'it is absurd to demand of such a man […] that he should just step aside from his own project and decision and acknowledge the decision which utilitarian calculation requires'[395]. 'It is to

[386] Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen, 312/313.
[387] Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen, 316.
[388] Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen, 316.
[389] Paul DuGay. Which is the self in self-interest? in: *The Sociological Review* (2005) 395.
[390] Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen, 313.
[391] Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen, 316.
[392] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Bernard Williams.
[393] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Bernard Williams.
[394] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Bernard Williams.
[395] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Bernard Williams.

alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source of his action in his own convictions […] It is to make him into a channel between the input of everyone's projects, including his own, and an output of optimistic decision; but this is to neglect the extent to which *his* projects and *his* decisions have to be seen as the actions and decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes with which he is most closely identified [...] It is thus, in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity'[396]. Integrity has a moral value and is central to agency in economics. Attacks on integrity disturb one' self-image as discussed in the section on cognitive dissonance in chapter two.

Tying back to Wallerstein, capitalism has given a specific economic system a degree of sustainability that has not been there before. It commenced about four centuries ago and is based upon sheer endless accumulation of capital. But more critically today it is based upon a value framework that is amoral and driven by socio-economic disparities of social polarization, tariffs and poverty. The kind of capitalism today does in fact strive on the inequalities in the world that are its opportunities for widening the profit margin on sales. Western capitalism in a sense is without direction, bound by no higher goals than making more money. It has radicalized over time and abandoned former work ethics like self-discipline and hard work. Being rich as the ultimate goal is independent of how hard one works. In fact those that work the hardest, the mine workers and factory workers, receive the smallest pay. Rich become those that know how to take advantage of the system, how to materialize on the imperfect market situations, the peripheries and their powerlessness to bargain for just prices and fair remuneration. Today's capitalism requires that two thirds of the world is poor, hence exploitable. This is why for Braudel capitalism is the 'anti-market'[397] and bound to collapse for 'it is in crisis'[398]. The capitalization on the social and cultural inequalities will and already has caused non-tolerable consequences and set free resistant forces.

[396] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Bernard Williams.
[397] Wallerstein, World-systems, 18.
[398] Wallerstein, World-systems, 76.

5.4. Limitations and Strengths of Studying the Phenomenology of the Economy

The emphasis 'on the human will [and] human agency'[399] is what makes this thesis a humanist account. The author has taken the courage to reveal underlying, philosophical and phenomenological fissures of the radical capitalist system for which there are no quantitative 'hard' facts available. This could indeed be a weakness of the thesis, a compromise of its scientific appeal. Yet not necessarily, as the notion of truth has been considerably narrowed to experimental, empiricist processes since the 18th century. The separation of philosophy from the natural sciences has become to be weighted according to which one is best for enhancing knowledge. And knowledge came to be coded in numbers and 'hard' facts prioritizing physics, mathematics and other sciences over the Humanities. The author has purposefully chosen a hermeneutic approach because of the intrinsic value of observing and analyzing specific phenomena that are difficult to express in numbers yet extremely important and *real* for the global economy.

Also a field study and personal interviews with the two businessmen and their employees by the author herself could have provided additional information on the role of identity in the Turkish economy. Two reasons have led the author to refrain from a personal visit of Tekbir and Ipekyol in Istanbul this time. The most pressing one was the limited time frame available for writing the thesis that made a collection and analysis of additional data in the relatively short time unfeasible. However she can only encourage other researchers to incorporate personal interviews with the Turkish businessmen if they are interested in the field of identity and the global cultural economy. She herself plans such a visit in the future, possibly in the frame of a doctoral program.

The other reason for omitting an own empirical study of Tekbir and Ipekyol was the unlikelihood of retrieving more or extra information by interviewing Mr. Karaduman and Mr. Ayaydin by a personal visit. Rather it would be recommendable to interview other businessmen and their employees as well as political figures in order to derive a more conclusive picture of the political economy and the various imaginations and

[399] Wallerstein, World-systems, 5.

their respective degree of influence on Turkish identity. Here one would necessitate a translator to conduct the interviews and overcome the language barrier. A new case study on different companies would also reveal how representative this particular case study is.

Lastly one could criticize that the author takes a double stance whereby she on one hand challenges the universalist philosophical basis of classical economics, but on the other hand applies Western 'universal' concepts throughout her thesis. For instance when she stresses the importance of the individual over the collective, the socio-cultural over the economic and the ideals of freedom and democracy she is taking a universalizing perspective herself. She acknowledges to be undoubtedly bounded by her own cultural, linguistic, political identitarian space. Nonetheless this shortcoming is marginal considering the 'pragmatic universalist' methodology outlined in the beginning that legitimizes certain generalizations. The pragmatic use of some universal ideas enabled this exploratory and reflexive study in the first place. It is argued that what is universal about the concepts used is the idea of the natural relationship of culture, which includes ethics and identity, and economics. Especially the case study approach provided some 'convincing grounding evidence' [and is] appropriate in new topic areas'[400]. The author endeavored to apply a stringent logic throughout the paper in order to provide new insights. The interdisciplinary perspective taken was useful to 'focus on complex interactions'[401] between identity and ethics as part of culture and the economic sphere.

For future research the author suggests to continue to refine an integrative model of economics that accounts for the socio-cultural dimension. She also hopes to have inspired a new look on cultural identities to be less based on national, ethnic terms, but more on hybridity and fluidity. People that emphasize certain aspects of their identity, be it religious, sexual or otherwise, would be less segregated and dichotomized. By this holistic approach to viewing identity policy-making would be less inclined towards taking the rejection of an imitation of Western economic culture by non-Western economies as a confrontation, but as a natural, legitimate means to express their identity.

[400] Eisenhardt, Building theories, 532.
[401] Eisenhardt, Building theories, 532.

A future model could expand on the present thesis and center around 'collective possibilities'[402] rather than global discrepancies. Eventually the historical division between social and economic science must be annihilated. Appadurai's social model could be useful in establishing such a model for future policy-making and economic planning. Such outlook would produce fundamentally different research focuses and inspire more synthetic, integrated approaches to global issues. Preserving the complexity and multi-disciplinarity of economic globalization will provide more justice to the people affected by the capitalist world-system and improve the policies made by supra-national bodies such as the IMF, the World Bank (WB) and the World Economic Forum. Besides it will grant people inside and outside of the periphery humility and dignity they are to this day deprived of.

The thesis made apparent the relevance of the socio-cultural factors for economic development and growth and reasoned that the 'clash of fundamental values'[403] within the global economy is due to this intricate relationship. The integration of local economies and identities into the dominant economic system is implying a 'great uncertainty' and a 'great questioning about the structures of knowledge'[404]. Hence, moral reasoning about making money is critical for economic agency.

5.5 A Final Word on Self-interest

In this final section a remark on the concept of self-interest underlying economic theory will be made. The author's intention was to illustrate the historical contingency of ethically-framed self-interest for economic behavior. The author wishes to conclude this thesis by stating that due to the 'misconception'[405] about self-interest in 'sociological and economic discourse'[406] economic theory is particular and must not be applied universally. Thinking from the European perspective on self-interest about economic globalization ultimately fails to account for the variety of interpretations of self-interest that exists. A correct understanding of self-interest must conceive of the 'historical context and the cultural milieu'[407]. Until now however economists from the

[402] Wallerstein, World-systems, 90.
[403] Wallerstein, World-systems, 88.
[404] Wallerstein, World-systems, 90.
[405] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 391.
[406] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 391.
[407] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 391.

IMF, the WB and elsewhere work with the 'old' Western categorizations of human motivation being geared towards the 'rational maximization of one's own utility'[408]. What is needed and should be subject to future research is a new economic theory that deals with 'real man'[409]. Ultimately, a theory must emerge that allows for fluidity and adaptation of self-interest so it ceases to be normative and embraces the 'historical plurality of self-interested conducts'[410] that reach far into the present. The author was motivated to make the reader conscious of the limitations of 'neo-classical [global radical capitalism that] has accustomed us to the image of human beings as rational maximizers of their own self-interest'[411]. Instead it should be taken from reading this paper that self-interest is directed towards certain purposes, identities and ideologies that in turn serve a 'certain way of life'[412].

As a consequence it is dangerous to 'import particular doctrines of self-interest'[413] into the world and to pretend that self-interest is naturally material and about maximizing one's profit. It is bound to cause resistances and misreadings of the diversity of cultural interpretations of selves in the global economy. The thesis on the ideologies of identities in the global cultural economy is to be understood as capitalism critique that begins with the very foundation of how we think of our selves in the economy. What are individuals driven by and for what purpose? The answers are no longer discussed despite the fact that they are historically and culturally specific. How capitalism is understood and conceptualized today creates a certain personality structure and identity that is 'one-sided, predictable, rational and in some sense repressed personality'[414].

The thesis pointed out that self-interest as rational and utility-maximizing self is a historical shaping of personality during the 17th and 18th centuries. A functional understanding of the economy and man was seen to increase material prosperity and to lead to freedom and civility once the 'violent passions that had fuelled European wars of religion'[415] were tamed. Religious disenchantment and philosophical writings

[408] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 396.
[409] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 392.
[410] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 392.
[411] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 391.
[412] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 391.
[413] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 391.
[414] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 392.
[415] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 393.

on the nature of man at that time began to infuse meaning into the worldly successes. 'Predestination'[416] theory and rational self-interest that tamed the formerly passionate, will-less subject to be hard-working and self-disciplined came to establish self-interest as 'beneficial form of human conduct'[417]. At the same time the specific interpretation of rationally self-interested man was 'assumed ontological foundation'[418] from which even sociological theories extracted their basic rationale. However self-interest was never meant to explain all sorts of human behavior. And consequently Hobbes, Hume, and Smith had in mind that the sort of self-interest *they* envisioned necessitated other motivations and identities to coexist with. Because man is not restricting his self-interest by nature, Smith was theorizing an enlightened self-interest for economic development. Being rational about one's self-interest meant to limit personal desires and to account for the other's needs as well. For him and the other enlightenment thinkers 'the rational pursuit of utility, far from being universal, is a rare moral achievement'[419]. Self-interest as moral capacity means 'a strenuous process of moral self-disciplining [in order to] be in control of oneself and to control one's impulses'[420].Originally self-interest is hence a moral aspect of economics and 'the very antithesis of the celebration of unbridled egoism'[421].

The role of the self in economic theory and agency has been dealt with historically and then, in the second chapter, psychologically. Both those sections were pivotal to argue for an economic theory that includes the socio-cultural dimension of ideologies, identities and their meaningful relation to the outside world. We need an 'ethical and practical'[422] foundation for the economy that has a 'more complete conception of humanity'[423]. By consulting psychological theories and the cultural context of globalization the author derives a final, new definition of self. The self is 'a subjectivity that is historically cultivated to meet the purposes of a particular way of life'[424]. The reader should take home the idea that global, radical economics is not about how the world really is, but about a proposed 'cultural transformation'[425]. The rational-actor

[416] Singer, Ethics and self-interest, 77.
[417] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 394.
[418] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 395.
[419] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 396.
[420] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 399.
[421] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 397.
[422] Tripp, Islam and the moral economy, 104.
[423] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 408.
[424] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 397.
[425] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 400.

model' is a version of self-interest that is a 'politically and culturally superimposed mode of conducting civil life'[426]. It entails quests for power over ideologies of identities and their cultural self-understanding that is to be contested on two instances. First due to the cultural dogmatism it must be rejected. The normative, cultural power of *this* concept of self-interest has led to 'economic grievances that contribute to Muslim resentment of the global economic order [due to its] unmistakable cultural, and specifically religious, dimension'[427]. Second, it falls short of depicting human identity in a correct manner and must be revised to understand that 'each form of personhood has it own history […] and fashions its own ethos, and is directed by its own techniques to its own ends'[428]. The interdisciplinary perspective taken towards the subject of identity within economic theory has discovered a new self and the necessity for a new theorizing of economics to enhance understanding and policy-making. The discovery of self and the plurality of factors motivating economics lets us return to conceptualizing self-interest and self as comprising 'passion, emotion, desire, culture, spontaneity, morality and virtue'[429] all of which deserve a role when thinking about the global economy.

Meaning is to be recuperated in the ambiguity of the global economy by extending Appadurai's global landscapes theory to integrate techno- and financescapes with media- and ideoscapes. This would lead to thinking about the economy as something inseparable from the communication and imagination of ideologies of identities across borders. Whilst the theoretical separation makes sense to the extent that it facilitates the analysis of various processes of economic globalization it implies a structural separation that invites scholars to look at economics just from investigating techno- or financescapes without having to draw onto the enmeshed human, motivational and discursive aspects of identity and ideology.

Global business is more than a synchronization of globally dispersed production chains and a functionalization of culture for economic means. Instead it is a manifestation of a particular philosophy, an interpretation of the world that can come to impose identities onto newly ingested regions and their ethnic groups. For any

[426] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 406.
[427] Kuran Timur. The religious undercurrents of Muslim economic grievances. *The social science research council online*. http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kuran.htm, accessed May 13, 2008.
[428] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 407.
[429] DuGay, The self in self-interest, 408.

economic globalization scholar then finding out more about the reaction and resolution of the social and cultural within economic globalization is central to deepening the understanding of this complex process. For future reasoning and theorizing about the global economy, one must recover its moral dimension. Only then can we achieve an 'economy for the people'[430].

> *'[…] Wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking: for it is merely useful for the sake of something else'*[431]

[430] Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen.
[431] Aristotle in Sen, On ethics and economics, 3.

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
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Appendix 1: The thesis' hypothesis visually

Assumption: Human beings have the natural tendency to attribute meaning to their work; this meaning comes in form of cultural aspects of identity and moral principles of a higher purpose (those can be religious)

Hypothesis: Capitalism as an economic system is really a cultural system and should be theorized as such – economic theory should be interdisciplinary and comprise cultural factors of identity and ethics/morals that are context-dependent (that is adjusted to different cultural contexts).

Relationship of mutual contingency: ethics-work
Main critique: notion of self-interest changes over time



Ethics used to be a natural component of work until economic science split from social science and capitalist culture 'emancipated' itself from ethical/moral frameworks imposed onto it.

Goal: Return to an ethical conception of economics and capitalism as a socio-cultural economic system.

Appendix 2.

Table1: Selected facts on Turkey

Population	71,892,807 (July 2008 est.)
Religion	Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), other 0.2% (mostly Christians and Jews)
Ethnic groups	Turkish 80%, Kurdish 20% (estimated)
Languages	Turkish (official), Kurdish, Dimli (or Zaza), Azeri, Kabardian *note:* there is also a substantial Gagauz population in the European part of Turkey
Country name	*conventional long form:* Republic of Turkey *conventional short form:* Turkey *local long form:* Turkiye Cumhuriyeti *local short form:* Turkiye
Currency	Turkish lira (TRY); old Turkish lira (TRL) before 1 January 2005
GDP per capita	$12,900 (2007 est.)
GDP composition by economic sector	*agriculture:* 8.9% *industry:* 28.3% *services:* 62.8% (2007 est.)
Unemployment rate	9.9% plus underemployment of 4% (2007 est.)
Industries	textiles, food processing, autos, electronics, mining (coal, chromite, copper, boron), steel, petroleum, construction, lumber, paper
Agricultural products	tobacco, cotton, grain, olives, sugar beets, pulse, citrus; livestock
Export commodities	apparel, foodstuffs, textiles, metal manufactures, transport equipment

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency. *The world fact book on Turkey*. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html, accessed June 10, 2008.]

Appendix 3: Film makers' notes on Turkey's Tigers/case study one

Filmmaker Notes by Jon Alpert and Matthew O'Neill, PBS program 'Turkey'sTigers'.

Filmmakers Jon Alpert and Matthew O'Neill discuss the relationship between East and West, the challenges of shooting in Turkey, and what they learned about the Turks while filming the program.

WIDE ANGLE: In "Turkey's Tigers," we see a portrait of Islam not often depicted in American media. What do you hope American audiences will learn about modern Turkey from this film?

Jon Alpert and Matthew O'Neill: Too often we think of the so-called Islamic world as an impenetrable block of indistinguishable nations — painted with the attitude that "East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet." But in modern Turkey East and West are always meeting each other at all sorts of strange and surprising angles. Whether it's the high-fashion "Islamic" look you see on the catwalk in our documentary or the close political ties Turkey has to both the United States and Iran — modern Turkey is not easily classified.

Turkey is often described in the American media as a model of democracy and secularism in the Muslim world. In fact, the state keeps close tabs on religion, seeing it both as a threat and a potential social cement. All mosques are run by the government. Around 99 percent of Turks are Muslims (mostly Sunni with a substantial Alevi-Shiite minority), but the country's secular establishment, including the courts and the military, has sought for decades to restrict Islamic influence, which some political leaders view as an obstacle to Western-style modernization.

Under Turkish law, women are not allowed to attend schools and or work in public buildings wearing headscarves. Even wives of ministers are excluded from government functions and formal state dinners because they wear headscarves. The ruling Justice and Development Party, which has its roots in the Islamic movement and has dominated parliament and local government since elections in 2002, has made no secret of its desire to lift the ban on head scarves.

Both Islamic and secular leaders are using the rhetoric of freedom to push forward their ideas, with one side demanding religious freedom to wear headscarves in public places, and the secularists fighting local government efforts to restrict alcohol use.

The overriding question: Will Turkey stay in an eternal state of suspension, tense between secular Europe and the Islamic Middle East? Or will it eventually tilt definitively in one direction?

We think that in this film audiences will see that there is probably some third way for Turkey — somewhere in the “twain” zone where East and West are blending — especially in business.

Politically influential, pragmatic and devout — Turkey’s Muslim entrepreneurs offer many parallels to pious Christian businessmen in the United States — and there’s no simple way to categorize either group.

WIDE ANGLE: You’ve both spent your careers shooting documentaries internationally, from Cuba to China to Iraq. What are some of the particular challenges you faced while filming in Turkey?

Jon Alpert and Matthew O’Neill: According to Turkish law, no public employees can go on record with the media without permission from some place above in the bureaucracy — this can make setting up scenes at schools or any public buildings (or interviewing a street-sweeper) a somewhat Kafka-esque adventure.

It is also virtually impossible to get access to anyone in the Turkish military — and the military plays a substantial role in the Turkish state.

WIDE ANGLE: The film profiles businessmen at the heart of modern Anatolian Tiger economy. What is the role of women in the business realm of Turkish society?

Jon Alpert and Matthew O’Neill: In the board rooms of Istanbul women seemed to be fairly well represented — but their role in the booming businesses of Kayseri was almost non-existent. Though the Turkish economy is dominated by men, things did appear to be slowly changing — especially at the top of the socio-economic scale. A number of businessmen in Kayseri whose wives wore the headscarf and stayed at home, had daughters whom they hoped would get involved in business — whether

they wore or did not wear a headscarf did not seem to make a difference. In Istanbul where there was a more established secular tradition, women were much more likely to take an active and visible role in business.

WIDE ANGLE: Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul seems to embrace democratic freedoms, but critics accuse the AKP of quietly re-introducing an Islamic government to Turkey. How receptive was the Deputy Prime Minister to participating in the documentary and did you feel that he was an open subject?

Jon Alpert and Matthew O'Neill: We were extremely privileged to have a great degree of access to Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as he made room in his busy schedule for us to spend an extraordinary amount of time with him and his family. He had invited us to his country house at one point — and we were disappointed that his busy schedule shuttling (at the time) between Washington, Moscow and Tehran prevented that from happening. But generally he was open and warm with us. He is very proud of what he believes the AK Party stands for and has accomplished — and very proud of his native Kayseri.

[Source: 'Turkey's Tigers'. *Wide Angle*. Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). By Jon Alpert and Matthew O'Neill. August 22, 2006, available online: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/turkeys-tigers/jon-alpert-and-matthew-oneill/366/, accessed February 5, 2008.]

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- Composed a handbook of a conference on 'Religion and NGO's'
- Discussed conceptual questions of religious fundamentalism with experts and scholars from the conference

U.S. Consulate Leipzig- *Intern* Mar 07-Apr 07
- Developed, investigated and completed a research project on Germany's labour market in collaboration with the political/economic officer
- Gave an interview for the German press published in B.I.T. magazine 2007

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